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3        Chapter 1: Introduction 
Abstract 
Ensuring the safety of employees remains an elusive goal for many companies. 
The imperative to operate safely, efficiently and profitably can often create 
competing objectives for senior leaders and requires constant focus and commitment 
from every level of the organisation. Traditionally, the role of board members and 
senior executives has not been considered in the context of workplace safety beyond 
that of ensuring compliance with relevant safety legislation. The research in this 
paper draws upon leadership theory and corporate governance to explore the role of 
board members and senior executives in safety leadership and safety governance.  
Three criteria of safety leadership have been identified from existing safety 
leadership literature – vision, personal commitment, decision-making - with an 
additional fourth criterion of transparency developed based on alternative models of 
safety leadership. In a novel approach, these four criteria have been applied to 
written communications as well as examined against the views of board members 
and senior executives. Study 1 involved a longitudinal analysis over a ten-year time 
period of safety-related disclosures in annual reports and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reports of 76 large Australian listed companies. The findings 
from Study 1 have provided empirical evidence of the application of the four criteria 
of safety leadership to public disclosures of safety-related activities.  
Study 2 was an in-depth exploration of two Australian companies from within 
the Study 1 sample to provide a more detailed consideration of safety leadership. 
Findings from Study 2 confirmed that external safety-related disclosures reflect an 
internal focus on safety by senior leaders. Further, the findings from Study 2 
confirmed the applicability of the four criteria of safety leadership to the most senior 
leaders of an organisation – board members and senior executives. In a contribution 
to practice, safety governance has been defined and a framework developed for use 
by boards to assist with integrating safety leadership behaviours into board decision-
making processes around workplace safety, and to help guide senior leaders’ 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders on this key organisational issue. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The vast majority of workers in developed countries take it for granted that 
going to work on a daily basis will be an activity that does not compromise their 
personal safety (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002). However, despite 
considerable advances in personal safety measures over recent decades, throughout 
the world it is estimated that 2.3 million people die from work-related accidents or 
diseases each year (International Labour Office, 2011). In addition, 317 million 
workers are injured in accidents at work that result in absences of more than four 
days (International Labour Office, 2011). These statistics highlight not only the 
significant personal cost that workplace accidents have on individual workers and 
their families but also suggests that workplace safety can expose organisations to 
commercial, reputational and legal risks. On a practical level, a company’s safety 
record can affect its ability to win commercial tenders and contracts, might influence 
its ability to retain a government licence to operate, and may impact a company’s 
reputation (Prior, 2009).  
When considering statistics closer to home, despite considerable improvements 
in the safety of physical working environments in Australian companies over the past 
century, of the 12 million adults who worked at some point during 2009-2010, 5.3% 
experienced a work-related injury or illness (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010). 
Tragically, 289 workers in Australia also died as a result of their employment in a 12 
month period (Safe Work Australia, 2011) highlighting the importance that vigilance 
with regards to safety continues to play in Australian workplaces.  
Aside from the obvious human cost, there is compelling evidence that 
providing a healthy and safe working environment has the potential to increase 
labour productivity and company profits (Lamm, Massey, & Perry, 2007).  
Increasingly employers are striving to provide safer and healthier workplaces for 
their employees with the goal of achieving improved job satisfaction as well as 
stronger bottom line results (Boles, Pelletier, & Lynch, 2004; Brandt-Rauf, Burton, 
& McCunney, 2001). Due to the significant individual, regulatory and financial 
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impacts of workplace safety on companies, safety-focused research continues to offer 
opportunities to enhance the theoretical basis of the field and to expand the body of 
knowledge around how companies, and those who lead them, are best to respond to 
the safety challenge.  
All Australian companies are required under relevant workplace health and 
safety legislation to adhere to strict codes of compliance to ensure working 
conditions are safe for their employees. While some Australian companies may 
choose to adopt a purely compliance based approach to workplace safety, effective 
leadership by managers and supervisors within an organisation is recognised as 
playing a crucial role in the development of an organisation’s safety culture (Barling 
et al., 2002; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Hoffmeister et al., 2014; 
Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2009). As a result, senior leaders are increasingly 
seeking to manage safety in a way that not only ensures a safe work environment for 
their employees, but also reflects the company’s espoused safety values.  
Surprisingly, the role of board members and senior executives is often not 
considered in the literature when exploring how safety issues are led in an 
organisation, a situation that is increasingly being challenged by industry. After high 
profile workplace safety disasters, including the BP Texas City oil refinery fire (BP 
Baker Report, 2007) and the Pike Rive mine explosion (Panckhurst, 2012), the role 
of the board has been considered in detail. In addition, recent Australian workplace 
health and safety legislation (Work Health and Safety Act, 2011) places a direct onus 
on board members to demonstrate appropriate due diligence when considering the 
workplace safety arrangements within the organisations they govern. This research 
study will therefore focus on the intersection of three fields of knowledge – 
leadership theory, corporate governance and workplace safety – with a specific focus 
on the safety leadership and safety governance of board members and senior 
executives. 
Andriessen (1978) suggested that senior leaders in an organisation have the 
highest influence on workforce safety behaviour, even overriding the effects of the 
supervisor (O’Dea & Flin, 2001). Senior leaders determine policies, goals and 
priorities that influence indirectly the safety motivation of workers. There is also a 
direct relationship in that, even if a site supervisor is not focused on safety, workers 
will work more safely when senior leaders stress the importance of safety in 
16 Chapter 1: Introduction 
company policies (Lu & Yang, 2010; Shang, 2011). In order to be effective, senior 
leaders need to continuously demonstrate a visible commitment to safety, best 
indicated by the time they devote to safety matters (Flin & Yule, 2004).  Further, the 
behaviour of senior leaders will reflect the priority they place on safety, and 
employees can interpret these behaviours to create ideas and norms as signalling the 
importance of safety to their leaders (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).  
The leadership of senior managers is of paramount importance in improving 
safety performance (Bryden, 2002). While senior leaders, including board members 
and senior executives, are often located some distance away from an operational site 
or office environment, they can still demonstrate their commitment to safety by 
providing resources for safety, showing concern for employees, being clear and 
consistent in their support for safety, and displaying transformational leadership 
behaviours (Flin & Yule, 2004; p. ii48). Individuals in formal leadership roles, such 
as board members and senior executives, have a particularly strong potential to 
influence safety behaviours through being seen as role models for others (Cree & 
Kelloway, 1997). Each of the three fields of knowledge to be considered in this 
research study – leadership theory, corporate governance and workplace safety – will 
now be introduced.  
1.1.1 Leadership theory 
Leadership theory will be pivotal throughout this study and will focus 
primarily on transformational leadership theory (Bass, 1990) and the sub-theory of 
safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL) (Barling et al., 2002). 
Transformational leadership constructs have increasingly been applied to workplace 
safety in recent decades (Barling et al., 2002; Bryden, 2006; Hofmann & Morgeson, 
1999; Hofmann, Morgeson & Gerras, 2003; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; 
Kelloway & Barling, 2010; Kelloway, Mullin & Francis, 2006; Mullen, Kelloway & 
Teed, 2011; Zohar, 2002). The four dimensions of transformational leadership (Bass, 
1990) are viewed as having a natural connection with the qualities needed to enhance 
workplace safety (Barling et al., 2002; Inness et al., 2010). From the four dimensions 
of transformational leadership (Bass, 1990), the sub-theory model of SSTL (Barling 
et al., 2002) has emerged. This model shifts a leader’s style from that of control-
based compliance with safety practices (Barling & Hutchinson, 2000) to a leader 
developing and communicating a vision for a safe workplace that inspires employees 
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to participate in safety practices (Mullen et al., 2011).  There are a significant number 
of models proposing alternative leadership behaviours to promote effective safety 
leadership and while there is no clear agreement, the Barling et al. (2002) model of 
SSTL has received the most attention in existing literature (Clarke, 2013; De Koster, 
Stam & Balk, 2011; Kelloway & Barling, 2010; Mullen et al., 2011; Mullen & 
Kelloway, 2009).  
The four dimensions of transformational leadership – idealised influence, 
inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration – 
will each be considered in Chapter 2 to understand their application and relevance to 
the safety leadership of senior leaders. A model of safety leadership developed by 
Barling et al. (2002) will be analysed in detail as well as a systematic literature 
review of alternative models of safety leadership. From these analyses, three criteria 
of safety leadership – vision, personal commitment, decision-making – will be 
identified and adapted from existing theory. A fourth criterion of transparency will 
also be identified from alternative models of safety leadership and will be used 
throughout this research.  
Defining senior leaders 
Before commencing a consideration of safety leadership as it applies to the 
current research, it is timely to define the term ‘senior leaders’. Clarification is 
important because where an organisation may have a range of leadership levels, the 
researcher must first decide which level of leadership he or she is assessing 
(Petersen, 2005; Wu, 2008), particularly given there are significant differences 
between management levels within an organisation and their impact on safety 
outcomes (Clarke, 1999; Roger, Flin, Mearns & Hetherington, 2010).  The term 
‘leaders’ has been used ambiguously in the literature and it is often unclear which 
level of leadership is being assessed, (Flin & Yule, 2004; O’Dea & Flin, 2001). 
Roger et al. (2010, p. 1934) sought to define ‘senior leaders’ as the individuals 
who lead the organisation and work at a strategic level, acting as chief executives, 
directors and general managers. There have been few studies investigating the 
leadership influence of senior leaders on safety performance with most studies 
limited to middle manager or site supervisor level (Lu & Yang, 2010; Reid, Flin, & 
Mearns, 2008). In relation to empirical safety research, senior leaders have been 
called a “neglected species” (Flin & Yule, 2004, p. ii48). Yet given that board 
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members and senior executives are ultimately accountable for their organisation’s 
safety performance, with significant legal consequences in the aftermath of a safety 
incident, they are a group of senior leaders worthy of academic consideration. This is 
particularly the case in workplace safety where the higher an individual is within an 
organisational hierarchy, the greater their potential to influence organisational safety 
outcomes (Reason, 1997).  
This study will explore the safety leadership role of senior leaders with specific 
focus on board members and senior executives. Board members will include the 
Chairman and all non-executive directors. Senior executives will include the CEO 
and all executives reporting directly to the CEO. Before commencing a brief 
introduction to corporate governance, a further short clarification of terminology is 
necessary. Some boards have adopted the title of Chairwoman or Lady Chairman in 
the event of a woman holding the position. Other boards use the neutral title Chair so 
as to avoid indicating gender at all. The predominant title for this role used in large 
Australian companies remains that of Chairman regardless of whether a man or 
woman holds the position. As a result and for ease of reference, the role will be 
referred to as Chairman throughout this research study with the intent that the term 
be interpreted as genderless. A brief introduction to the field of corporate governance 
will now be provided. 
1.1.2 Corporate governance 
While the study of corporate governance has only received academic attention 
in earnest in recent decades, the practice of operating and governing corporations has 
been in existence for centuries. Corporate governance theory, in particular agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997) will be explored as part of this research study to understand the 
development of the role of a board. These theories also help to explain the 
relationship between board members and senior executives, and their focus on 
organisational issues such as safety, which will be considered during this research. 
The roles and responsibilities of the key players in corporate governance – the 
Chairman, board members, CEO and senior executives – will be considered in detail 
as well as the role of the collective board and board sub-committees.  
When considering the impact of leadership on workplace safety, the role of the 
board of directors is often ignored. Boards are the ultimate decision makers in an 
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organisation and while they do not have operational responsibilities, directors do 
have specific individual responsibilities to the company in deciding how the 
company is governed. A board of directors is responsible, amongst many other 
duties, for safeguarding the interests of shareholders, monitoring management and 
approving corporate strategy (Nicholson & Newton, 2010). In this way, boards are 
ultimately responsible for determining those issues that are of most importance for 
the organisation, and in turn determining what issues the CEO and senior executives 
focus their attention upon (Ocasio, 1997). These areas of focus are frequently 
communicated, in the case of a publically listed company, via annual reports and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports and therefore the use of these written 
communications will be an important area for investigation as they relate to 
disclosures of safety-related activities. 
Given there are no mandatory disclosure requirements for publically listed 
companies within Australia for workplace health and safety performance, a variety of 
approaches have been taken by those companies that choose to voluntarily disclose 
their safety-related activities and workplace safety performance. It has been argued 
that when companies disclose workplace health and safety performance results due to 
a commitment to their people and espoused values, rather than merely an obligation 
to comply with external legislation, safety culture is improved (Barling et al., 2002). 
The focus by senior leaders on workplace safety, and any corresponding decisions to 
make disclosures of safety-related activities in public documents, will be investigated 
throughout this study.  The third field of knowledge to form a foundation for this 
research project is workplace safety, which will now be considered briefly. 
1.1.3 Workplace safety 
Workplace safety is a broad discipline that touches on areas as diverse as 
leadership, culture, behaviours, risk controls (Montero, Araque, & Rey, 2009) and, in 
the case of the current research, corporate governance. Safety management has 
evolved considerably over the past century. Initially engineering solutions provided a 
physical barrier to assist in keeping employees safe (Hale & Hovden, 1998) however 
trade union pressure (Webb, 2009) and a recognition that there was a limit to the 
safety benefits of relying solely on engineering barriers (De Joy, 2005) saw further 
advances. By the mid-twentieth century, human factors research was used to assist in 
hiring individuals who demonstrated safe behaviours (Hale & Hovden, 1998), 
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combined with a significant increase in government safety regulations (Hakkinen, 
1995). By the 1980s, a number of high profile workplace disasters in advanced 
industries saw a critical examination of safety management (Guldenmund, 2000) and 
this review has led to modern companies establishing advanced safety management 
systems and focusing on the role of supervision and leadership in driving safety 
cultures. Yet despite this renewed focus, the role of the board in safety has only 
received limited attention (Smallman & John, 2001); a gap the current research will 
seek to address.  
Throughout this thesis, reference will be made to an organisation’s focus on 
workplace safety both internally and externally. An internal focus on safety is 
intended to refer to the internal policies, procedures, investigations, reporting, formal 
communication, training and other methods undertaken within the organisation to 
address safety issues. This internal focus on safety may or may not be communicated 
externally by an organisation. Therefore references to an external focus on safety are 
intended to investigate the extent to which an organisation may choose to 
communicate externally with stakeholders about their approach to managing safety 
outcomes. An external focus on safety by an organisation can be evidenced through 
annual report disclosures, CSR reporting, corporate websites, AGM presentations or 
other communication platforms with stakeholders. 
1.2 RESEARCH GAP 
There have been several calls for more academic research in the field of 
workplace safety (Barling et al., 2002; Brown, 1996; Das, Pagell, Behm, & Veltri, 
2008). This current research study will seek to address that call by considering safety 
leadership in the context of corporate governance. Workplace safety has been 
researched in several disciplines including organisational behaviour, behavioural 
operations and quality management (de Koster et al., 2011), however, not with a 
specific emphasis on the role of board members and senior executives with respect to 
safety leadership. The current research will therefore focus on the intersection of 
three areas of knowledge – leadership, corporate governance and workplace safety as 
shown in Figure 1 below.  
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                      Figure	  1	  -­‐	  Area	  of	  research	  focus	  
The research being undertaken will seek to extend existing safety leadership 
knowledge through the application of four criteria of safety leadership – vision, 
personal commitment, decision-making and transparency. These four criteria will be 
identified and defined based on three existing dimensions from transformational 
leadership theory (idealised influence, inspirational motivation and intellectual 
stimulation) as well as an additional criterion, transparency, identified after a 
detailed literature review of alternative models of safety leadership. In a novel 
approach, this research study will apply these four criteria to examine written 
disclosures of safety-related activities in large Australian companies as well to 
understand the applicability of safety leadership criteria to the views of board 
members and senior executives to safety.  
The current research responds to the need for additional work to be undertaken 
to further the theoretical development of the concept of safety leadership (Clarke, 
2013). Until now, SSTL has largely focused on the safety leadership behaviours of 
supervisors and middle managers (Lu & Yang, 2010; Reid et al., 2008) and whilst 
there is extensive literature analysing the role of safety leadership with followers in a 
firm (Conchie, Taylor & Charlton, 2011; Dunlap, 2011; Lu & Yang, 2010; Mullen et 
al., 2011; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Roger et al., 2010), there 
is a research gap in understanding the role of safety leadership exhibited by board 
members and senior executives. This is particularly the case with board members 
given there has been little to no research undertaken regarding the safety leadership 
or safety governance responsibilities of boards (Flin & Yule, 2004; Smallman & 
John, 2001). Given the important role that board members and senior executives play 
with respect to governing their organisations, and possible or potential consequences 
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for board members and senior executives when a serious safety incident occurs, this 
gap deserves academic attention. This research will hopefully also assist senior 
leaders to lead and govern their organisations in the area of workplace safety 
effectively in the future. 
This research will also respond to the call for future research to understand 
public disclosures in more depth. Kent and Zunker (2013) highlighted this limitation 
when stating that the quality of voluntary employee-related disclosures relied on: 
companies reporting negative information, particularly when it is clear that 
the company has negative information to report. This measure has 
limitations and in-depth interviews and case studies could address this issue 
in future research (Kent & Zunker, 2013; p. 1094). 
Limited evidence exists of employee-related disclosures by listed companies 
that are required to produce an annual report (Kent & Zunker, 2013). The research 
being undertaken will seek to address that gap through analysing the safety-related 
disclosures of 76 large Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed companies over a 
ten-year period at three different time periods. In total, 230 public documents will be 
analysed to form the basis of the findings. From a methodological perspective, by 
using a longitudinal study, changes in safety-related disclosures over time in large 
Australian companies can be identified; an area that has not previously been 
researched in relation to safety leadership.  Lu and Yang’s (2010) research into 
safety leadership called for further studies to adopt a longitudinal approach and the 
methodology will be important to understand the changing trends in safety-related 
disclosures over a period of ten years and how this knowledge may influence change 
in the future. There have been relatively limited studies of the safety reporting of 
Australian companies (O’Neill, 2010), and in most instances the research is focused 
primarily on a comparison of safety statistics to provide a benchmark or comparison 
across industries of actual results of statistical safety performance (Prior, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013; Safe Work Australia, 2010). Such an analysis can often fail to 
consider safety activities beyond raw numerical data.   
Lastly, the current research is expected to make a contribution to corporate 
governance through the development of an empirically based safety governance 
framework for boards. The framework will provide boards with practical 
recommendations for implementing safety governance in large organisations. Doing 
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so will help in the development of robust and meaningful safety governance 
measures, aligned with safety leadership criteria, against which boards may be able 
to assess their performance. The safety governance framework is expected to be 
valuable to industry as boards seek higher levels of safety performance within their 
organisations. Having identified the fields of knowledge to be considered by the 
current study, and the focus on the role of senior leaders, it is now relevant to 
consider the research questions that will address the identified gaps in the literature. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to address these gaps in existing literature, the following three research 
questions will be addressed in this study: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A qualitative approach has been taken to the research design and two distinct 
research phases will be completed. Study 1 will involve a documentary analysis of 
annual reports and CSR reports. At three time periods, five years apart, over ten 
years, the annual report and any available CSR report for the given time period will 
be analysed. Study 2 will involve in-depth case studies of two companies from the 
Study 1 sample. Three phases will be completed in Study 2 including analysis of 
additional public material, analysis of internal company material, and semi-structured 
interviews with board members and senior executives.  One of the strengths of this 
research design is in the combined approach of Study 1 and Study 2, which will 
provide access to a large number of converging pieces of evidence to triangulate the 
data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) in order to address the research questions.  
Given the subjective nature of public disclosures and the lack of mandatory 
reporting with respect to safety performance, it is expected that using a qualitative 
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design will address the research questions successfully since qualitative research 
acknowledges the contextual nature of inquiry (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p.7; Irvine 
& Gaffikin, 2006). Highlighting the increased use of qualitative methods in recent 
years, Frost & Shaw (2014; p. 1) observed that:  
Until recently qualitative methods were brought to mixed methods research 
simply as a means of triangulating data and findings. The contribution made 
by the qualitative component was often overlooked in the final presentation 
of mixed methods research and its findings… the last few years have seen 
great changes in this approach (Frost & Shaw, 204; p. 1).  
Whilst quantitative research has been claimed as being powerful in its reliance 
on the power of numbers (Irvine & Gaffikin, 2006), qualitative research allows a 
researcher to move behind measurement (Lincoln & Denzin, 2003) to “watching 
people in their own territory…interacting with them in their own language, on their 
own terms” (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.9). For the current research, particularly 
combining document analysis in Study 1 with case studies in Study 2, a qualitative 
approach to research design will provide a comprehensive methodology to address 
the research questions.  A qualitative approach will also allow themes to be identified 
that are not fully developed before research commences. Lastly, it is advantageous to 
investigate the phenomenon of safety leadership holistically and qualitative research 
allows such an approach to be taken through consideration of a wide range of 
varying pieces of evidence.   
1.5 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT 
In order to improve the standard of corporate responsibility for safety, it is 
necessary to raise the level of safety awareness of those who are in positions to give 
greater prominence to the place of safety on the corporate agenda (Flin & Yule, 
2004). As already outlined, findings from the research being undertaken is important 
in the context of the field of corporate governance, and will also build on existing 
understanding of safety leadership literature by exploring the applicability of four 
criteria of safety leadership. Existing theory will be extended by analysing the 
application of safety leadership criteria to written communications in the context of 
public disclosures of safety activities by large Australian companies. This research 
will also extend annual report and CSR report literature by focusing on employee-
related disclosures, specifically relating to safety, by providing analysis of the 
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changes in safety disclosures in annual reports and CSR reports in Australian 
companies over time.  In addition, knowledge of annual report disclosures will be 
enhanced through a greater understanding of the types of disclosures made in respect 
of safety-related activities and the focus more on tangible, structural information 
(such as statistical data, documents and systems) as compared to narrative 
information on culture and leadership.  
Through the use of case studies from industry sectors operating in traditionally 
high-hazard and low-hazard environments, this research will provide a deeper 
understanding of the degree of congruence between the levels of focus on safety an 
organisation demonstrates through public disclosures, with their level of internal 
focus. Interviews with senior leaders will also provide much greater knowledge of 
the extent to which safety leadership, and specifically the four safety leadership 
criteria, applies to the views of senior leaders. 
Lastly, findings of the current research will assist in the development of a 
safety governance framework that provides boards with specific guidance on how to 
ensure the four criteria of safety leadership are integrated into their decision-making 
processes and reporting regimes as well as help guide their relationships with internal 
and external stakeholders when addressing workplace safety. In addition, outcomes 
from the current research will provide practical guidance to organisations on how to 
best disclose safety-related activities in annual reports and CSR reports. The research 
being conducted will also provide guidance to potential investors, as well as other 
stakeholders, of large listed companies seeking to understand the approach taken to 
managing safety within an organisation. Currently the primary focus of investment 
houses and individual investors is on lag indicators of safety performance such as a 
company lost time injury frequency rates or fatality rates (Prior, 2009; 2010; 2011; 
2012; 2013). This research will extend that practice by looking at a broader range of 
leadership factors.  
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE  
The first chapter of this PhD thesis has been an introduction to the research 
problem and the gaps in the literature to be addressed by the research questions. 
Before providing an overview of the literature, it is helpful to consider how the 
remaining thesis will be structured. Five chapters will form the body of this research 
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as shown in Table 1. These chapters will include a review of the existing literature in 
each of the three fields of investigation, an outline of the research design, the results 
of Study 1, the results of Study 2 and a final chapter discussing the overall research 
findings.  Table	  1	  -­‐	  Chapter	  structure	  
Chapter Content 
2 Literature review 
3 Research design 
4 Study 1 results 
5 Study 2 results 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 will now introduce the three fields of literature in which the research 
outlined in this paper is focused - leadership theory, corporate governance and 
workplace safety. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 27 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a brief outline to the current research and this 
chapter will now provide an explanation of the relevant theories to be considered 
within the fields of leadership and corporate governance. Lastly this chapter will 
introduce the area of workplace safety to provide an operational context. When 
commencing a research project, it is necessary to ground the research study in a 
theoretical framework and to identify gaps in the existing literature warranting 
further examination. To identify gaps relevant to safety leadership and the role of the 
board, it will be necessary to consider existing literature in leadership and corporate 
governance whilst also considering the field of workplace safety. In order to ensure 
all relevant background literature is considered, this literature review will be broken 
into three sections to fully establish the theoretical basis for the research being 
undertaken.  The structure for the literature review is shown in Table 2 below and 
will be broken into three sections – leadership theory, corporate governance and 
workplace safety. Table	  2	  –	  Literature	  review	  structure	  
Section Content 
 
2.2 
 
Leadership theory 
-­‐ Transformational leadership 
-­‐ Safety leadership 
-­‐ Alternative models of safety leadership 
 
2.3 Corporate governance 
-­‐ Theoretical foundations to corporate 
governance 
-­‐ Key players 
-­‐ Public disclosures 
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2.4 Workplace safety 
-­‐ Defining safety governance 
-­‐ Evolution of safety management 
-­‐ Safety in the boardroom 
 
The first section of the literature review, leadership theory, will consider the 
theory of transformational leadership (Bass, 1985) and more particularly that of 
safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL) (Barling et al., 2002). The four 
existing dimensions of transformational leadership – idealised influence, 
inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration – 
will be analysed in detail to understand their theoretical basis. To gain a deep insight 
into the application of these four dimensions to workplace safety, a systematic 
review of SSTL and a range of alternative models of safety leadership will be 
undertaken. Focusing on existing models of safety leadership will provide a 
foundation from which the theory of safety leadership can be understood and four 
criteria of safety leadership developed and applied. The first section of the literature 
review will also highlight the gap in existing literature with respect to consideration 
of the role of senior leaders, particularly board members and senior executives, with 
respect to safety leadership.  
The second section of the literature review will introduce the theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance, including agency and stewardship theory. 
These theories will provide a basis for understanding the role of the board as it is 
currently perceived in Australia and help clarify the relationship between the board 
and senior executives. The key players in corporate governance will also be explored 
in detail including the Chairman, board members, CEO and senior executives in 
order to understand their individual responsibilities and the different perspectives 
from which each role will view the safety of employees. Lastly, this section of the 
literature review will review the current literature with respect to public disclosures 
by companies through annual reports and CSR reports. A critical aspect of the 
research being undertaken is exploring the application of safety leadership to written 
communications in the form of annual reports and CSR reports. Therefore it is 
important that an understanding be gained of the role such communications play in a 
corporate governance context as well as briefly consider common practice of such 
disclosures in industry. This section of the literature review will highlight the lack of 
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existing literature with respect to the disclosures of safety-related activities despite a 
growing interest from stakeholders.  
The third, and final, section of this literature review will conclude by 
establishing the context of the current research, which is workplace safety. It will be 
relevant to understand how safety management has evolved in the modern 
organisation in order to place the role of senior leaders in context. Given the gap in 
current literature addressing this important issue, a definition for safety governance 
will be developed. This section of the literature review will highlight the growing 
relevance of safety leadership in modern organisations and again consider the lack of 
literature in terms of the role of board members and senior leaders with respect to 
safety. The first of the three sections, and areas of focus for the current research, 
leadership theory, will commence the literature review. 
2.2 LEADERSHIP THEORY 
The topic of leadership has generated dozens of theoretical and empirical 
models over the past several decades (Babcock-Roberson & Strickland, 2010). 
Stogdill (1974, p. 259) stated, “There are almost as many definitions of leadership as 
there are persons who have attempted to define the concept”. A search of the 
ProQuest database on 16 July 2014 revealed more than 350,000 peer reviewed, 
scholarly journal articles which have been written on the subject of leadership. It is 
not surprising that there is such weighty consideration applied to the topic of 
leadership given the high expectations and demands placed on those at the most 
senior levels. Leaders of organisations are expected to understand the complexity of 
the world in which they operate, have the “intelligence, sensitivity, and ability to 
empathise with others” (Tseng, Tung, & Duan, 2010, p. 57) while also ensuring their 
businesses are run profitably, safely and meet the needs of all stakeholders.  
Given the high expectations on leaders at all levels, a number of theories have 
been proposed to suggest how leaders might best achieve their goals and influence 
other people. These have included different theories addressing leadership styles 
(Lindell & Rosenqvist, 1992), transformational leadership theory (Bass & Avolio, 
1994) and leader-member exchange theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The unifying 
feature of these theories is that they each suggest leadership behaviours, as well as 
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the implications those behaviours may have on followers and ultimately, leader 
performance (Tseng et al., 2010).  
For the purposes of the current research, transformational leadership will be the 
leadership theory focused upon since it is the theory that has been integral to the 
formation of a model of SSTL. It is also the theory that has been most readily applied 
to workplace safety providing a useful framework of existing literature to consider 
(Barling et al., 2002; Bryden, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2003; Hofmann & Morgeson, 
1999; Inness et al., 2010; Kelloway & Barling, 2010; Kelloway et al., 2006; Mullen 
et al., 2011; Yule, 2003; Zohar, 2002). Transformational leadership has received 
significantly more attention over the decades than other leadership theories, 
providing an excellent basis from which to understand the theory in detail. Before 
considering SSTL theory and alternative models of safety leadership that have been 
proposed, it is necessary to understand the parent theory of transformational 
leadership in some detail.  
2.2.1 Transformational leadership 
Although there are a wide range of leadership theories on the most effective 
leader behaviours, transformational leadership has been the most frequently 
supported leadership theory over the past two decades (Avolio, Walumbwa, & 
Weber, 2009; Guay, 2013, p. 55; Judge & Bono, 2000; Sosik & Jung, 2010) and the 
most widely accepted leadership paradigm (Harms & Crede, 2010; Rubin, Munz, & 
Bommer, 2005; Tejeda, 2001). Studies of transformational leadership have been 
conducted in the lab (Jung & Avolio, 1999) and in the field (Yammarino, Dubinsky, 
Comer, & Jolson, 1997). Leaders have been studied in a wide variety of 
organisational settings (Bass, 1998; Stone, Russell, & Patterson, 2004) including the 
military (Kane & Tremble, 2000), the education sector (Koh, Steers, & Terborg, 
1995) and in business environments (Howell & Avolio, 1993).  
While not directly given the term transformational leadership, the first 
reference to a concept reflecting what would become known as transformational 
leadership was by Burns (1978). In his book Leadership, Burns outlined the 
relationship between leaders and followers and suggested the role of leaders to be 
that of inspiring and motivating followers to achieve common goals (Burns, 1978). 
The concept was further developed by Bass (1985) who coined the term 
transformational leadership and many argued that the theory then gained further 
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traction in response to the leader-driven corporate cultures that emerged during the 
1980s and early 1990s (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1985). The central figure 
of the leader in those corporate cultures was paramount; and their vision, 
commitment, strong communication skills and impressive personality created an 
irresistible enthusiasm and willingness to obey amongst followers (Alvesson & 
Spicer, 2011, p. 15). In response to such a heavy focus on one individual, and in 
recognition of the negative side of charisma, a less heroic ideal of transformational 
leadership emerged which was defined by Bass (1985) as:  
Leadership that inspires employees to go beyond their self-interest and 
instead focuses on the norms, values, and goals of the organization to 
subsequently perform beyond expectations (cited in de Koster et al., 2011, p. 
756).  
Transformational leadership theory contends there are three styles of leadership 
- transactional, laissez-faire and transformational (Bass, 1985). These three styles can 
be measured using the 45-item Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire developed by 
Bass (1985). The MLQ has been used significantly in leadership studies since its 
development in the 1970s and “the vast majority of published empirical research on 
the topic has utilized the MLQ” (Hinkin & Schrieshein, 2008; p. 501).  Essentially 
the questionnaire allows respondents to rate the behaviour of their supervisor. The 
responses can then be measured against the four dimensions of transformational 
leadership, three dimensions of transactional leadership and a further dimension of 
laissez-faire leadership.  Before considering transformational leadership in more 
depth, the leadership styles of transactional leadership and laissez-faire leadership 
will be considered briefly. 
Transactional leadership conceptualises leadership as a transactional 
relationship between leader and follower (Flin & Yule, 2004).  In a transactional 
relationship, a leader may offer a number of incentives and/or punishments that are 
contingent on the subordinate’s performance meeting agreed standards, known as 
contingent reward (Bass & Avolio, 1994). Leaders using a transactional leadership 
style gain compliance from followers, set goals, agree on what needs to be 
accomplished, monitor performance and administer reinforcement accordingly (Flin 
& Yule, 2004). All leaders use a transactional leadership component in their daily 
interactions with followers; however Bass and Avolio (1994) argued that only 
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leaders of the highest performing teams display transformational behaviours in 
addition to transactional behaviours.  
The second style of leadership within the broader theory of transformational 
leadership is laissez-faire leadership. Passive, uninvolved forms of leadership are 
generally considered to be the most ineffective styles of leadership (Avolio, 1999; 
Bass, 1997; Hater & Bass, 1998) and effectively amount to an absence of leadership 
and disregard of supervisory responsibilities (Bradford & Lippitt, 1945). Laissez-
faire leadership has also been described as leader inaction, being unavailable when 
needed by employees, failure to clarify performance expectations, and avoidance of 
both decision-making and leadership responsibilities (Bass, 1990; Hater & Bass, 
1988; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Mullen et al., 2011). Both transactional and laissez-
faire leadership are empirically distinct from transformational leadership (Mullen et 
al., 2011). Given the importance of the theory of transformational leadership to the 
development of safety leadership, and the well established links between a 
transformational leadership style and safety (Barling et al., 2002; Clarke & Ward, 
2006; Hofmann et al., 2003; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009), the dimensions of 
transformational leadership will now be considered in more depth. 
In his seminal work, Bass (1990) introduced four key dimensions of 
transformational leadership - idealised influence, inspirational motivation, 
intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration. Each of these four 
dimensions has been studied at length in the literature and each forms an important 
component of this research study. Idealised influence (or charisma) is the degree to 
which the leader behaves in admirable ways that cause followers to identify with that 
leader. Leaders who manifest idealised influence display conviction, provide a vision 
and sense of mission, instil pride, appeal to followers on an emotional level and gain 
respect and trust (Bass, 1990; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). These leaders become role 
models who are admired, respected and emulated by followers (Avolio & Bass, 
2002; Bass, 1998; Bass & Avolio, 1994). The development of a shared vision is an 
integral component of the idealised, transformational leader’s role (Jung & Avolio, 
2000) as a vision helps followers visualise a futuristic state while aligning personal 
values and interests to the collective interests of the group’s purpose (Avolio & Bass, 
2002; Bass, 1990; Jung & Avolio, 2000).   
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The second dimension of transformational leadership, inspirational motivation 
is the degree to which the leader articulates a vision that is appealing and inspiring to 
followers; essentially “providing meaning and challenge to their follower’s work” 
(Avolio & Bass, 2002, p. 2). Leaders with inspirational motivation challenge 
followers with high standards and expectations, communicate optimism about future 
goal attainment, use symbols to focus efforts, express important purposes in simple 
ways and provide meaning for the task at hand (Bass, 1990; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). 
Interactive communication becomes a key tool for a transformational leadership style 
to build relationships with their followers, forming a cultural bond and leading to a 
shift in values between both parties towards common ground (Stone et al., 2004). 
The leader inspires followers to see the attractive future state while at the same time 
communicating expectations and demonstrating a personal commitment to goals and 
a shared vision.  
The third dimension of transformational leadership, intellectual stimulation is 
the ability of a leader to challenge assumptions, take risks and solicit followers’ 
ideas. Leaders who exhibit intellectual stimulation encourage creativity in their 
followers, promote intelligence, rationality and careful problem solving (Bass, 1990; 
Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Leaders with a transformational leadership style stimulate 
their followers “to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing 
problems, and approaching old situations in new ways” (Avolio & Bass, 2002, p. 2). 
Such leaders seek their followers’ ideas and include them in problem solving. 
Followers’ mistakes are not publicly criticised, and creativity is openly encouraged 
(Stone et al., 2004).  Further, the intellectually stimulating leader encourages 
followers to try new approaches while emphasising rationality (Bass, 1990). 
The fourth and final dimension of transformational leadership, individualised 
consideration, is the degree to which the leader attends to their followers’ needs. 
Leaders who display individualised consideration act as a mentor and/or coach, 
listen to their follower’s concerns and needs, give personal attention and treat each 
employee individually (Bass, 1990; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Personal attention is 
based on the individual follower’s needs for achievement and growth (Avolio & 
Bass, 2002). Such a leader recognises and demonstrates acceptance of individual 
differences in terms of needs and desires within their followers (Stone et al., 2004). 
Further, the transformational leader fosters two-way communication through 
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effective listening (Avolio & Bass, 2002; Bass, 1998). Through ensuring individual 
consideration, and in conjunction with the remaining three transformational 
leadership behaviours, followers become empowered (Behling & McFillen, 1996). 
The implications of transformational leadership have been suggested to be 
significant (Burns, 1998; de Koster et al., 2011; Stone et al., 2004; Yukl, 1998) and 
to be encouraged as a leadership style for being able to make a difference in 
company performance at all levels (Bass, 1990). Yukl and Bruce (1992) summarised 
the impact of a transformational leader in stating that such leaders articulate a vision 
in a clear and appealing manner, explain how to attain that vision, act confidently 
and optimistically, express confidence in their followers, emphasise values with 
symbolic actions, lead by example and empower followers to achieve the vision 
(cited in Stone et al., 2004, p. 352).  
Transformational leadership theory is, however, not without its critics. Van 
Knippenberg and Sitkin (2013) proposed four problems that they believe require a 
re-thinking of transformational leadership theory and suggest it may be time to go 
“back to the drawing board” (Van Knippenberg and Sitkin, 2013; p. 1). The first 
issue identified is that transformational leadership lacks a clear conceptual definition, 
with meaningful boundaries allowing for any element of leadership to be clearly seen 
as either transformational, or not. The second problem identified is that 
transformational leadership theory has a “simultaneously underdeveloped and overly 
inclusive causal model” (Van Knippenberg and Sitkin, 2013; p. 15). Third, 
conceptualisation and operationalization confounds transformational leadership with 
its effects and lastly, most transformational leadership measurement tools are invalid 
and fail to achieve empirical distinctiveness.  
These criticisms certainly raise rich areas for future research on 
transformational leadership theory. The suggestion that most measurement tools are 
invalid is one that is particularly important since many research studies of 
transformational leadership have relied on Bass & Avolio’s (1990) Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ).  It is expected that the concerns raised by 
Knippenberg and Sitkin (2013) will have implications for future transformational 
leadership research studies and have been considered throughout this current 
research study. 
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Relevance of transformational leadership to safety 
Transformational leadership constructs have increasingly been applied to 
workplace safety in recent decades (Barling et al., 2002; Bryden, 2006; Hofmann & 
Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson & Gerras, 2003; Inness, Turner, Barling & 
Stride, 2010; Kelloway & Barling, 2010; Kelloway, Mullin & Francis, 2006; Mullen, 
Kelloway & Teed, 2011; Zohar, 2002). The four dimensions of transformational 
leadership (Bass, 1990) are viewed in the literature as potentially being related to the 
qualities needed to enhance workplace safety (Barling et al., 2002; Inness et al., 
2010). From transformational leadership theory (Bass, 1990), the sub-theory of 
safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL) (Barling et al., 2002) has 
emerged. This model highlights the possibility of a leader’s style in relation to safety 
differing from that of control-based compliance with safety practices (Barling & 
Hutchinson, 2000) to a leader developing and communicating a vision for a safe 
workplace that inspires employees to participate in safety practices (Mullen et al., 
2011).  There are a significant number of models proposing alternative leadership 
behaviours to promote effective safety leadership and while there is no clear 
agreement, the Barling et al. (2002) model of SSTL has received the most attention 
in existing literature (Clarke, 2013; De Koster, Stam & Balk, 2011; Kelloway & 
Barling, 2010; Mullen et al., 2011; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009).  
Given the profound impact that a leader can exert on the lives of others for 
their betterment or harm (Ciulla, 2004), it is not surprising that a leader can also have 
a significant impact on an individual worker’s personal safety (Barling et al., 2002).  
This is reflected in the existence of a leadership dimension, or similar concept, in 
safety climate inventories. It has long been argued that organisations in which leaders 
take an active role in promoting safety enjoy better organisational safety outcomes 
(Inness et al., 2010; Zohar, 1980). A transformational leadership style is seen as the 
most effective way for senior leaders to communicate their commitment to safety in a 
believable form (Bryden, 2002, 2006; Yule, 2003).  Given that leaders with a 
transformational leadership style become role models for their teams, it is argued that 
by shifting their teams’ focus toward safe production rather than succumbing to 
productivity pressures, these leaders are able to demonstrate workplace safety as a 
core value through their individual personal commitment to safe outcomes (Barling 
et al., 2002). Leaders who base their prioritization of safety on underlying core 
36 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
values are expected to exhibit increased consistency across a variety of situations, 
which will help further reinforce an unwavering commitment to safety (Hofmann, 
2011). Transformational leadership behaviours have also been found to affect the 
degree to which employees voluntarily participate in safety-related activities (Clarke 
& Ward, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2003; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). Where the 
leadership style of senior leaders follows the transformational leadership model, 
there is a corresponding positive influence on safety performance (Reid et al., 2008) 
as well as leading to a better understanding of safety issues and improved 
communication (Conchie, Taylor, & Donald, 2012). Having introduced the broad 
foundation of transformational leadership theory, a more specific focus on safety 
leadership, and the models of safety leadership in existing literature, will now be 
undertaken. 
2.2.2 Safety leadership  
As already indicated, the link between leadership and safety is both 
theoretically and empirically supported (Christian et al., 2009; Hoffmeister et al., 
2014; Nahrgang et al., 2011). Over the past two decades an increasing amount of 
literature has considered the specific leadership behaviours that contribute to being 
an effective safety leader. The most widely referenced theory in the literature is 
safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL), which was developed by Barling 
et al. (2002) and subsequently tested in a range of empirical studies including Mullen 
and Kelloway (2009), De Koster et al. (2011) and Mullen et al. (2011). In addition to 
SSTL, a number of alternative models of safety leadership have also emerged. A 
systematic literature review has been conducted in order to classify themes that 
emerge from these models and will be outlined in detail below. The four dimensions 
of transformational leadership - idealised influence, inspirational motivation, 
intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration – have been mapped against 
each of the alternative models of safety leadership from the literature. This will assist 
in identifying clear unifying themes as well as highlight the gaps in existing literature 
to be addressed by this research study. In addition, it will be clear that senior leaders 
such as board members and senior executives are lacking from consideration in the 
literature. Before considering the alternative models in detail, the model of SSTL 
proposed by Barling et al. (2002) will be reviewed. 
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Safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL) 
The first research to develop a specific model of the behaviours of 
transformational leadership as they applied to safety was conducted by Barling et al. 
(2002).  SSTL has since been studied in a range of operational settings including 
warehouses (de Koster et al., 2011); the food and beverage industry (Barling et al., 
2002), colleges (Kelloway et al., 2006) and hospitals (McFadden, Henegan, & 
Gowen, 2009). To date, SSTL has not been considered in the context of senior 
leaders and particularly not board members, providing an excellent opportunity for 
further research. SSTL shifts the focus from control-based safety practices that 
increase compliance through rewards and punishment (Barling & Hutchinson, 2000) 
to a style where the leader develops and communicates a vision for a safe workplace 
and inspires all employees to actively participate in safety practices (Mullen et al., 
2011, p. 44). The behaviours proposed by SSTL see leaders focus their inspirational 
and motivational efforts towards safety (Barling et al., 2002; de Koster et al., 2011) 
and inspire and promote positive safety-related practices (Mullen & Kelloway, 
2009).  Under the SSTL model, leaders challenge individuals to develop innovative 
ways of approaching and solving safety-related issues and they communicate high 
expectations regarding safety (Mullen et al., 2011). The implications of an SSTL 
style is that employees are motivated to create and sustain a safe work environment 
because they believe in the value of safe work practices, rather than complying with 
policies to avoid punishment (Mullen et al., 2011). Through being a safety-oriented 
role model, communicating a vision for safety, stimulating employees to think of 
new safety enhancing procedures, and by caring about employees’ safety, SSTL is 
argued to enhance safety performance (de Koster et al., 2011). 
In their seminal research, Barling et al. (2002) considered each of the four 
transformational leadership dimensions. A modified survey instrument using 10 
items from the MLQ (Bass & Avolio, 1990) was developed to assess participants’ 
perceptions of their direct supervisors’ SSTL behaviours. The first study (Study 1) 
conducted by Barling et al. (2002) surveyed the safety attitudes of 174 restaurant 
workers. The second study (Study 2) surveyed the safety attitudes of 164 workers 
below the age of 25 working in a range of diverse jobs. Study 1 provided strong 
support for a model whereby SSTL predicted workplace injuries through the effects 
of perceived safety climate, safety consciousness and safety-related events. Study 2 
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replicated and extended the model when applied to workers from a diverse range of 
employment settings.  
The SSTL model provides a framework for the application of the four 
dimensions of transformational leadership to safety. When considering the first 
dimension of transformational leadership, inspirational motivation, leaders will 
manifest this dimension in a workplace safety context when they challenge 
subordinates to go beyond their individual needs for the collective good (Barling et 
al., 2011). This can be achieved through convincing followers that they can obtain 
levels of safety performance previously thought unattainable (Mullen et al., 2011).  
This dimension involves leaders articulating an inspiring safety vision (De Koster et 
al., 2011; Kelloway & Barling, 2010) and challenging individuals to achieve 
exceptional levels of safety standards and exceed minimum safety requirements 
(Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). Communication of a safety vision is a critical element 
of inspirational motivation because it communicates the importance of safety, 
increases motivation of employees to care, raises awareness of safety issues and 
increases motivation of employees to enact safety-oriented behaviours (De Koster et 
al., 2011). Clarke (2013) suggests that this dimension also involves leaders providing 
meaning, optimism and enthusiasm in relation to safety.  
Given the emphasis in SSTL on leaders becoming role models by doing what is 
moral or right rather than what is expedient, the second dimension of 
transformational leadership - idealised influence – encourages leaders to shift their 
focus toward safety and away from the short-term focus that results from the 
productivity pressures they must bear (Barling et al., 2002). Leaders who are high in 
idealised influence convey safety as a core value through their own personal 
commitment, thereby facilitating higher levels of followers’ trust in management and 
organisational loyalty. The focus on being a safety role model is a critical aspect of 
this dimension (De Koster et al., 2011; Mullen et al., 2011; Mullen & Kelloway, 
2009) and requires leaders to do what is proper and ethical rather than what is 
effortless (Kelloway & Barling, 2010). Leaders manifesting idealised influence are 
guided by their moral commitment to those they lead, which extends beyond the 
interests of the organisation (Kelloway & Barling, 2010). Through such role 
modelling behaviour, leaders are able to raise employees’ awareness of safety issues 
thereby increasing their knowledge of safe behaviours (De Koster et al., 2011). An 
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employee’s individual awareness of safety issues can occur at both a cognitive and 
behavioural level. De Koster, et al. (2011; p. 755) makes the observation that: 
Cognitively, safety consciousness means being mentally aware of safety in 
your work and knowing what behaviours foster operational safety. 
Behaviourally, safety consciousness enacts the behaviours that foster 
operational safety.  
When exhibiting the third dimension of transformational leadership, 
intellectual stimulation, leaders challenge their followers to confront long-held 
assumptions and motivate them to think in innovative ways that enhance safety 
(Barling et al., 2002). In doing so, leaders encourage their employees to address 
safety issues, safety practices and safety policies, and to enhance information sharing 
about safety risks. There is a focus on innovation, with leaders encouraged to 
challenge employees to develop innovative and improved practices for safety matters 
(Clarke, 2013; Kelloway & Barling, 2010; Mullen et al., 2011; Mullen & Kelloway, 
2009). This dimension encourages leaders to help employees question their own 
commonly held assumptions and reframe problems in innovative ways (Kelloway & 
Barling, 2010).  Through promoting intellectually stimulating behaviour, leaders will 
encourage followers to be creative in developing new ways of solving problems 
(Clarke, 2013).  
The final transformational leadership dimension addressed in the SSTL model 
is individualised consideration.  Leaders demonstrate this dimension by showing an 
active interest in their followers’ wellbeing, including their physical safety. In this 
way, leaders’ real concern with their employees’ safety is evident, as they are not 
satisfied with achieving minimal external requirements such as government standards 
(Barling et al., 2002) or legislative compliance. This dimension also involves leaders 
paying special attention to employees’ needs for achievement, as well as their 
personal and professional development (Clarke, 2013; Kelloway & Barling, 2010).  
In the Barling et al. (2002) study, it was found that when leaders were perceived to 
provide safety training because of a commitment to safety rather than an obligation 
to comply with external regulations, perceived safety climate was improved.  
Hoffmeister et al. (2014) conducted survey-based research with 1167 
construction pipefitters and plumbers to test the hypothesis that each of the four 
dimensions of SSTL impact safety in different ways and for different reasons. The 
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Hoffmeister et al. (2014) study found that idealised motivation was important for 
establishing a positive safety climate and idealised influence was important for 
encouraging safety participation and safety compliance amongst apprentices. 
Hoffmeister et al. found that individualised consideration seldom contributed to a 
large amount of the overall variance explained in safety outcomes, suggesting that it 
may not be as effective as the other dimensions in promoting safety at work 
(Hoffmeister et al., 2014, p. 76). This suggests that the role of coaching, as envisaged 
through the dimension of individualised consideration, is not as important in 
promoting safety as the message that is sent through other behaviours that leaders 
engage in such as idealized influence, inspirational motivation and intellectual 
stimulation.  
SSTL (Barling et al., 2002) has adapted the four dimensions of 
transformational leadership in the safety context and found it to be a strong predictor 
of enhanced safety performance (de Koster et al., 2011). However, a number of 
alternative models of safety leadership have also been identified in the literature and 
provide evidence of further safety leadership traits, beyond those proposed by SSTL 
(Barling et al., 2002).  These additional leadership traits will help formulate the basis 
for the safety leadership likely to be most relevant to the current research being 
undertaken and applicable to senior leaders. This is because despite the breadth of 
literature considering SSTL, there has been no empirical research considering the 
application of SSTL to board members and senior executives. This remains a gap in 
the literature worthy of consideration. 
2.2.3 Alternative models of safety leadership 
To assess the range of additional safety leadership models that have been 
proposed in the literature, a systematic review was conducted. The systematic review 
identified research in which specific safety leadership behaviours had been 
identified. The first step of the review involved a broad, text based search using the 
two search terms “transformational leadership” and “safety leadership”. This first 
phase of the literature review (completed initially on 27 June 2012 and repeated on 
18 March 2014) resulted in 39 peer reviewed, scholarly journal articles identified 
from across three databases (ProQuest, Scopus and Web of Science). The second 
step in the review was to undertake a manual search of all returned results to identify 
those articles that proposed a unique safety leadership model based on 
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transformational leadership theory. Any duplicates or journal articles that did not 
propose a model for safety leadership were excluded. Where journal articles were 
cited and not already included within the review list, they were also reviewed. For 
example, articles published before 2002 (when the theory of SSTL emerged) were 
considered relevant if they provided a model for safety leadership that could be 
mapped against the dimensions of transformational leadership. 
Within each model, those factors proposed as elements of safety leadership 
were identified and allocated within one of five columns shown in Table 3 
comprising the four dimensions of transformational leadership as well as an 
additional fifth column for “additional factors”. This column included any leadership 
behaviours identified by the alternative models that did not readily fit within one of 
the existing four dimensions of transformational leadership. In some cases, safety 
leadership factors identified by the alternative models were listed twice where the 
model proposed a broader definition than any one dimension of transformational 
leadership.  
Table 3 summarises the systematic review of alternative models of safety 
leadership. Each safety leadership model has been listed in chronological order of 
publication. The review highlights the range of safety leadership traits proposed 
within the broader transformational leadership approach to safety, and also helps 
demonstrate the existing gap in the literature in terms of the lack of consideration of 
senior leaders in existing research.   Table	  3	  –	  Alternative	  models	  of	  safety	  leadership	  	  
 Idealised 
influence 
Inspirational 
motivation 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Individualised 
consideration 
 
Additional 
factors 
Simard & 
Marchand (1994) 
 
Personal 
involvement  
 Worker 
involvement 
  
Cooper (1998) Controlling Controlling Caring Caring Controlling 
 
Simon & Carrillo 
(1999) 
 
Build trust and 
open commitment 
Make the case for 
change 
 
Develop 
capabilities 
 Monitor progress 
 
 Create a shared 
vision 
  Recognise 
accomplishments 
Geller (2000) Focus on process 
 
Leaders use 
conditional 
statements 
 
Leaders educate 
 
Leaders make 
more distinctions 
 
Leaders listen first 
 
Leaders set 
expectations 
Leaders promote 
ownership 
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 Idealised 
influence 
Inspirational 
motivation 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Individualised 
consideration 
 
Additional 
factors 
Leaders are 
confident but 
uncertain 
 
 Leaders 
encourage choice 
  
Leaders look 
beyond the 
numbers 
    
O’Dea & Flin 
(2001) 
Visibility  Workforce 
involvement 
 
 Proactive 
management 
  Relationships   
Bryden (2002) Leadership Commitment Workforce 
involvement 
 
 Accountability 
Carrillo (2002) Insight 
 
Direction  Insight 
 
 
Focus 
 
  Capability  
Accountability     
Blair (2003) Exemplary 
behaviour 
Establish 
expectations 
Educate 
employees 
 
 Evaluate 
effectiveness 
   Enable employees 
 
  
   Encourage 
employees 
  
Wu (2005) Safety caring  Safety coaching 
 
Safety caring Safety controlling 
Krause & 
Weekley (2005) 
 
Influencing Inspiring Challenging Engaging  
Lu & Yang 
(2010) 
Safety concern Safety policy Safety motivation 
 
 Safety motivation 
Dunlap (2011) 
 
Management 
engagement 
Developing a 
safety culture 
Employee 
involvement 
 Accountability 
Shang (2011) Safety concern Safety policy   Safety motivation 
Griffin & Hu 
(2013) 
 
 Safety inspiring  
 
 Safety monitoring 
Roger (2013) Incorporates 
safety into 
decision-making 
 
 Promotes 
exchange of 
safety information 
 
 Monitoring 
operational reality 
 
Acts as a safety 
role model 
 
 Supports and 
motivates 
 
 Reinforces with 
reward and 
consequences 
Provides direction  Communicates 
clear safety 
expectations 
  
Krauss & Casey 
(2014) 
Inspiring 
 
Vision Collaborating 
 
Actively caring 
 
Supporting 
 
Role-modelling  Challenging  Recognising 
 
Analysis of alternative models of safety leadership identified several criteria in 
common with the SSTL model (Barling et al., 2002). In addition, the analysis 
outlined in Table 3 introduced a fourth safety leadership criteria not previously 
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considered by SSTL (Barling et al., 2002). This additional criterion will be referred 
to as the transparency criterion in this research project and will be defined in more 
detail later in this chapter. The analysis also identified a reduced emphasis on 
individualised consideration, a dimension of transformational leadership and the 
SSTL model (Barling et al., 2002).  The four criteria to form the basis of this 
research study are considered together to be the most effective basis of safety 
leadership. Each criterion on its own is expected to enhance safety leadership within 
an organisation, however, it is anticipated that the concept of safety leadership being 
considered in this research study is most effective when all four criteria are witnessed 
within an organisation together and, when identified as present at both an 
organisational and individual level, will suggest enhanced safety leadership is 
present.  Each of the criteria of safety leadership identified through the analysis, as 
well as the dimension of individualised consideration, will now be considered in 
more detail. 
Before doing so, it is timely to clarify terminology with respect to dimensions 
and criteria. Within transformational leadership theory, the term dimension was used 
by Bass (1985) and subsequently also in the SSTL model (Barling et al., 2002) to 
describe idealised influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and 
individualised consideration. For the purposes of this research project, and in order 
to distinguish from the four transformational leadership dimensions, the term 
criterion will be used. Existing literature has been used to help devise the names of 
each of the four criteria that will form the basis of the current research – vision, 
personal commitment, decision-making and transparency. For example, the first 
transformational leadership (and SSTL) dimension of inspirational motivation will 
be largely reflected in the criteria of personal commitment.  The literature from 
which the term vision has been developed is outlined below.  
Vision  
The first criterion of safety leadership to be used in the current research relates 
to the transformational leadership dimension of inspirational motivation. This 
dimension of transformational leadership theory was frequently represented in the 
literature of alternative models of safety leadership (Blair, 2003; Bryden, 2002; 
Carrillo, 2002; Cooper, 1998; Dunlap, 2011; Geller, 2000; Krauss & Casey, 2014; 
Krause & Weekley, 2005; Lu &Yang, 2010; Shang, 2011; Simon & Carrillo, 1999). 
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However, none of the literature reviewed applied this dimension to board members, 
confirming a gap in existing literature. The systematic review of alternative models 
of safety leadership helped identify the behaviours expected of leaders who 
demonstrate this criterion.  Given it is challenging for any leader to encourage an 
employee to increase their intrinsic commitment to safety, senior leaders can only 
seek to directly influence others by placing emphasis on safety throughout the 
organisation. One of the ways this may be achieved is through articulating a safety-
related vision as well as putting in place systems and processes to achieve that vision 
(Hofmann, 2011). This criterion will be relevant to senior leaders since they pass 
their values on to employees as a means of shaping behaviour and directing the focus 
of the organisation (Berson, Oreg, & Dvir, 2008; Schein, 1992).  
Leaders were expected to set safety expectations (Blair, 2003; Geller, 2000) 
and solicit a commitment to safety from others in a public way (Bryden, 2002). In 
addition, safety leaders were expected to make the case for change and create a 
shared vision (Simon & Carrillo, 1999) while also establishing safety goals (Cooper, 
1998; Lu & Yang, 2010; Shang, 2011). Leaders demonstrating this dimension were 
seen as being able to inspire (Carrillo, 2002, Krauss & Casey, 2014) while also 
creating a clear safety mission (Lu & Yang, 2010; Shang, 2011). In addition, leaders 
were expected to set high standards (Krause & Weekley, 2005; Shang, 2011) and 
communicate a safety vision in a way that resonated with individuals at all levels of 
the organisation (Griffin & Hu, 2013; Krause & Weekley, 2005). Leaders needed to 
ensure that the vision was understood and communicated clearly (Dunlap, 2011). It is 
anticipated that each of these leadership qualities will apply to senior leaders within 
an organisation. Senior leaders set the safety vision of an organisation through 
establishing safety objectives, formalising safety policies and allocating resources to 
manage safety. These factors are also expected to be readily applicable to written 
communications. 
This dimension will therefore be one of the four safety leadership criteria to 
be used in this research study. Given the gap with respect to its application to senior 
leaders, a definition has been developed. Based on a review of existing literature, and 
highlighted by an analysis of existing models of safety leadership, this criterion will 
be referred to as vision. The definition of vision based on existing literature and 
which will be used in the current research is as follows:  
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Vision is the ability of a senior leader to publicly articulate shared safety 
goals that resonate across all levels of an organisation. Senior leaders 
demonstrating vision will inspire others, set high standards for safety 
behaviours, establish safety expectations and solicit commitments to safety 
from others. 
Personal commitment 
The second criterion of safety leadership to be utilised in this research study 
relates to the transformational leadership dimension of idealised influence. This 
dimension of transformational leadership theory was represented in much of the 
safety leadership literature setting out alternative models of safety leadership (Blair, 
2003; Bryden, 2002; Carrillo, 2002; Cooper, 1998; Dunlap, 2011; Geller, 2000; 
Krauss & Casey, 2014; Krause & Weekley, 2005; Lu &Yang, 2010; O’Dea & Flin, 
2001; Roger, 2013; Shang, 2011; Simon & Carrillo, 1999; Simard & Marchand, 
1994; Wu, 2005; Zohar, 1980).  However, again no research was found relating this 
dimension to board members, with focus primarily on managers and supervisors. The 
review of alternative models of safety leadership helped extend understanding of 
how this dimension may be applied and established expectations of leaders 
demonstrating these behaviours. Leaders frequently demonstrated a personal 
commitment to safety symbolically (Flin & Yule, 2004; Lu & Yang, 2010) and 
sincerely (Zohar, 1980). Caring for employees (Cooper, 1998) and building trust and 
open communication (Simon & Carrillo, 1999) were also seen as vital behaviours of 
a leader demonstrating personal commitment. Setting an example (Blair, 2003; 
Carrillo, 1999; Lu & Yang, 2010; Krauss & Casey, 2014; Roger, 2013; Shang, 
2011), completing action plans and following up on safety concerns brought forward 
by employees (Carrillo, 1999) were also presented as leadership behaviours under 
this dimension. Other relevant factors included listening, questioning and looking 
beyond statistical data (Geller, 2000).  
Visible leadership, consistent application of the safety rules and being a role 
model for safety (O’Dea & Flin, 2001) were areas for focus by leaders demonstrating 
personal commitment. Beyond behaviours, exemplifying a positive attitude to safety 
(Bryden, 2002), increasing optimism, instilling pride (Krause & Weekley, 2005) as 
well as developing self-awareness of how people, including both the leader and 
others, contribute to the safety challenge (Carrillo, 2002) were all seen as important. 
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In communicating a personal commitment to safety, a passion for safety is important 
(Carrillo, 2002) and leaders were expected to set an example (Bryden, 2002; Carrillo, 
2002). More practically, leaders’ words must be supported by their actions and 
leaders were not perceived as credible unless they allocated money for safety 
supplies and initiatives, discussed safety performance in organisational meetings and 
behaved safely in an operational environment (Dunlap, 2011). In addition, senior 
leaders demonstrate personal commitment by stressing the importance of safety 
equipment; acting on safety policies; demonstrating concern for safety improvement; 
and coordinating with other departments to solve safety issues (Shang, 2011).  
Leadership behaviours reflecting this dimension are expected to apply to 
board members and senior executives. In terms of behaviours of senior leaders, 
personal commitment to safety can be shown through ensuring safety concerns raised 
via employee safety committees are actioned and personal safety behaviours are 
high, particularly when visiting sites or touring offices in view of employees. In the 
context of written communications, personal commitment can be demonstrated 
through letters to shareholders that are directly attributable to an individual Chairman 
and/or CEO. 
This dimension will therefore be the second safety leadership criterion to be 
used in the current research. Based on a review of existing literature, and highlighted 
by a review of existing models of safety leadership, this criterion will be referred to 
as personal commitment. The definition of personal commitment based on the 
literature and which will be used in this research study is as follows:  
Personal commitment is a sincere, visible and genuine dedication to 
workplace safety that demonstrates care for the safety and welfare of others. 
Senior leaders with a personal commitment to safety exemplify a positive 
attitude towards safety, role model safe behaviours and help solve safety 
issues on behalf of employees. 
Decision-making 
The third criterion of safety leadership to be used in this research study 
relates to the transformational leadership dimension of intellectual stimulation and is 
referenced throughout existing literature (Blair, 2003; Bryden, 2002; Cooper, 1998; 
Dunlap, 2011; Geller, 2000; Krauss & Casey, 2014; Krause & Weekley, 2005; Lu & 
Yang, 2010; O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Roger, 2013; Simard & Marchand, 1994; Simon & 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 47 
Carrillo, 1999; Wu, 2005). Reference to this dimension in the existing research 
primarily focused on supervisors and managers, not senior leaders.  This criterion 
was described in the literature as referring to employee involvement (Bryden, 2002; 
O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Simard & Marchand, 1994) and engaging everyone with the 
relevant experience in decision-making around safety (Flin & Yule, 2004; Lu 
&Yang, 2010; Wu, 2005). The emphasis on decision-making in the literature became 
the focal point for this criterion within this research study given it captures the one of 
the essential roles of senior leaders within an organisation – making decisions about 
the organisation in an operational sense by senior executives and through governance 
mechanisms by the board. 
Building on this focus on decision-making, in the SSTL model, the dimension 
of intellectual stimulation references information sharing on safety (Barling et al., 
2002) and a focus on problem-solving (Clarke, 2013). Using the SSTL definition as a 
starting point, whilst also incorporating the additional factors identified in the 
alternative models of safety leadership focused on decision-making, a broad 
definition for this criterion was adopted. Communication channels with employees, 
through safety committees or other means, will be addressed through this criterion 
given that safety committees can improve communication by bringing senior leaders 
and employees into the process of safety planning (Cooper, 1998). Formal and 
informal communication channels within an organisation are essential methods for 
making decisions about safety and for leaders to encourage employees to address 
safety issues and enhance sharing of safety information (Barling et al., 2002). 
In addition to communications around safety, this dimension refers to the need 
for leaders to develop capabilities of employees including ensuring they are assigned 
appropriate safety issues and projects (Simon & Carrillo, 1999). This enables 
delegation of roles and responsibilities with respect to safety to enhance safety 
decision-making processes.  Leaders were expected to educate, promote ownership 
of safety and encourage employees to make safe choices (Geller, 2000). The notion 
of empowering employees to make decisions with respect to safety (O’Dea & Flin, 
2001) was also balanced with the need for leaders to ensure that employee safety 
concerns are heard (Bryden, 2002; Krauss & Casey, 2014) and their safety 
suggestions taken on board (O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Bryden, 2002). Leaders were 
encouraged to stimulate employees’ abilities and engage their intellect (Wu, 2005) 
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through education and encouragement (Blair, 2003; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Lu & Yang, 
2010). It has been suggested that leaders provide employees with a flow of 
challenging ideas to help them rethink old ways of doing things, to challenge 
dysfunctional paradigms and to promote rational and careful problem solving 
(Krause & Weekley, 2005). Communication in all directions was viewed as 
important (Roger, 2013) to gain employee commitment and increase the quality of 
workplace safety efforts (Dunlap, 2011). 
This dimension will be the third safety leadership criterion to be used in the 
current research and a definition has been developed to help identify the context in 
which it will be used with senior leaders. Based on a review of existing literature, 
and highlighted by the review of alternative models of safety leadership, this 
criterion will be referred to as decision-making. The definition of decision-making 
based on the literature to be used in this research study is as follows:  
Decision-making promotes sound assessment of safety issues while also 
providing an opportunity for open communication between all levels of an 
organisation. Senior leaders promoting decision-making ensure safety 
concerns are heard and employees are included in safety planning processes.  
Transparency 
The fourth criterion of safety leadership to be used in the current research is a 
new criterion of safety leadership and is based on the additional factors that were 
identified during the systematic literature review.  The new criterion is a combination 
of references to additional factors not readily allocated to one of the existing four 
dimensions of SSTL (Blair, 2003; Bryden, 2002; Cooper, 1998; Dunlap, 2011; 
Krauss & Casey, 2014; Lu & Yang, 2010; O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Roger, 2013; Shang, 
2011; Simon & Carrillo, 1999; Wu, 2005). Within this criterion are a number of 
individual, but related, leadership behaviours considered important in the context of 
safety leadership for senior leaders. These include holding others accountable for 
safety outcomes (Bryden, 2002; Dunlap, 2011; Geller, 2000; Lu & Yang, 2010) as 
well as being clear and transparent when dealing with safety issues (Flin & Yule, 
2004; Lu & Yang, 2010).  
Leader behaviours linked to this criterion included ‘safety controlling’ 
(Cooper, 1998; Wu, 2005), which refers to the need for leaders to ensure that 
employees follow regulations and procedures. In addition, leaders monitor progress 
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against safety goals (Griffin & Hu, 2013; Krauss & Casey, 2014; Simon & Carrillo, 
1999) and monitor the effectiveness of safety initiatives (Blair, 2003; Griffin & Wu, 
2013; Krauss & Casey, 2014; Roger, 2013; Wu, 2005). Leaders build accountability 
by making the link between safety and performance at all levels including setting 
individual, team and corporate safety targets (Bryden, 2002; Dunlap, 2011) and 
leaders were required to promote an environment for reporting incidents (O’Dea & 
Flin, 2001; Lu & Yang, 2010). Finally, leaders demonstrating transparency 
recognise achievements in safety (Simon & Carrillo, 1999) and communicate 
transparently about safety recognition and reward systems (Hansen, 2000; Lu & 
Yang, 2010; O’Dea & Flin, 2001; Roger, 2013; Shang, 2011; Wu, 2005) to 
encourage employees’ safety behaviours.  
This criterion also includes a range of tools for holding others to account for 
safety performance. In the Hoffmeister et al. (2014) research testing the four 
dimensions of SSTL, the role of the leadership theory of contingent reward was 
considered. Contingent reward leadership, which involves clearly communicating 
which employee behaviours are desired and rewarding those behaviours, was found 
to be an important predictor of safety climate, compliance and participation 
(Hoffmeister et al., 2014). In a safety context, contingent reward leadership involves 
leaders helping employees understand organisational safety-related goals, keeping 
employees focused on achieving those goals and rewarding behaviour consistent 
with such achievement (Bass, 1985).  These additional contributions were therefore 
important in highlighting the existing gaps in the literature with respect to safety 
leadership, and how it may be applied to senior leaders. 
These additional factors will form the fourth safety leadership criterion to be 
used in the current research. Based on a review of existing literature, this criterion 
will be referred to as transparency and the definition that will be used is as follows:  
Transparency refers to senior leaders being open to scrutiny of safety 
performance through monitoring and communicating the effectiveness of 
safety initiatives. Leaders demonstrate transparency through formal and 
informal communications, which celebrate safety successes, as well as 
openly communicate safety challenges as they emerge. 
Therefore, the four criteria of safety leadership to be used in this paper are 
vision, personal commitment, decision-making and transparency. These four criteria 
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have all been identified from the existing SSTL and safety leadership literature and 
after identifying a gap in existing literature with respect to safety leadership as 
applied to senior leaders. It is important to note that one dimension of 
transformational leadership (and SSTL), individualised consideration, has not been 
used as one of the four safety leadership criteria in this research and the rationale for 
that decision will now be explained. 
Individualised consideration  
It was apparent after a review of the literature that this dimension was the least 
referenced dimension within the alternative safety leadership models with only six of 
the sixteen models reviewed including individualised consideration (Carrillo, 2002; 
Cooper, 1998; Geller, 2000; Krauss & Casey, 2014; Krause & Weekley, 2005; Wu, 
2005).  Where this dimension was referenced in the literature, it referred to the need 
for leaders to be accessible and to cultivate personal relationships (Carrillo, 2002) as 
well as to act as mentors and/or coaches (Carrillo, 2002; Krause & Weekley, 2005). 
Leaders were also expected to provide feedback and personal attention (Krause & 
Weekley, 2005). While the limited references to individualised consideration was 
not, of itself, a determining factor in excluding this dimension from the current 
research, it does indicate that in the context of safety, individualised consideration 
has been considered to have limited impact in influencing safety behaviours. This 
was also found in the research conducted by Hoffmeister et al. (2014) which was 
suggested that the role of coaching, as envisaged by individualised consideration, 
was not as important in promoting safety as the behaviours promoted through 
idealised influence, inspirational motivation and intellectual stimulation.  
Given the safety leadership focus of the research being undertaken in the 
current study is focused on board members and senior executives, the role of acting 
as a mentor or coach is not expected to be as relevant as compared, for example, to 
the leadership behaviours identified under the transparency criterion, which involves 
holding others to account for safety performance. While coaching, mentoring, 
accessibility and providing personal attention to employees are all important aspects 
of safety leadership; they are not as relevant to the research being undertaken. 
Therefore the dimension of individualised consideration has not been included 
within the four criteria of safety leadership in this research study. 
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2.2.4 Summary 
The first section of the literature review has introduced the theory of 
transformational leadership. The sub-theory of SSTL was considered in detail as well 
as a systematic review of alternative models of safety leadership. Throughout the 
literature review it was evident that senior leaders are indeed a ‘neglected species’ 
(Flin & Yule, 2004, p.ii48) with respect to safety leadership. Despite the 
considerable influence these leaders have on the lives of employees, little research 
has been applied to the most effective ways in which the most senior leaders of an 
organisation might lead and govern in safety. Important attention has already been 
given in existing literature to the safety leadership role of supervisors and managers 
and this research study will seek to expand that knowledge by also considering the 
safety leadership of board members and senior executives. A systematic review of 
safety leadership literature has provided the foundation to identify and define four 
criteria of safety leadership model to be used – vision, personal commitment, 
decision-making and transparency. The identified gaps will be addressed through the 
following reesearch questions which will apply the four developed criteria of safety 
leadership directly to both public disclosures and to the views of board members and 
senior executives: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time?  
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
As the four safety leadership criteria will be applied in the context of the most 
senior levels of an organisation, as well as considered in light of public disclosures of 
safety-related activities, the literature in the field of corporate governance will now 
be reviewed in order to understand how theories of safety leadership may apply.  
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
This section of the literature review will provide an analysis of the theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance with a particular focus on agency and 
stewardship theory. Detail will then be provided on the role of the key players in the 
current research including board members and senior executives. Lastly, this section 
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will provide an introduction to public disclosures of large companies including the 
various theories that underpin the publication of both annual reports and CSR 
reports.    
While the practice of corporate governance is “as old as trade” (Tricker, 2012, 
p. 4) the term itself only emerged in the 1970s, gained prominence in the 1990s and 
has grown rapidly since 2000 (Blackwell, 2013).  Despite the relatively recent 
academic and industry focus on corporate governance, the business of trading has 
been in existence for centuries, whether as craftsmen or local traders in medieval 
times, or international companies shipping tea to the New World. The joint stock 
companies, which began to be formed in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, were 
the first indication of a new kind of business entity. Unlike guilds of craftsmen, the 
members of joint stock companies were not traders actively participating in the 
business, but investors (Blackwell, 2013). It was at this time that the frequently 
quoted comment of the philosopher Adam Smith in the 1776 publication of The 
Wealth of Nations highlighted the need for what would become known as corporate 
governance:  
The directors of companies, being the managers of other people’s money 
rather than their own, cannot well be expected to watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which (they) watch over their own (cited in Tricker, 
2012, p. 6). 
Since 1776, with many corporate collapses, case law and legislative 
amendments to draw upon, broad principles of corporate governance have been 
defined. One such example is set out below from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)’s 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined (OECD, 2004). 
In the Australian context, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), through the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council, released a set of eight corporate governance 
principles in 2004. These principles have been updated and amended in the 
intervening decade (ASX, 2010, 2014a) and have gained considerable support in the 
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Australian business community. Although not currently mandated, whether a 
company chooses to adopt the governance practices suggested by the principles is a 
matter for a company board (ASX, 2014a).  
The ASX principles provide a useful guide to understand how corporate 
governance is defined in practice for large Australian boards. The principles also 
establish the context in which boards operate and the influence these principles may 
have in a board’s approach to workplace safety. For example, ASX corporate 
governance principle suggests that a publicly listed Australian company should lay 
solid foundations for management and oversight (ASX, 2014a). Recommendations 
include establishing the respective roles and responsibilities of board members and 
senior executives; as well as disclosing the process for evaluating performance of 
senior executives. In the context of workplace safety, this may mean an organisation 
could include safety within a board charter or establish a board sub-committee with 
specific responsibility for safety. This principle also states that where safety has been 
included as a performance measure linked to remuneration for senior executives, this 
must also be disclosed (ASX, 2014a). 
Two other ASX corporate governance principles are relevant to the current 
research and worth noting. The first outlines the need for companies to promote 
ethical and responsible decision-making (ASX, 2014a). While no direct reference to 
workplace safety is made, many organisations disclose a code of conduct (ASX, 
2014a) that includes reference to maintaining a safe workplace. The second relates to 
recognising and managing risk, including the establishment of a sound risk 
management framework (ASX, 2014a). Workplace safety is frequently viewed as a 
risk within organisations and would generally be addressed by boards through this 
principle. Having now briefly considered the approach to corporate governance in 
Australia in practice, it is important to consider the theoretical foundations of 
corporate governance to understand in greater detail, through particular consideration 
of agency theory and stewardship theory, why this approach may have evolved.  
2.3.1 Theoretical foundations to corporate governance 
The field of corporate governance is very broad and during its emergence in 
recent decades, numerous theories including agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 
1972), institutional theory (Maggio & Powell, 1983) and stakeholder theory 
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(Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984) have all been applied.  It has been suggested that 
the study of corporate governance has even been complicated by the structure, role 
and impact of boards having been studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives, 
which in turn has resulted in the emergence of a number of often competing theories 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003, p. 190).  
The “agency problem” (Tricker, 2012, p. 58) remains most clearly stated by the 
comments of philosopher Adam Smith in 1776 cited above. That is, the board of 
directors of a company who manage other people’s money cannot, according to 
agency theory, be expected to manage it with the same vigilance as they may manage 
their own. Pivotal to this argument is the view that shareholders have effectively lost 
control of large companies as they have grown in size (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
As a result, senior executives become the only people with the specialised knowledge 
necessary to operate the company and so effectively gain control (Mizruchi, 1983). It 
is argued that an agency loss occurs; that is, the extent to which the financial returns 
to the shareholders fall below what they would be if the shareholders, or owners, 
themselves exercised direct control of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theorists view senior executives, including the CEO, as opportunistic agents 
motivated by individual utility maximisation and suggest that shareholder objectives 
will be met once managerial opportunism is under control (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
Ultimately the model that underlies agency theory is that of a self-interested actor 
rationally maximising his or her own personal economic gain (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991).   
A major structural mechanism to curtail the risk of managerial opportunism is 
the board of directors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) in order to separate the initiation 
and implementation of decisions of senior executives from the ratification and 
monitoring of those decisions by the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). There have been 
many critics of agency theory, particularly given it often focuses at the level of 
boards as entities and does not consider interpersonal relations between directors 
(Tricker, 2012). An additional corporate governance theory relevant to consider is 
that of stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) which has evolved from psychology 
and sociology (Al Mamun, Yasser, & Rahman, 2013).   
Stewardship theorists argue that the motives of senior executives, including the 
CEO, are aligned with the objectives of their principles (Donaldson, 1990) rather 
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than entirely self-interested rational economic models (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Importantly, stewardship theory recognises a range of non-financial motives for 
managerial behaviour including the need for achievement and recognition, the 
intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and strong work 
ethic. Further, senior executives are seen as capable of acting for the benefit of 
shareholders (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Essentially stewardship theory argues that 
the move of corporate control from a dispersed group of shareholders to professional 
senior executives is a positive development toward managing the complexity of the 
modern corporation (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  Stewardship theory argues that 
conflicts of interest between various stakeholder groups and the company should be 
met by competitive pressures in the free markets and backed by legislation and legal 
controls (Tricker, 2012). The role of the board under stewardship theory is to 
empower, rather than control, senior executives and that by being empowered to act, 
senior executives will do so responsibly (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Pivotal to the argument of agency theory is that shareholders have “lost 
effective control” (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; p. 5) as large businesses have grown in 
size and therefore boards of directors independent from management influence will 
enable performance to be maximised. For the purposes of the scope of the current 
research, both agency and stewardship theory are relevant and each will be 
considered in the context of safety. Agency theory is the basis upon which the 
corporate governance structures, such as a board, are based. Stewardship theory is 
also relevant in understanding the motivations of the key players within those 
corporate governance structures. Stewardship theory has previously been used to 
understand senior executive approaches to CSR (Godos-Diez, Fernandez-Gago & 
Martinez-Campillo, 2010) providing a useful foundation for application in the 
current research to workplace safety. The monitoring structures of agency theory will 
be considered, in conjunction with ‘stewards’, or senior executives, as they integrate 
a fiduciary relationship to shareholders with a moral relationship with stakeholders 
(Gibson, 2000; Hernandez, 2008). Given the focus on board members and senior 
executives, it is necessary to consider their roles in greater detail. 
2.3.2 Key players  
Within the bounds of relevant corporate law, boards are free to select the 
corporate governance structures used within their companies. Some possible options 
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for boards include whether to form board sub-committees, whether to separate the 
role of chairman and CEO, the size of the board and the ratio of non-executive 
directors to executive directors (Carson, 2002). As there are many structures used for 
company boards depending on whether the company is publicly listed or private, a 
for-profit or not-for-profit business, a sole trader or family company, this research 
will focus to the corporate governance models of large, ASX listed companies in 
Australia. It is important to understand the clear delineation of the corporate 
governance roles of each of the key players to understand the different perspectives 
they may have on issues facing the organisation, such as workplace safety.  
Board of directors 
Research indicates that institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for 
good governance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The board of directors, or a board, is a 
central tenet of corporate governance. In Australia, the UK and the US, the model of 
a unitary board has been adopted in contrast to some European countries, such as 
Germany and Holland, which have a two-tier board in place (Tricker, 2012).  
Typically the board of directors of an Australian ASX listed company might be 
comprised of a Chairman who is generally independent, a majority of independent 
non-executive directors with various skill sets, a CEO, and potentially a number of 
senior executives who are also members of the board and referred to as executive 
directors. The key difference between a non-executive and executive director is to 
the extent to which the individual is involved in the day-to-day management of the 
organisation. Non-executive directors are not employed full time and may have a 
number of different company board roles within their portfolio. Executive directors 
generally form part of the key executive team and also sit on the board of directors of 
the company in which they are employed.  
Shareholders normally appoint the Chairman and non-executive directors 
whereas the board appoints the CEO, as well as any executive directors. The size of a 
board of directors has received considerable attention (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994; 
Goodstein, Gautum, & Boeker, 1994; Jensen, 1993; Singchawla, Evans, and Evans, 
2011; Yermack, 1996) with general agreement that when boards get beyond seven to 
eight people they are less likely to function effectively (Jensen, 1993). Boards 
function as “enquiring, analytical and deliberative decision-making bodies where the 
output is the product of the collective contributions and inputs of all directors” (Cole, 
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2012, p. 26). Ultimately that output is expected by institutional investors to 
contribute to firm performance (Black, 1992; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Useem, 
1993). 
Nicholson and Newton (2010) analysed the functions of a board by 
conceptualising four key roles from the literature. These roles will now be addressed 
in order to consider more closely the approach a board may take to specific 
organisational issues it confronts, such as workplace safety.  The first key role of a 
board was defined by Nicholson and Newton as board control; that is, supervising 
management and protecting shareholders (Keasey & Wright, 1993 cited in Nicholson 
& Newton, 2010) in order to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities. As outlined by 
Nicholson and Newton (2010), the board control role dominates current research in 
the field. While responsibility for workplace safety is not expressly stated, safety is 
an issue that would be directly related to ratifying and monitoring management. For 
example, where a board did not feel that the issue of workplace safety was being 
adequately managed, or the internal safety strategy was ineffective, a board could 
exercise board control.  
 The second conceptualisation of the role of the board according to Nicholson 
and Newton (2010) relates to board service; that is, a range of assistance provided by 
the board broadly defined as a “service/expertise/counsel role” (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & Johnson (1998) cited in Nicholson & Newton, 2010) and a more specific 
role in “generating and analysing strategic alternatives” (Forbes & Milliken (1999) 
cited in Nicholson & Newton, 2010).  In the context of workplace safety, this may 
involve board members with specific skills and expertise advising executives in 
relation to safety issues. Depending on the skills of the board members, and the 
perceived or actual importance of safety to the external reputation of the company, 
the board service role may also see board members enhance the corporate reputation 
of the company through external engagement with stakeholders focused around 
safety issues.  
The third role conceptualised by Nicholson and Newton (2010) is board 
strategy. That is, a broad range of contributions from “approving, monitoring and 
reviewing strategy at one end, to a leadership role of active involvement in 
establishing the goals, values and setting direction at the other end” (Ingley & Van 
der Walt (2001) cited in Nicholson and Newton, 2010). When considering safety 
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goals, safety values and safety objectives, this may involve the board reviewing 
safety initiatives and, in some cases, formulating a safety strategy. In addition, this 
role could involve board members guiding the company mission with respect to 
safety and ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated.  
The final role conceptualised by Nicholson and Newton (2010) is that of the 
board providing access to resources. This occurs when companies utilise board 
members to assist in controlling their operating environments or to secure critical 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) cited in Nicholson and Newton, 2010). While 
not directly related to workplace safety, it is possible to extend this role to board 
members when they link senior executives to external resources to assist in 
developing an effective approach to managing workplace safety, as well as ensuring 
financial resources are available where required for safety initiatives, including 
training. While the main board is the key focus for corporate governance research 
and decision-making, board sub-committees also play an important role and allow 
focus on particular issues to be achieved. 
Board committees 
Boards use committees to focus board member attention on specific issues, 
particularly as the scale and complexity of issues facing directors continues to grow 
(Tricker, 2012). Board committees are seen as an effective use of directors’ time with 
much of the key decision-making and implementation occurring at committee level 
(Singhchawla et al., 2011). However, there has been some criticism that board 
committees may be formed to promote the appearance of good corporate governance 
without serving any useful purpose to the organisation (Carson, 2002; Menon & 
Williams, 1994). Australian ASX listed companies are expected to have board 
committees in the areas of audit, remuneration and nominations of new directors 
(ASX, 2010). Many companies that are not publicly listed have followed a similar 
board committee governance framework to ensure best practice and because the 
existence of such committees can enhance the confidence of investors (Singhchawla 
et al., 2011).  
Generally board committees are created as a standing committee of the board 
with a formal charter setting out full committee delegations and responsibilities. 
From time to time the board may establish special purpose committees to reflect 
particular issues at hand. In addition, some companies may consider an issue of such 
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importance that a greater degree of focus and attention is required and is therefore 
best dealt with by a board committee outside of a regular board meeting. A board 
committee focused on health, safety and the environment might be such an example. 
In all cases the responsibilities of a board committee are clearly identified and 
delineation between the work of the committee and the work of the board is made 
(Tricker, 2012).  
It should be noted that board committees do not mean the delegation of 
responsibilities by the full board for any area of responsibility. For example, if the 
Audit Committee reviews particular financial transactions in detail, members of the 
full board who do not sit on the Audit Committee are still liable for all decisions 
made and so must ensure that they are aware of the issues involved.   In most cases 
board committee recommendations must be ratified by the full board, after the actual 
decisions are made within the board committee meeting. There is little academic 
attention on the formation of board committees, and their effectiveness, when 
considering the issue of workplace safety. This research study provides an 
opportunity to examine this gap in the literature by exploring a company’s internal 
focus on safety and whether decision-making structures such as the formation of a 
board committee form part of a company’s safety governance framework. The 
important role of a board Chairman will now be considered.  
Chairman 
The role of the Chairman has evolved from one of merely arranging board 
meetings to that of being the leader of the board team (Tricker, 2012). Many 
corporate scandals, as well as the global financial crisis, have put exponentially more 
pressure on boards and their Chairman (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2013). Together 
with the CEO, it is the Chairman who sets the corporate agenda for the company 
(Dulewicz, MacMillan & Herbert, 1995) and a Chairman can have substantial 
influence over the agenda of board meetings, impacting board members’ allocation 
of attention (Ocasio, 1997).  The Chairman not only ensures that the board’s work is 
“transparent, accountable and ethical, but also takes responsibility for the board’s 
development” (Syrett & Lammiman, 1999, p. 152). The Chairman can hold the 
position in an executive or non-executive capacity and this distinction relates to the 
extent of their involvement in the company.  
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In the context of large Australian boards, the functional role of the Chairman 
extends both inside and outside of the boardroom. Inside the boardroom, the 
Chairman is responsible for overseeing the activity of the board (Levrau & Van den 
Berghe, 2013) as well as leadership of the board (Tricker, 2012) including chairing 
and preparing for board meetings (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2013). In addition, the 
Chairman is responsible for leading board development and board evaluation 
(Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2013), arbitrating between board members and others 
(Tricker, 2012) and liaising with the CEO and senior executives (Levrau & Van den 
Berghe, 2013).  There are also a number of functional responsibilities for Chairmen 
that occur outside of the boardroom. These include the Chairman being responsible 
for ensuring the board pays appropriate attention to strategy formulation (Levrau & 
Van den Berghe, 2013; Tricker, 2012) and being the public face of the company 
(Tricker, 2012) including liaising with shareholders and other stakeholders (Levrau 
& Van den Berghe, 2013). In addition, the Chairman is responsible for overseeing 
compliance with legal and corporate governance requirements (Levrau & Van den 
Berghe, 2013). 
Arguably it is the variety of leadership roles expected of him or her that can be 
the most unique challenge for a Chairman. The Chairman is the leader of a multi-
member governing body that stands at the apex of the organisation (Bainbridge, 
2002). And while the board of directors is the highest decision-making body in the 
organisation, the Chairman is not at the top of any decision-making hierarchy in the 
same way as the CEO is (Gabrielsson, Huse & MiniChilli, 2007). While power is 
centralised with a CEO, a board operates under the assumption of collective wisdom, 
striving to reach decisions in a consensus style (Cadbury, 2002; Levrau & Van den 
Berghe, 2013). In this respect, it is argued, “being a leader of a board is much more 
complex and challenging than individual leadership of a company” (Levrau & Van 
den Berghe, 2013, p. 107). In addition, the Chairman has no statutory position given 
all directors have legally equal responsibilities (Tricker, 2012). The authority of the 
Chairman is derived from that of the board, with no ability to instruct other board 
directors.  A Chairman is merely considered the first among equals having been 
chosen among, and by, the directors to lead the board (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 
2013).  
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Board members 
Historically, board members earned criticism for being under-utilised – merely 
examples of “old boy networks, celebrity members and the images of “yes” men in 
suits” (Dimma, 1996, p. 217). By the 1970s the presence of non-executive directors 
(NEDs) had become common on the boards of listed companies, although the 
concept of director independence was not entirely well understood (Blackwell, 
2013).  In the Australian context, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles (ASX 
2014a) have sought to overcome this challenge by clearly articulating how 
independence may be defined. The independence, or otherwise, of a board member is 
considered important because:  
To describe a director as “independent” carries with it a particular 
connotation that the director is not allied with the interests of management, a 
substantial security holder or other relevant stakeholder and can and will 
bring an independent judgement to bear on issues before the board.  It is an 
appellation that gives great comfort to security holders and not one that 
should be applied lightly (ASX, 2014a; p. 16).   
To help assess whether a board member is independent, the ASX Principles 
provide a number of examples of “interests, positions, associations and relationships” 
(ASX, 2014; p. 16) that may raise concerns or doubts about the independence of an 
individual board member. These include the extent to which the board member may 
have previously been employed by the entity, has previously provided material 
professional services or has had a material business relationship with the entity, is a 
substantial security holder themselves or has been a board member for such a period 
that the individual’s independence may have been compromised (ASX, 2014a). 
In the modern board, there have been increasing numbers of professional, 
independent directors on boards and CEOs are realising the important function that 
these highly experienced individuals can fulfil (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). 
A non-executive director is a board member who does not hold an executive 
management position in the company (Tricker, 2012). Non-executive directors 
frequently form the majority of board members on corporate boards and have been 
described by Forbes and Milliken (1999) as the formal link between the shareholders 
and the senior executives entrusted with the day-to-day functioning of the company. 
Non-executive directors have also been described as spanning the boundary between 
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the organisation and the environment, feeding back information to management 
about stakeholders’ desires, whilst simultaneously feeding out information to 
stakeholders about the organisation (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997, p. 662). As 
both agency and stewardship theory suggests, the needs and wants of stakeholders 
may vary significantly between internal stakeholders and those external to the 
organisation (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
The duties and responsibilities of directors have largely been enshrined in case 
law and legislation. At the core of directors’ duties is the concept that duties arise 
because of the director’s role as an agent, trustee and fiduciary of the company, and 
that these duties are owed to the company (Blackwell, 2013). In the broadest of 
terms, non-executive directors owe a fiduciary duty to their company to act honestly, 
in good faith and to the best of their ability in the interests of the company (Baxt, 
2012). In addition, non-executive directors are expected to act to avoid conflicts of 
interest and to act with care and due diligence. In contrast to board directors who are, 
in most cases, independent to the company, it is necessary to consider the roles of 
those senior executives operating within the organisation. Given the breadth of 
literature considering the role and responsibilities of senior executives in the modern 
company, the focus in this literature review will be on the relationship of a CEO 
specifically, and senior executives more generally, with their Chairman and board. 
Senior executives 
The relationship between the Chairman and CEO is, according to Tricker, “one 
of the most crucial, most sensitive, and most subtle relationships in the organisation” 
(Tricker, 2012, p. 331). The relationship is of central importance in corporate 
governance and can have significant organisational implications (Shen, 2003). 
Drawing on the work of Levrau and Van den Berghe (2013) and Lorsch (2009), 
Table 4 below sets out a comparison of the two roles against the dimensions of 
accountability, decision-making, leadership, authority and access. It is clear that the 
Chairman and CEO work in very different contexts and the leadership approach of 
the Chairman and CEO are completely different given the Chairman is largely a part-
time leader of equals, and the CEO is at the top of a formal hierarchy with frequent 
contact with subordinates. 
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Table	  4	  -­‐	  Comparison	  of	  board	  Chairman	  and	  CEO	  leadership	  roles	  adapted	  from	  Levrau	  &	  Van	  den	  Berghe	  (2013)	  and	  Lorsch	  (2009)	  
Dimension Chairman CEO 
Accountability Accountable to shareholders, 
stakeholders and other board members 
Accountable to the board 
Decision-making With other board members leads the 
highest level of decision-making in the 
company 
Responsible for implementing 
decisions made by the board 
Leadership Generally a part-time leader of equal 
peers at board meetings that take place 
at infrequent intervals and under time 
constraints 
Full-time leader of 
subordinates with frequent 
contact on a continuous basis  
Authority Does not have instruction authority 
over other board members 
Has instruction authority over 
subordinates 
Access Generally non-executive, dealing with 
limited and incomplete information, 
highly dependent on management 
Has information on the daily 
operations of the company 
with access to all layers of the 
organisation 
 
The CEO is the primary agent in both agency and stewardship theory (Tosi, 
Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). Under agency theory, the CEO is assumed to be a 
“rational and self-maximising wealth seeker” (Tosi et al., 2003). Under stewardship 
theory, CEOs are intrinsically motivated to make decisions in the interest of the 
company since this in turn may lead to personal opportunities for growth and 
achievement.  
Also critical to the running of a successful organisation is a broader group of 
senior executives. Senior executives implement the decisions made by the board and 
are essential to the effective management of the organisation. Agency theorists argue 
that when effective controls such as a board of directors are absent, senior executives 
have an incentive to pursue their own interest at the expense of shareholders (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Examples of such self-interest might be excessively high levels 
of remuneration or the pursuit of “self-aggrandizing strategies” (Grossman, 2010, p. 
48). According to agency theory, senior executives will be more likely to promote 
the interests of shareholders when they answer to independent boards of directors 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Stewardship theory maintains that senior executives have 
been trained and socialised to view their interests as consistent with those of the 
company and its various stakeholders (Donaldson, 1990). Stewardship theory 
assumes that senior executives will pursue collective, organisational level goals 
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rather than individualistic, self-serving ones (Davis et al., 1997). Rather than 
developing adversarial relationships with stakeholders, including shareholders, senior 
leaders will engage in coalition-building activities that balance potentially competing 
stakeholder interests (Grossman, 2010).   
A further important aspect of corporate governance is the manner in which 
information about company performance (including safety performance) is publically 
disclosed. The next section of the literature review will consider generally the public 
disclosures a company may make through annual reports and CSR reports, and more 
specifically public disclosures of safety-related activities.  
2.3.3 Public disclosures  
Public disclosures form a key indicator for an investor in understanding how 
well a company is performing and whether an investment should be made. While 
there is a relatively high level of academic interest in the nature of voluntary 
corporate disclosures (Abeysekera, 2008; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; Meek, 
Robert, & Gray, 1995), disclosures relating to safety-related activities have received 
limited attention. Health and safety disclosures are often viewed under a broad 
banner of human resources reporting (Deegan et al., 2002) without a greater depth of 
analysis. This is despite “employee health and safety attracting the greatest level of 
media attention within the human resources theme as well as representing the human 
resources issue with the greatest amount of annual report disclosure” (Deegan et al., 
2002, p. 329). This gap in the literature will be addressed through this research study. 
Consideration will firstly be given in this literature review to disclosures in annual 
reports and CSR reports generally with a more detailed consideration of disclosures 
of safety-related activities in Australia to follow. 
Annual reports 
Annual reports are the central means for a company to communicate with 
shareholders and have become the primary information source for investors, 
creditors, employees and government (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). Annual 
reports also provide a special communication opportunity for organisations to go 
beyond simply reporting financials (Cameron & Guthrie, 1993). The voluntary 
narrative included in many company annual reports allows companies to show 
leadership and vision in reflecting the values and position of the organisation 
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(Clackworthy, 2000). Like all publicly available documents however, they may not 
reflect the objective reality of the organisation (Abeysekera, 2008). The widely 
acknowledged risk remains that disclosures within annual reports are biased, with 
ambiguous and self-serving attributions, and may contain attempts by senior leaders 
to influence the impressions of external stakeholders (Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer, 
2007).  
Annual report disclosures have a number of mandatory requirements. The 
Corporations Act 2001 states that all Australian listed companies are required to 
prepare an annual financial report and a directors’ report. The Corporations Act 2001 
also requires that within the directors’ report there must be an operating and financial 
review. This review should, under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, 
provide information that shareholders would reasonably require to make an informed 
assessment of the company’s operations, financial position and business strategies as 
well as prospects for future financial years. The Corporations Act 2001 specifies that 
all information must be included in the body of the annual report itself and not 
reference other documents or rely on the fact that relevant information may have 
been previously disclosed to the market. Beyond these requirements, the choice of 
what a company discloses is a matter for the board of directors.  
In practice, many boards now disclose significantly more information in their 
communications with shareholders than that required by the Corporations Act 2001. 
Any voluntary disclosures made in annual reports are intended to complement 
mandatory disclosures (Costa, Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2013) after weighing up 
whether the perceived benefits exceed the direct and indirect costs involved in 
increased disclosure (Garcia-Meca, Parra, Larran & Martinez, 2005; Oliveira, 
Rodrigues, & Craig, 2006; Vergauwen & Alem, 2005).   
One of the more common voluntary disclosure sections seen in annual reports 
is a letter to shareholders from the CEO, Chairman or both. This letter has been 
identified as one of the most widely read and most important parts of an annual 
report (Bartlett & Chandler, 1997, pp. 253-4; Fanelli & Grasselli, 2005; Hyland, 
1998; Mir, Chatterjee, & Rahaman, 2009; Prasad & Mir, 2002).  The publication of 
such a letter is voluntary and there is considerable freedom in the choice of how and 
what to disclose (Abrahamson & Amir, 1996). While letters to shareholders are not 
audited, they are subject to strong scrutiny by financial analysts, shareholders, 
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regulators and journalists (Smith & Taffler, 2000). Costa et al (2013, p. 436) 
identified five broad areas of focus for content usually reserved for the letter to 
shareholders including operations, leadership, strategy, financial and culture. There is 
a gap in existing literature with respect to the extent to which these important letters 
are used to communicate with stakeholders on safety issues and this research study 
will seek to address that gap. 
One of the features of this research study will be to understand in greater detail 
the content of letters to shareholders, by both the CEO and Chairman, and the extent 
to which existing theory supports what is occurring in practice with respect to safety 
disclosures. It is therefore important to understand why voluntary letters by the CEO 
or Chairman should be of interest to researchers and more specifically why they are 
relevant to this research study. Amernic, Craig, and Tourish (2010, pp. 30-31) 
summarised five key reasons. First, the letter is a written symbol, signed by the 
Chairman or CEO, who take responsibility for its contents. Second, Amernic et al. 
(2010) argued that sociologically the CEO’s letter is an important ritual that provides 
accountability through explanations from the previous years’ performance and 
targets for the next. Third, the letter provides an insight into the thinking and attitude 
of the most senior leaders in the organisation. Fourth, the letter highlights those 
performance measures against which senior executives should be judged. And fifth, 
the letter helps shareholders understand the Chairman or CEO to a greater extent by 
defining their values, the company culture and the mindset they are influential in 
developing (Amernic et al., 2010). This research will seek to understand how letters 
to shareholders are used in the context of communicating about workplace safety and 
whether they reflect the four criteria of safety leadership.  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports 
Increased awareness within business, and more broadly across society, with 
respect to environmental and social issues has contributed to a transformation in the 
way business is conducted (Junior, Best, & Cotter, 2014; Kolk & Van Tulder, 2010; 
Seuring & Muller, 2008). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) relates to the 
activities of organisations in terms of their contribution to achieving economic, social 
and environmental sustainability and is considered a helpful conceptual framework 
for exploring the corporate attitude of such issues to stakeholders (Jenkins & 
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Yakovleva, 2006) as well as providing accountability for company performance 
(Junior et al., 2014).  
Discussions on the impact corporations have on the environment and society 
first emerged in the 1940s, long before the term CSR was constructed (Claydon, 
2011). The philosophy underpinning the concept of CSR argues that the 
responsibility of an organisation extends beyond delivering financial returns to 
shareholders; and that company objectives should also consider sustainable growth, 
equitable employment practices and long-term social and environmental wellbeing 
(Junior et al., 2014, p. 2). This is in direct contrast to one of the sternest critics of 
CSR, Friedman (1970) who argued that the social responsibility of business is to 
focus on increasing its profits. Neo-classical economists argue that focusing on social 
responsibility can negatively impact shareholder returns, even if only in the short 
term (Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield, 1985; Crilly & Ioannou, 2014; Jensen, 2002; 
McWilliams & Siegal, 1997).  
Yet alternative views posit that social responsibility also represents 
opportunities for profitable business growth (Bansal & Roth, 2000) as well as 
reduces the likelihood of negative regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Freeman, 1984; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Companies 
use CSR reports to disclose to shareholders and other stakeholders their performance 
in economic, social and environmental areas. The first CSR reports emerged in the 
1970’s primarily in the United States and Western Europe (Junior et al., 2014; Kolk, 
2010; Owen, Swift & Hunt, 2001). As the titles of CSR-related reports can vary 
considerably (Junior et al., 2014), for the purposes of the current research all 
voluntary reports disclosing material relating to sustainability, corporate social 
responsibility, social performance and community issues will be referred to under the 
umbrella term of ‘CSR report’.  
There are a number of limitations of CSR reports. In Australia, it is not 
compulsory for a company to publish a CSR report and an Australian Federal 
Government enquiry into whether CSR reporting should be made mandatory 
concluded that the current Corporations Act gave directors adequate guidance for 
providing non-financial information by listed companies (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 2006).  Because of the absence 
of regulation, companies manage themselves in relation to the objectivity of 
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environmental and social information released publicly (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 
2006). Therefore one of the limitations of CSR reporting is that, unlike annual 
reports, they are not audited which may result in data that is unreliable. Companies 
can also be selective about the depth and range of material they disclose in order to 
manage stakeholders impressions and corporate reputation. This has led to a number 
of reporting guidelines being developed, including the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) (Borglund, Frostenson & Windell, 2010; Brown, de Jong & Levy, 2009; 
Junior et al., 2014; KPMG Global Sustainability Services & Accountability, 2005).  
Disclosures of safety-related activities 
Due to the voluntary nature of employee-related disclosures, not all companies 
make public disclosures on safety-related activities (Prior, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013). For those companies that do, some avenues in which organisations report their 
safety data includes within the body of annual reports and/or CSR reports which are 
publicly available and generally always published on a company website. There are 
presently no regulations in Australia around how, when or in what form 
organisations must disclose their safety performance or safety-related activities 
(excluding notifications required by regulators with respect to fatalities and serious 
injuries). In assisting organisations and guiding them in their safety disclosures, an 
Australian Federal Government safety regulator offered suggestions on safety 
reporting in annual reports (National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 
2004, pp. 2-3). In presenting their opinion as to why effective safety reporting in 
annual reports is important, the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (now known as SafeWork Australia) stated that:  
By providing information on an organisation’s safety activities and 
performance, commitment to effective health and safety risk management is 
demonstrated to stakeholders. This, in turn, contributes to enhancing and 
promoting organisational credibility by demonstrating openness and 
transparency. It also provides a basis for acknowledgement of achievement 
(National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2004, p. 3) 
Among large Australian ASX companies there is a mixed approach to 
disclosures of safety-related activities. In some instances organisations do not report 
on safety at all, including those operating in what may be considered high risk or 
high-hazard industries (Prior, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Yet investors are 
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increasingly seeking to understand what the state of safety management within a 
company may be (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2004) and are 
investigating the social, environmental and ethical dimensions of a company before 
investing in it – a phenomenon referred to as socially responsible investing (Jenkins 
& Yakovleva, 2006). The theory of socially responsible investing has responded to 
the view that, with respect to safety, an organisation that consistently reduces 
workplace injuries improves profitability (Wilson, 2010). Further, shareholders’ 
groups have argued that safety is a relevant investment risk because when safety is 
poorly managed it can create unnecessary costs for a business, contribute to business 
disruption, hinder staff attraction, breach workplace regulations and basic human 
rights; and encourage increased regulation or regulator action (Byrne & Brogden, 
2011). In providing guidance for companies as to what investors may look for in 
terms of safety reporting, the need for safety culture commentary has been 
highlighted along with indicators that include governance, process and performance 
(Byrne & Brogden, 2011; O’Neill, 2010).  
Much criticism has been made of existing voluntary workplace safety reporting 
(Brown & Butcher, 2005; O’Neill, 2010; O’Neill, Clarke, & Flanagan, 2011; Safe 
Work Australia, 2013; Vuontisjarvi, 2006). Criticisms have ranged from data 
provided in annual reports and CSR reports being self-laudatory and only focusing 
on selectively positive results, not identifying the key hazards and risks in the 
organisation as well as not discussing the nature and effectiveness of risk control 
strategies (Safe Work Australia, 2013). In addition, concerns have been raised about 
the reliability of the data, the selectivity of the information released and the concern 
that the data are not comparable within an individual report, between reports of 
different years or between reports of companies within the same industry (Hopkinson 
& Whitaker, 1999; Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006). Often reporting focuses on highly 
summarised lag statistics such as lost time injury frequency rates (LTIFR) or total 
recordable injury frequency rates (TRIFR), which may be too aggregated to provide 
useful information, and can misrepresent injury rates as empirical evidence of 
improvements in health and safety (Safe Work Australia, 2013). 
Despite the challenges and criticisms evident within industry in respect of 
current disclosures of safety-related activities, a clear gap in the literature has also 
been identified in terms of alternatives to such disclosures. The current research is 
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expected to address both these gaps by considering safety-related disclosures beyond 
a purely statistical interpretation and examining the extent to which factors such as 
safety leadership may influence the disclosures a company makes.  
2.3.4 Summary 
The second section of this literature review has focused on the area of 
corporate governance, including agency and stewardship theory. The key players 
within a corporate governance framework have been introduced including the 
Chairman, board members, CEO and other senior executives. Lastly, the literature 
has been reviewed with respect to annual report and CSR report disclosures, 
including a specific focus on those disclosures relating to safety-related activities. 
This section of the literature review has highlighted a number of gaps in existing 
literature, which aim to be addressed through this research. In order to address these 
identified gaps the following research questions will be addressed during this 
research study: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
Before outlining the research design, an operational context will be provided 
through a detailed examination of safety governance and safety management in the 
modern company. 
2.4 WORKPLACE SAFETY 
The final section of this literature review will begin by defining workplace 
safety for the purposes of the current research and provide a brief introduction to the 
evolution of safety management. Whilst research in the field of safety has increased 
enormously in the last ten years, there are a number of recognised stages in the 
management of safety (Hale & Hovden, 1998). Each of these stages is reflective of 
an increasing recognition of the role of leadership and senior leader commitment to 
assist in driving improvements in workplace safety results. To understand the 
relevance of safety leadership for large organisations, it is useful to examine the 
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historical context of the management of safety. This will be followed by a more 
specific focus on safety in the boardroom and the potential impact on company 
reputation of significant safety events.  
2.4.1 Defining safety governance 
Workplace safety is a broad discipline that invariably touches upon fields as 
diverse as leadership, culture, behaviours, statistical performance, risk controls and 
methods of risk mitigation.  Montero et al. (2009) summarised health and safety as 
covering the social, mental and physical wellbeing of workers (Montero et al., 2009, 
p. 1441). It is important to define safety for the purposes of this research given the 
term safety can be used quite widely. As suggested by Montero et al. the term health, 
safety and environment (HSE) is used interchangeably to refer to physical safety of 
employees or health and wellbeing initiatives such as stress counselling, influenza 
vaccinations and weight management. Organisations can also make reference to the 
safe conduct of industrial or process matters such as building safety, patient safety, 
pharmaceutical safety, equipment safety, food safety, environmental safety, process 
safety, product safety or customer safety.   
In an effort to develop a common definition of the conceptual and operational 
aspects of safety, a combined research initiative by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and Collaborating Center on Safety Promotion and Injury published the 
document Safety and Safety Promotion: Conceptual and Operational Aspects (WHO, 
1998).  The definition of safety that emerged from this research stated that safety has 
two dimensions that are objective and subjective. The first dimension is objective 
and seen in behavioural and environmental factors measured against external criteria 
(Nilsen et al., 2004; WHO, 1998). The second dimension is subjective and refers to 
an individual’s internal feelings or perceptions of being safe (Nilsen et al., 2004; 
WHO, 1998). These definitions confirm that safety is more than simply avoiding 
injury, yet safety is rarely operationalised in a manner consistent with both 
dimensions of the term and is predominantly based on assessments of objective 
safety with success demonstrated through injury rate reductions (Nilsen et al., 2004).  
Given the need to focus the current research, the scope of safety to be considered will 
be limited to the physical safety of employees and therefore the objective dimension 
of safety as defined by the WHO. This approach is consistent with the original Latin 
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word salvus, from which the word safety is derived and means uninjured, in good 
health, safe (Harper, 2014).  
The concept of risk within business has been widely addressed in the literature; 
and when considering the role of board members and senior executives in managing 
such risk, physical safety risks are increasingly included. Waring (2013) outlines a 
range of safety incidents including the Piper Alpha disaster and Three Mile Island 
explosion, to highlight that an inability to manage safety of employees can have just 
as catastrophic an impact on business continuity and sustainability as other risks, 
such as fraud or financial collapse. Yet within the broad field of risk governance, 
specific reference to safety governance has only received limited attention in the 
literature, and even then, not directly in the context of workplace safety. A ProQuest 
search of the term “safety governance” on 14 July 2014 returned 99 peer-reviewed, 
scholarly journal articles. The most widely found use of the term safety governance 
is in the area of food safety. Safety governance in this context relates to ensuring 
food is produced and consumed in a way that prevents food-borne illnesses as well as 
maintaining high levels of animal and plant health (de Krom, 2009).  Within the 
search, only five journal articles used the term safety governance in the context of 
workplace safety and on closer analysis of these references it was clear that there is 
no widely accepted use of the term in the literature.  
Safety governance was used in the context of workplace safety in one piece of 
research to describe a command and control model of state regulation in safety, 
which is often adversarial and formalistic (Gray, 2009). Other uses of the term 
described safety management systems in Ontario (Kosny, 2005), Zimbabwe 
(Taderera, 2012) and the European Union (Ansell, 2008), however, no definition of 
safety governance was offered. Reference to safety governance was also made in the 
context of the difficulty in assigning responsibility for workplace fatalities when 
“safety governance is often spread over a number of management levels” (Wan, 
2007, p. 254) without any further explanation of the term. It is therefore necessary to 
look to industry to understand how the concept of safety governance may be 
interpreted. 
The concept of safety governance has received a limited level of attention 
within industry. In 2006 the UK Health and Safety Executive produced a document 
entitled Defining best practice in corporate occupational health and safety 
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governance (HSE, 2006). While this document did not directly define safety 
governance, it did provide a clear link between the corporate governance 
responsibilities of directors and workplace safety. A framework proposed by the UK 
Health and Safety Executive outlined seven principles for safety governance 
incorporating issues such as director competence; director roles and responsibilities; 
culture, standard and values; strategic implications; performance management; 
internal controls; and organisational structure (HSE, 2006). This is the closest 
description of safety governance identified as relevant to the current research being 
conducted. 
Given there is no accepted definition of the concept of safety governance in the 
literature or industry, and as the concepts are directly relevant to the focus of this 
research, a new definition is proposed. This definition has been developed after 
synthesising and analysing the existing literature and ensuring elements in the 
definition encompass leadership theory, corporate governance and workplace safety. 
The definition of safety governance to be used in the research outlined in this thesis 
is as follows: 
Safety governance is the relationship between board members and senior 
executives in the safety leadership of an organisation and provides the 
structure through which the vision and commitment to safety is set, the 
means of attaining safety objectives are agreed, the framework for 
monitoring performance is established; and compliance with legislation is 
ensured.  
Safety governance may be reflected in the charters and policies, 
communication channels, and reporting and measurement tools established by board 
members and senior executives to maintain attention and oversight on workplace 
safety performance beyond mere compliance with relevant legislation.   
The extent to which the board and senior leadership have become involved in, 
and responsible for, workplace safety has evolved over the past century. To 
understand the role that workplace safety plays in the modern company, and the 
reason it is an important issue warranting further academic consideration, an 
examination of how safety management has evolved and in particular the influence 
of employee involvement and senior leaders in that development, will follow. 
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2.4.2 Evolution of safety management 
To understand the need for focus on safety issues by senior leaders, it is helpful 
to examine the extent to which the management of safety has changed over the past 
century. Once industrialisation occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, businesses 
began to focus on engineering solutions to help guard employees from machinery, 
stop explosions and prevent structures from collapsing. This period, referred to as the 
first age of safety (Hale & Hovden, 1998), was characterised by managing the 
physical workplace environment and lasted from the 1880s until the end of the 
Second World War. Representative of the views of senior leaders at the time were 
the attitudes of UK factory inspectors who stated that the only accidents they were 
interested in having reported were those caused by technical faults since all others 
could be reasonably prevented (Hale, 1978; Hale & Hovden, 1998). It was during 
this period that research was conducted into personnel selection, training and 
motivation to help prevent accidents, often based on the theory that an injured 
worker was more likely to be ‘accident prone’ (Hale & Glendon, 1987; Hale & 
Hovden, 1998). This period resulted in strong action by unions who led the call for 
effective occupational health and safety legislation (Webb, 2009). The first such 
legislation in Australia was the Victorian Factories and Shops Act (1885), which 
legislated for fencing of machinery, provision of sanitary requirements and powers of 
inspectors (Webb, 2009). At this time, the culture of workplace safety was largely 
paternalistic, giving authority to diagnose and fix conditions to the employer (Webb, 
2009). Trade unions successfully demanded a 44-hour week and arguments for such 
an award was on the basis not only of the principle of fair pay for a day’s work, but 
also on the impact that extended and unreasonable hours had on worker’s health and 
safety (Webb, 2009). 
By the 1950s there was recognition that there were limits to the safety benefits 
that could be achieved solely through engineering measures (DeJoy, 2005).  The 
management of workplace safety therefore further developed between the 1950s and 
late 1980s, known as the second age of safety, when it was evident that companies, 
and society more broadly, had increasing dissatisfaction with the idea that safety 
could be addressed by simply matching the individual to the technology (Hale & 
Hovden, 1998). In addition, human factors research demonstrated that behaviours of 
workers needed to be addressed when attempting to improve safety results. During 
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the 1970s the growth of legal regulations in occupational safety, and the creation of 
safety committees and safety experts, led to workplace safety being regarded as an 
activity of safety professionals and labour inspectors (Hakkinen, 1995). This 
encouraged an absence of personal commitment to safety by senior leaders and led to 
reduced activity and awareness of the issue at the most senior levels because safety 
could be effectively delegated to others (Hakkinen, 1995).  
At the same time, a number of significant workplace disasters occurred during 
the mid 1980s (Hale & Hovden, 1998) resulting in increased academic, government 
and practitioner research into the causes of the accidents and the influence of 
leadership and safety culture. The Three Mile Island partial nuclear meltdown in 
1979, the Bhopal gas leak in 1984, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and the 
Space Shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986 were examples of significant workplace 
incidents during the period. These disasters had a profound impact on the political 
and societal views of workplace safety (Guldenmund, 2000) and it appeared that the 
time was right for a critical examination of safety management. Major incidents, 
particularly coming from the nuclear, gas and space industries where safety 
management was considered more advanced than in other industry sectors, 
challenged the general conceptions and presumptions about what may have been 
previously considered a safe and effective operation (Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2011). 
These high technology industries were well developed, often with highly 
bureaucratic safety systems in place which had been thought until that time to be 
sufficient to prevent such events (Hale & Hovden, 1998).  
Since the early 1990s there has existed a third age of safety, through which 
management systems have become the focus of development and research within the 
field of workplace safety (Hale & Hovden, 1998). This shift in emphasis commenced 
with cutbacks in government activity resulting in the withdrawal of government 
regulation and shopfloor inspections of workplace safety (Hale & Hovden, 1998). In 
the UK in the late 1990s for example, research was commissioned by the British 
Safety Council aimed at raising the profile of health and safety at the boardroom 
level (Smallman & John, 2001). The primary aim was to shift perceptions of safety 
from a purely regulatory response to a strategic issue on the corporate agenda. Under 
the banner of self-regulation the emphasis of regulators changed to place central 
responsibility on senior leaders of organisations for devising, installing and 
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monitoring their own safety management system (Hale & Hovden, 1998). This in 
turn resulted in regulatory authorities becoming interested in indicators that could 
provide them with a basis for planning the more limited controls they still wished to 
undertake and replaced more detailed worksite and plant inspections (Hale & 
Hovden, 1998). It also resulted in senior leaders needing to take seriously their 
responsibility to set up internal safety systems, including the development of 
performance indicators, in order to motivate and guide employees to consciously 
manage workplace safety (Hale & Hovden, 1998).  
This review of the historical progress in safety governance and management 
from industrialisation to the modern age helps highlight a further gap in the literature 
that this research study hopes to address. While research has focused on the broad 
changes in approaches to managing safety that have occurred, there is no empirical 
evidence in the literature of views of senior leaders and how these views may relate 
to safety leadership and ultimately the management of safety in an organisation. The 
role of senior leaders in safety will now be considered. 
2.4.3 Safety in the boardroom 
Many different issues will compete for a board members’ attention including 
monitoring senior executive performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Daily, 
Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson, 2010), share price 
performance, resource provision, organisational strategy and seeking new 
opportunities for growth (Charan, 1998). Workplace safety is another issue that will 
compete for attention in the boardroom and senior managers’ prioritisation of safety 
against other business drivers is clearly important (Flin & Yule, 2004). However, 
board members do not allocate equal amounts of time to every issue before them but 
rather allocate attention based on the perceived importance of the issue they face 
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997).  Hopkins (1995) 
provided the example of Shell Australia, where it was reported that one third of every 
board meeting was devoted to safety. Safety was, according to Hopkins (p. 187) 
always the first item on the board agenda and at each meeting the board generally 
discussed two or three particular lost time injuries (LTIs) and heard from senior 
executives regarding the circumstances surrounding each incident. It is clear from the 
example of Shell that the board and senior executives were focused on safety and, in 
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the view of Hopkins this was a critical factor in explaining the superior safety 
performance of the organisation.  
In a contrasting example, the lack of leadership by the Board of BP was found 
to be a root cause of the 2005 Texas Refinery explosion (BP Baker Report, 2007). In 
the final report the following comment was made: 
While site leadership is certainly important in establishing a positive process 
safety culture, the (Baker Panel) believes that leadership from the top of the 
company, starting with the Board and going down, is essential. In the Panel’s 
opinion, it is imperative that BP’s leadership set the process safety “tone at 
the top” of the organisation and establish appropriate expectations regarding 
process safety performance. Those expectations must reflect an unwavering 
commitment to process safety and infuse into BP’s workforce the mindset 
that process accidents are not acceptable (BP Baker Report, 2007, p. 60).  
In a more recent example, the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine 
Tragedy (Panckhurst, 2012) found significant failings on the part of the Board. The 
failures in governance of the Board highlighted by the investigation included the 
failure to verify that effective systems were in place to manage risks on site. The 
Board was also criticised for not holding senior executives to account for the 
assurances they were given in the lead up to the explosion but instead assuming that 
senior executives would draw to the board’s attention any major operational 
problems (Panckhurst, 2012, p. 18). In summarising their findings, the Royal 
Commission concluded that: 
The Board did not provide effective health and safety leadership and protect 
the workforce from harm. It was distracted by the financial and production 
pressures that confronted the company (Panckhurst, 2012, p. 18).  
In the Pike River report (Panckhurst, 2012), safety governance within the 
company and the level of attention given by the Board to safety came under 
considerable criticism. These criticisms included the Chairman’s general attitude that 
things were under control unless he was informed otherwise. In addition, the Board’s 
focus on meeting production targets set the tone within the organisation (Panckhurst, 
2012) thereby directing attention to matters other than safety.  
In a 2001 study of UK director attitudes towards health and safety, in-depth 
interviews revealed that while reputation is at stake for companies with poor health 
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and safety performance, beyond the point of ensuring liability is covered, corporate 
reputation is not further enhanced by an excellent safety record (Smallman & John, 
2001). Yet the cost of getting safety wrong can have disastrous consequences for 
company value, internal morale, customer contracts and government regulation.  
Concern about how corporate reputations affect shareholders’ perceptions has led 
many companies to consider their safety performance in much greater detail 
(European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2004).  
The case of Massey Energy in the USA is a striking example of the financial 
cost of poor safety. In 2010, an explosion at a Massey Energy mine in West Virginia 
killed 29 miners. At the time, Massey Energy was the fourth largest coal producer in 
the USA and the largest in the region. The day after the explosion, the share price for 
Massey Energy fell 11% and within a month had fallen 33% (Koehler & 
Hespenheide, 2013). Further financial deterioration followed once it was estimated 
than between USD $80 million – USD $150 million would need to be paid in 
compensation to the families of those killed, as well as an additional USD $62 
million worth of equipment and mineral rights which had been impacted (Koehler & 
Hespenheide, 2013). The CEO of Massey Energy was forced to resign once further 
evidence of the poor safety record of the organisation emerged. Less than a year 
later, Massey Energy had been bought out by another company “known for a focus 
on safety” (Koehler & Hespenheide, 2013, p. 103).  
Very limited literature is available regarding the views of senior leaders 
towards workplace safety (Huang, Leamon, Courtney, Chen, & DeArmond, 2007; 
Roger et al., 2010; Smallman & John, 2001). Even more limited is research 
considering the views of board members towards safety. One study was conducted in 
2001 and questioned the attitudes of board members to workplace health and safety 
in the UK (Smallman & John, 2001). In the study, 102 of the UK’s most senior 
directors were surveyed about their attitudes towards safety and in particular the 
relationship between safety and corporate reputation. The research revealed that 79% 
of directors cited health and safety as having a great or fair amount of tangible 
impact on corporate reputation, 88% of directors indicated that employee morale and 
reputation would be adversely affected by a poor safety culture and 68% of directors 
saw poor safety as adversely influencing productivity and efficiency (Smallman & 
John, 2001). Of those surveyed, eight respondents were selected for an in-depth one 
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hour interview to consider the status of safety within their organisations. 
Interviewees in the study stressed the importance of safety, which is largely to be 
expected. The directors went further to explain that safety was part of their 
organisational culture and went well beyond mere compliance with regulations 
(Smallman & John, 2001).  
Attention to safety in the boardroom requires directors to do more than simply 
review the injury statistics at each meeting or conduct a site visit annually.  Directors 
are urged to pay genuine attention to safety, hold senior executives accountable for 
safety outcomes, and expect improved performance without necessarily looking to 
apportion blame (Krause, 2000). In practice-based research conducted in the UK, 
interviews with institutional investors revealed that in the development of health and 
safety indicators to provide investors an understanding of safety management 
practices within an organisation, board involvement was considered amongst the 
most important (Mansley, 2002). Practical displays of such board member 
involvement included knowing that the board had considered and endorsed the 
company health and safety policy as well as having either a board member or the 
Chairman identified as a safety champion amongst the directors (Mansley, 2002). 
Yet such indicators are not codified in workplace safety legislation against which 
many boards continue to set their safety responsibilities. In recent decades, the role 
of Chief Risk Officer has emerged in many large organisations. Establishment of 
such positions within senior executive teams indicate a growing propensity by boards 
to be kept informed at a very high level of all risks being faced by an organisation, 
including those relating to issues such as workplace safety. 
2.4.4 Summary 
This final section of the literature review has examined the field of workplace 
safety as it relates to the current research study. Despite a strong focus on safety and 
the role of the board within industry, a significant gap in the literature was identified 
with limited research available examining the views of board members about 
workplace safety. The term safety governance was defined which incorporates safety 
leadership, corporate governance and workplace safety. In addition, a review of the 
evolution of safety management since industrialisation has highlighted the lack of 
research focus on the views of senior leaders as to their role in safety, despite focus 
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by industry. These gaps will seek to be addressed in this research study by the 
following research question: 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This literature review has introduced the broad theory of transformational 
leadership and more specifically, the sub-theory of SSTL and alternative models of 
safety leadership. Four criteria of safety leadership have been identified – vision, 
personal commitment, decision-making and transparency. This literature review also 
introduced theories of corporate governance, and outlined the roles of key players in 
the current research including board members and senior executives. Their roles, 
particularly in relation to safety, were explored. The literature with respect to annual 
report and CSR disclosures was introduced, as well the disclosures of safety-related 
activities in practice. Lastly, this study was given its operational context by providing 
an understanding of the evolution of safety management in the modern company. 
Gaps identified in the literature through this review have included consideration of 
senior leaders in relation to safety leadership and the manner in which public 
disclosures are made in relation to safety-related activities. In addition, throughout 
the literature on the evolution of safety management there is a gap with respect to the 
role of the board in workplace safety and the views of senior leaders with respect to 
that role. Three research questions will form the basis for this research study to 
address these identified gaps: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
The next chapter will outline the research design to be used in addressing these 
three research questions.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the field of leadership, there is a growing interest in the use of 
qualitative research, which allows a researcher to “inquire from inside” (Parry, 
Mumford, Bower, & Watts, 2014, p. 134). The research outlined in this paper has 
taken a qualitative approach in the research design to answer the three research 
questions given qualitative research acknowledges the contextual nature of inquiry 
(Glesne & Peshkin, 1992) making it well suited to the current research project. A 
qualitative research design does not attempt to relate study variables, but provides an 
understanding of the experiences shared by the participants (Creswell, 2005). This 
will be particularly relevant in helping to answer the research questions, which focus 
on understanding how companies, as well as individual board members and senior 
executives, reflect safety leadership in their public disclosures and views 
respectively. 
This chapter will outline in more detail why a qualitative design was adopted 
before providing detail on the methodology used for the research study. A holistic 
approach to the research was undertaken to answer the research questions with two 
distinct, but related, studies forming the foundation of the research design. Lincoln & 
Denzin (2003) outlined one of the strengths of qualitative research design is the 
ability to move behind measurement. In order to utilise this strength in this research, 
both studies have been designed using a qualitative design in order to adequately 
address the research questions. Study 1 involved a document analysis of annual 
reports and CSR reports and Study 2 involved in-depth case studies with two 
companies from the Study 1 sample. This chapter will describe the research design 
for the entire research project in detail.  
One of the strengths of the research design has been the combined approach of 
Study 1 and Study 2 to answer the research questions. The longitudinal approach 
taken in Study 1, combined with the in-depth case study of two of the sample 
companies in Study 2, has enabled a deep analysis of safety leadership with multiple 
sources of evidence from which to analyse data. By focusing on written 
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communications in Study 1, combined with additional internal materials and in-depth 
interviews in Study 2, the range of data sources has increased the strength and 
enhanced the trustworthiness of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011).  
A further strength of this research design has been to undertake case studies 
with organisations from both high-hazard and low-hazard industry sectors. The focus 
on workplace safety in research and by industry is often within high-hazard sectors 
where the consequence of a workplace safety incident may be catastrophic. However, 
while the consequence of workplace incidents in low-hazard sectors may be lower, 
the frequency of safety incidents is in fact higher than high-hazard industry sectors 
and a statistical comparison of the lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) of both 
sectors will be presented in Chapter 5. This research will explore the approach of 
boards and senior executives to workplace safety in contrasting industry sectors to 
enable a much deeper analysis, as well as comparison between cases, of the safety 
leadership criteria influencing senior leaders. 
In this chapter, Study 1 will be outlined and reasons discussed for selecting a 
longitudinal design, the method for selecting sample companies and information on 
how data was collected and analysed will be provided. Study 2 will then be 
considered with a discussion on case selection, the three phases of the case study 
design and methods for data collection and analysis explored. Lastly, this chapter 
will address issues of trustworthiness as well as limitations of the research design. 
Before commencing a detailed discussion of Study 1 and 2, further justification of a 
qualitative research approach will be provided. 
3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Qualitative research is keenly focused on the natural world (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011) and concerned with understanding the meaning that people attach to 
phenomena within their social worlds (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Because qualitative 
research places the researcher, as an observer, in the natural setting of the 
phenomenon being studied, researchers are able to turn the world being studied into a 
series of representations including field notes, interviews, photographs, recordings 
and memos to the self (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The origin of qualitative research 
can be found in the work of Immanuel Kant. In contrast to the earlier work of 
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Descartes, who promoted the importance of objectivity, and Comte, who asserted the 
social world could be studied through the lens of invariant laws just like the natural 
world (Snape & Spencer, 2003), Kant argued that there are ways of knowing about 
the world beyond positivism. A new school of thought, interpretivism, was integral 
to the creation of the qualitative research approach. Modern qualitative research 
continues to place emphasis on “methods which attempt to provide a holistic 
understanding of research participants’ views and actions in the context of their lives 
overall” (Snape & Spencer, 2003, p. 7). 
Parry et al., (2014) outlined a number of advantages to using qualitative 
research to study leadership. One of the advantages suggested by Parry et al. (2014) 
included the “flexibility to follow unexpected ideas during research and explore 
processes effectively” (p. 133) as well as the ability to ensure “sensitivity to 
contextual factors” (p. 133). Both of these advantages were important elements of 
this research study and will be discussed further in this chapter. Parry et al. (2014) 
also suggested an advantage of using a qualitative design in leadership research as 
being the increased opportunity for “in-depth and longitudinal explorations of 
leadership phenomena” (p. 133). Both Study 1 and 2 of this research design have 
sought to maximise the opportunity offered by qualitative research through 
undertaking a longitudinal study of safety-related disclosures as well as in-depth case 
studies, allowing for a deep analysis of safety leadership in order to answer the 
research questions of this study. 
The aim of qualitative research is to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
social world. The nature of the three research questions being addressed lend 
themselves particularly well to a qualitative approach. Parry et al. (2014) maintained, 
“the high sensitivity of leadership to context is well established in the literature” (p. 
134). Contextual research is concerned with identifying what exists in the social 
world and the way it manifests itself (Ritchie, 2003). A strong feature of the current 
research is the ability to describe safety leadership in the context of each company in 
the sample in Study 1 as well as in the participant’s own words in Study 2. Adopting 
a qualitative approach has allowed the phenomena to be ‘unpacked’, to understand it 
in more detail and explore how the issues are understood by those connected to them 
(Ritchie, 2003). As described by Parry et al., qualitative researchers are “well 
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positioned to open the ‘black box’” to gain insights into the dynamics of leadership 
(p. 134). 
Before commencing a detailed discussion of the research design, it is important 
to highlight the level of analysis being undertaken. While leadership research is 
typically undertaken at an individual level, corporate governance research is 
concerned with the operation of boards more broadly. Therefore, this research design 
will incorporate two levels of analysis – initially at an organisational level to answer 
research questions 1 and 2 and then at an individual level to answer research question 
3, with interview data aggregated to gain an understanding of how the group 
operates. The two levels of analysis being used are supported by the research 
conducted by Dalton and Dalton (2011), which found that the overwhelming 
majority of research on board leadership is multi-level.  
3.3 STUDY 1  
Study 1 involved a document analysis of annual reports and CSR reports from 
ASX200 companies, each at three time periods, five years apart, over a ten-year 
period. Study 1 was conducted first so that an understanding of the workplace safety 
context in which an individual company, and the industry sector in which it operates, 
would prepare the researcher for case study research in Study 2. It was necessary to 
gain a deep understanding of the safety disclosures that had emerged during the 
previous ten years to assist in framing relevant investigations in Study 2. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, very little research has been undertaken on public 
disclosures of safety-related activities therefore to enhance knowledge in this field, a 
longitudinal approach was undertaken. A longitudinal study was important for 
providing evidence of changes in safety-related disclosures over time, rather than at a 
point in time, to understand how company approaches may have changed. This 
allowed for trends over time to be understood and to understand whether approaches 
to safety leadership and safety governance had changed over the time period under 
analysis.  
In addition, industry variation was considered to be a relevant factor in 
understanding the level of disclosures across companies in the sample. While it was 
expected that there may be a focus on safety disclosures by companies operating in 
traditionally high-hazard industries, as already discussed, the paucity of research in 
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this area meant that it was also an opportune time to understand the level of safety 
reporting by companies in what might be considered low-hazard industries. While 
safety issues are often perceived to be primarily the focus for companies undertaking 
high-hazard work, office based environments often have higher frequency rates of 
minor injuries (APPEA, 2014; Safe Work Australia, 2014) making safety relevant for 
all companies in the sample.  
The document analysis used descriptive coding (Saldana, 2011) to analyse 
safety disclosures against the four safety leadership criteria, followed by a process of 
focused coding (Saldana, 2011) to analyse categories of disclosures over time and 
compare them between industry sectors. Details of the processes used during each 
phase of coding are provided below. The analysis of publicly available documents 
during Study 1 provided an understanding of safety disclosures across a large sample 
and through a process of descriptive and focused coding, allowed categories and 
themes to be identified against the four safety leadership criteria - vision, personal 
commitment, decision-making and transparency. Figure 2 outlines the two research 
phases that were followed in Study 1. 
 Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Study	  1	  research	  phases	  	  
3.3.1 Length of study 
As a longitudinal study, a key consideration was the length of time likely to 
furnish the most relevant data to assist in addressing the research question. 
Consideration was given to the fact that one of the characteristics recommended to 
measure an organisational culture is relative stability for at least five years (De Cock, 
Bouwen, De Witte, & De Visch, 1986; Guldenmund, 2010). In a previous 
longitudinal study of organisational values of annual reports, researchers elected to 
use a five-year gap and whilst the researchers agreed five years is not extensive, it 
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was considered long enough to allow general trends to be identified (Kabanoff & 
Holt, 1996).  
 In order to gauge an appropriate period of time for the longitudinal study, a 
preliminary study was conducted of three ASX200 companies to understand the level 
of disclosures of safety-related activities across two time periods, five years apart. 
The three companies were selected randomly from three different sectors – financial 
services, energy, and consumer staples. The preliminary study involved analysing 
nine documents in total – an annual report for each of the three companies from the 
years 2000, 2005 and 2010. The documents were reviewed for any references to 
safety-related activities and themes were noted. Initially, the first time period 
analysed was five years with an analysis of annual reports for the companies in 2005 
and 2010. This analysis revealed that certain themes began to emerge in 2010 that 
had not been evident in 2005; potentially reflecting the evolution in the stages of 
reporting maturity found by Smallman and John (2001).    
The preliminary study was then extended to include a second time period of the 
preceding five years to include the reporting year 2000. This allowed a ten-year 
comparison of safety disclosures to be made. It became evident that by adding an 
additional time period of five years, a greater level of comparison could be made 
across the three companies. It also allowed for a deeper analysis of changes that 
occurred within industry sectors that would provide a rich body of data to draw from 
in Study 1. In addition, safety culture change requires the exercise of leadership at all 
levels over at least five to seven years to be effective and lasting (Simon & Frazee, 
2005) making the ten-year period a valuable one in which to identify potential 
change.  
3.3.2 Sample and sampling 
The focus of Study 1 was to analyse the public disclosures of safety-related 
activities of large Australian organisations. The Australian ASX listed companies 
included in the sample were selected from the constituents of the Australian Stock 
Exchange 200 (ASX200). This index was introduced in Australia in 2000 and 
replaced the previous All Ordinaries Index (S&P Indices, 2011). The ASX200 
measures the performance of the 200 largest index-eligible stocks listed on the ASX 
by float-adjusted market capitalisation and is widely considered Australia’s pre-
eminent benchmark index (S&P Indices, 2011). Inclusion in the ASX200 Index 
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generates significant institutional interest for constituents as well as media and 
financial analytical coverage.  A sample from the ASX200 was selected because 
there is a positive relationship between entity size and the level of company 
disclosure (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1996). In 
addition, large companies tend to disclose more social and environmental 
information than smaller companies do (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006; Meek et al., 
1995) and so make them a valuable sample to study. Practically, as listed companies 
there would also be a large range of publicly available documents for review.  
Once it had been determined that the timescale for the data to be collected 
would be ten years, the researcher identified the top 200 listed companies on the 
ASX during each of the three relevant years being used for analysis in Study 1. 
Standard & Poor’s Indices Service provided the researcher with a list of the 
constituents in the ASX 200 on 1 July 2001, 1 July 2006 and 1 July 2011. A 
comparative analysis was then undertaken by the researcher to assess which 
companies appeared on the ASX200 indices in each of the three relevant years in 
order to determine which organisations would form the sample. Where an 
organisation was not listed in the ASX200 index in any one of the three years of 
2001, 2006 and 2011, they were excluded from the sample. The first stage of the 
comparative analysis involved reviewing which companies on the 2011 indices were 
also on the 2006 list. After the first stage, the number of possible companies for 
inclusion in the document analysis reduced from 200 to 105.  The second stage of the 
comparative analysis involved reviewing which of the 105 remaining companies in 
2006 were also in the 2001 index. After this final stage of comparative analysis, 77 
companies remained. Two companies in the index in 2001 merged by 2011 and 
therefore 76 companies formed the final sample from which data were collected in 
Study 1.  
Industry sector representation 
Variation by industry sector in approaches to disclosing safety activities in 
annual reports and CSR reports was integrated in to the research design.  In order to 
undertake Study 1, the final 76 sample companies were sorted according to their 
allocated Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector code.  GICS is an 
international industry taxonomy aimed at standardising industry definitions and was 
introduced in Australia by the ASX in 2002 (ASX, 2014b). Within the taxonomy are 
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10 industry sectors and 24 industry groups. Each of the 10 GICS industry sectors was 
represented in the Study 1 sample.  Table 5 provides details of the spread of 
organisations included within the sample sorted according to their industry sector 
GICS code.  
Table 5 - Companies in Study 1 sample 
Industry sector Number of companies 
Consumer discretionary 12 
Consumer staples 5 
Energy 5 
Financial services 21 
Health care 5 
Industrials 11 
Information technology 1 
Materials 12 
Telecommunication services 2 
Utilities 2 
 
N=76 
 
It was anticipated that the sample size of 76 companies spread across all 
industry sectors would provide sufficient organisations from which to gain rich 
information about the safety disclosure patterns of large Australian organisations 
over time. However it was necessary to verify whether the sample group was 
representative of the broader ASX200 constituency and so the industry sector 
representation in the sample was compared with the ASX200 constituency in 2001, 
2006 and 2011. An average sector representation over ten years was also calculated 
based on the three time periods analysed. Table 6 shows that the sample of 
companies used for this research was representative of the wider ASX200 group in 
existence across the 10-year period of 2001 – 2011. The greatest variance was 4.2% 
in the materials sector however as this was one of the largest sectors in the sample 
group this figure was not considered statistically significant. 
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Table	  6	  -­‐	  Actual	  industry	  sector	  representation	  of	  ASX200	  (2001,	  2006,	  2011)	  	  
Industry sector 2001 2006 2011 10 year average 
Variance 
to sample 
Consumer discretionary 13% 14% 13% 13% -2.8% 
Consumer staples 7% 6% 4% 6% -0.6% 
Energy 3% 8% 11% 7% +0.4% 
Financial services 27% 27% 18% 24% -3.6% 
Health care 8% 7% 5% 7% +0.4% 
Industrials 12% 13% 16% 14% -0.5% 
Information technology 8% 2% 2% 4% 2.7% 
Materials 16% 17% 26% 20% 4.2% 
Telecommunication services 3% 1% 2% 2% -0.6% 
Utilities 3% 6% 5% 5% 2.4% 
      
3.3.3 Data collection 
The two types of documents central within this research study for analysis were 
annual reports and CSR reports, given that these documents outline senior leaders’ 
thoughts in a comprehensive yet compact manner (Neimark, 1996). It is 
acknowledged that public documents such as these are designed to influence external 
stakeholders and to manage public impressions of the organisation. However, words 
matter, especially when expressed strategically by key corporate decision makers 
who wish to create an influential ideology with stakeholders (Conaway & Wardrope, 
2010). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that word choice reflect the cognitive 
categories individuals use to allocate their attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Sapir, 
1944; Whorf, 1956). In addition, “words that are frequently used are cognitively 
central and reflect what is most on the user’s mind; words that are used infrequently 
or not at all are at the cognitive peripheral, perhaps even representing uncomfortable 
or alien concepts” (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel & Bierman, 2010, p 953). The choices 
an organisation made in terms of what information to disclose enhanced the richness 
of the data.  Equally valuable were those organisations that made no reference to 
safety, or even only a limited reference, in their annual reports and CSR reports. 
Table 7 sets out a breakdown of the number of sample companies with an 
annual report and a CSR report; and the total number of documents analysed in 
Study 1. Not all organisations in the sample had a CSR report available. Where a 
report was available, any relevant content relating to safety was 
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understanding of safety disclosures for that organisation; however, the absence of a 
CSR report did not preclude inclusion of that company in the sample. References to 
safety that were located in CSR reports were not separately identified in the analysis 
because many companies simply included their CSR equivalent reporting within the 
body of the company’s main annual report rather than publishing a separate 
document. While beyond the scope of the current research, it is relevant to note that 
there was a considerable increase in the publication of CSR reports between 2001 
(where only two companies in the sample published CSR reports), to 2011 (where 32 
reports were available).  
Table 7 - Total number of documents analysed (2001, 2006, 2011) 
Document type  2001    2006  2011  Total 
Annual reports     77*    77*    76*   230 
CSR reports      2    16    32    50 
Total      79    93   108   280 
*As previously outlined, two companies in the index in 2001 merged by 2011 and therefore 76 companies formed the final 
sample from which data was collected in Study 1. 
Disclosure levels in annual reports are generally one of the most important 
sources of corporate information (Kent & Zunker, 2013; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; 
Oliveira et al., 2006). The annual report has long been the central source of corporate 
communications to investors and other stakeholders, and is widely used by 
companies for various voluntary disclosures (Campbell, 2000; Kent & Zunker, 2013; 
Rockness, 1985; Wiseman, 1982). Annual reports were chosen as a key data source 
because they are regularly produced and present an historical account of the activities 
of an organisation (Abeysekera, 2008; Neimark, 1996). Annual reports provide a 
valuable opportunity to compare approaches to communicating disclosure of safety-
related activities over time. Despite risks of impression management, annual reports 
are still valuable artefacts for analysis (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Ocasio, 
2011; Tuggle, Sirmon, et al., 2010). Annual reports are the main method of 
communication with shareholders and other stakeholders and so contain valuable 
information on the levels of attention from the board and senior executives in various 
areas (Ocasio, 2011). On a practical level, annual reports are easily available and can 
be compared across years, which allow a systematic, longitudinal analysis of 
approaches to safety disclosures that might not otherwise have been possible.  
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Defining safety 
A further key consideration in the research design was the data to extract from 
annual reports and CSR reports that related to safety. Because the number of items 
that may be disclosed by a company in their annual report is extensive, researchers 
tend to focus on a small sub-set of items (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnely, 2004), 
which in this case were safety-related activities. The first stage in data collection 
involved searching each of the 280 documents in the sample individually for 
references to safety. This involved a text search using the search terms safe (to 
include safety, safest, safely), injury, occupational, fatal (to include fatalities, 
fatality), employee, CSR, various technical safety measurements such as LTIFR and 
TRIFR and common safety abbreviations such as OHS and HSE. A visual search 
was also conducted to see whether there were additional references to safety 
throughout the report that may not have been captured during the text search. This 
criterion for sorting and collecting of references to safety was expected to be relevant 
to all industry sectors given the high frequency of lost time injuries in traditionally 
low-hazard industries (Safe Work Australia, 2014). 
A standardised approach to the collection of artefacts is recommended 
(Creswell, 2009) and therefore data collection for each of the 280 documents was 
consistent and an essential part of the research design. All areas of the annual report 
were reviewed for any references to safety, including the financial statements. As the 
documentary analysis was undertaken it was clear that safety emerged in recurring 
areas in many annual reports. These areas included, but were not limited to: 
• Lists of company values; 
• Sections of the annual report setting out business highlights or 
achievements for the year; 
• Chairman and/or CEO letters; 
• Employee-related sections; 
• Directors reports that included the board charter or details of relevant 
board committees relating to safety; 
• Remuneration reports providing details of short term incentives or 
bonuses payable to the CEO or senior executives; 
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• Detailed safety sections setting out statistical information of safety 
performance; and 
• Commentary provided on safety-related activities, safety initiatives, 
safety processes and safety improvements. 
These sections were all given close attention and focus by the researcher to ensure all 
relevant references to safety were included in Study 1. In addition, all other areas of 
the board report were reviewed in the event that references to safety appeared in a 
different context. 
A decision was made by the researcher to only include express references to 
safety during data collection. This decision was made because vague overarching 
commitments to corporate responsibility or sustainability, or even the care of 
employees, did not always indicate the company expressly intended to refer to safety. 
Given the uncertainty, and in order to enhance reliability of data, it was considered 
important to only include data that made a direct reference to safety. This was best 
achieved through limiting the data to those organisations reports where the reference 
to safety was clear and specific. 
A further design consideration made by the researcher was to exclude 
references to “health” within the document analysis. The term “health and safety” is 
commonly used by companies and often refers to a range of employee-focused 
initiatives and health-based programs including stress counselling, flu vaccinations, 
weight management assistance, private health cover discounts and anti-bullying 
initiatives. These matters were considered outside the scope of the current study. 
Only those references to safety in an organisational context such as the physical 
safety of employees in the workplace, safety culture and safety behaviours, safety 
leadership and safety values, were included for analysis.  
There were also a number of non-employee focused safety issues that were 
considered to be outside the research scope of this paper and excluded from analysis. 
These included references to building safety, equipment safety, pharmaceutical 
safety, food safety, environmental safety, process safety, product safety, and 
customer safety. The other references to safety-related matters not included in Study 
1 referred to external safety crises affecting the wider community. For example, 
during the ten-year period included in the analysis, a number of annual reports made 
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reference to the Queensland floods, New Zealand earthquakes, World Trade Centre 
terrorist attacks and the Japanese tsunami. While these references often involved 
some level of personal commitment to safety by the company concerned, they were 
not considered by the researcher to be relevant as they were events outside the 
control of the organisation and impacted the safety of a much broader group of 
people than just the employees of the business.  
Document management 
It was important to consider the order in which annual reports and CSR reports 
would be analysed to maintain a consistent approach to the themes that were being 
identified. All annual reports were analysed first in chronological year order, starting 
with 2001 and within that, by industry sector. This analysis was then repeated for all 
annual reports in 2006, by industry sector, and again for all annual reports in 2011, 
by industry sector. Once all annual reports had been analysed and descriptively 
coded, all available CSR reports were analysed and descriptively coded starting in 
2001 (and again in industry sector order), followed by 2006 and 2011 and again in 
both cases, analysed by industry sector. By using a systematic approach to the 
document analysis it was possible for the researcher to become fully immersed in the 
themes identified in each time period as well as experiencing the differences of the 
disclosures between industry sectors. 
Reliability of coding needs to be a particular focus for a single researcher 
coding large amounts of written data. The concept of “inter-coder reliability” 
(Creswell, 2009) refers to the level of agreement between multiple coders on the 
application of codes to the data. A process was developed between the researcher and 
two research supervisors to enhance reliability of findings. During Study 1, a coding 
manual was developed by the researcher, which included definitions for each of the 
codes as they were identified. After initially coding one full set of annual reports for 
2001, the researcher met with a supervisor to examine in detail the codes and coding 
structure which had been developed, as well as the application of these codes to the 
data. The coding manual was refined as a result of these discussions until agreement 
was reached on the nature of the codes being developed and the coding of the 
content. These discussions continued throughout the coding of all annual report and 
CSR documents in Study 1. In Study 2, a similar process was followed to ensure 
agreement of the codes being applied to interview transcripts. Refinements were 
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made based on these discussions in order to ensure agreement was reached on the 
coding of interviews against each of the four criteria of safety leadership. 
In order to maintain confidentiality of all companies in the sample, a naming 
protocol was developed for Study 1 where each company would be identified by a 
letter designating the industry sector to which the company belonged. The industry 
sector letter abbreviation was also linked to an allocated number for each company. 
For example, E3 indicated a company from the energy sector and within that industry 
sector was differentiated with the number 3. Table 8 below lists the industry sectors 
and naming protocol used throughout Study 1. Table	  8	  -­‐	  Industry	  sector	  abbreviation	  codes	  
Sector Code 
Consumer discretionary CD 
Consumer staples CS 
Energy E 
Financial services F 
Health care HC 
Industrials I 
Information technology IT 
Materials M 
Telecommunication services TS 
Utilities U 
 
3.3.4 Data analysis 
Once the annual reports and CSR reports had been collected, a key decision for 
the researcher was the method of documentary analysis. The two methods for 
consideration were thematic analysis and/or content analysis. Whilst thematic and 
content analysis are closely related and share many of the same principles and 
procedures (Marks & Yardley, 2004) there are key differences that were considered 
before deciding that a combination of the two approaches was the most appropriate 
method to address the research questions that underpinned Study 1. Figure 3 sets out 
the various phases of data analysis that was undertaken in Study 1.  
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 Figure	  3	  -­‐	  Data	  analysis	  for	  Study	  1	  
Content analysis 
Content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique (Parry et al., 
2014) and was considered to hold significant value for Study 1 of the research 
project in order for direct comparisons to be made of disclosures over time. Content 
analysis is considered a flexible method for analysing data (Cavanagh, 1997; Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999) and the specific type of 
content analysis approach chosen will depend on the problem being studied (Weber, 
1990; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In this research a manifest content analysis was used 
counting the frequency of specific content (Kondracki, Wellman, & Amundson, 
2002). During the document analysis and coding process, mentions of safety were 
noted as an absolute (rather than applying any qualitative meaning to the mention) so 
that direct comparisons of the number of disclosures could be made over time. 
Thematic analysis  
Theoretical thematic analysis is a highly flexible qualitative research method 
that can be applied across a range of approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Essentially 
thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns or 
themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This makes thematic analysis an ideal 
tool for investigating whether public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the 
four criteria of safety leadership. It is a search for themes that will be vital to assist in 
the description of the phenomenon (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Thematic 
analysis places a greater emphasis than content analysis on the qualitative aspects of 
the material being analysed (Marks & Yardley, 2004) and provided a rich source of 
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data for analysis. Thematic analysis was able to uncover identified themes in safety 
disclosures that appeared throughout the 280 documents that were reviewed.   
Each document was analysed in accordance with the thematic analysis 
approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006), which has the advantage of being 
flexible (Conchie, Moon, & Duncan, 2013).  The use of software to manage the 
analysis was considered, however the researcher determined that it was of limited 
benefit for the purposes of this research project and a deeper understand of the data 
would be gained through manual analysis. Annual reports and CSR reports were 
initially coded and analysed for themes, patterns and meaning. A theme was 
constructed from repeated patterns of meaning throughout the data. Emerging themes 
were identified by ‘combing’ through the data and relating this to one of the four 
safety leadership criterion to build a strong picture of whether their presence was 
evident in the documents.  Thematic analysis supplemented the process of content 
analysis to enrich understanding of safety disclosures over the ten-year period. 
Coding 
In order to identify themes in the data, and to assist in the process of thematic 
and content analysis, it was necessary to undertake detailed coding of the 280 
documents included within Study 1. Coding occurs via two overlapping sorting and 
categorizing processes – descriptive coding and focused coding (Charmaz, 2002; 
Saldana, 2011; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The essence of coding is sorting vast 
quantities of data into categories that render meaningful analysis from the vantage 
point of a framework or set of ideas (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006). 
Coding allows data to be related to ideas that may emerge from existing theoretical 
frameworks or from the ground up (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999; Lofland et al., 
2006). Descriptive coding is appropriate for virtually all qualitative studies (Saldana, 
2011) and is particularly useful for assessing longitudinal change (Saldana, 2003).  
Descriptive coding requires researchers to assess documents line by line and consider 
the meaning of that discrete item or section of information. One of the features of 
descriptive coding is that the codes are generally numerous and varied (Lofland et 
al., 2006).  The second stage of coding used in Study 1, focused coding, is 
considerably more selective and conceptual (Charmaz, 2002; Lofland et al., 2006). 
During this process, the most salient categories in the data are identified and 
decisions are made about which codes make the most analytic sense (Charmaz, 2006; 
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Saldana, 2011).  The practical steps taken by the researcher during both coding 
processes is outlined in greater detail below.  
First round coding - descriptive coding 
During the initial round of coding, a coding manual was developed (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006) and memos on the various codes and categories that were 
created were maintained (Richards, 2011).  A key research design consideration was 
developing a consistent approach to the sections of the annual report and CSR report 
to be included when coding against the four safety leadership criteria. Given one of 
the criterion was personal commitment, only content from the Chairman and/or CEO 
letters in the annual reports and CSR reports were used for data collection. The 
remaining three safety leadership criteria – vision, decision-making and transparency 
– were considered by collecting data from the entire annual report or CSR report 
(excluding the Chairman and CEO letter). Data was only coded once, so if a 
reference to safety statistics, for example, was only made in the Chairman’s letter it 
was coded against the criterion of personal commitment; it was not also coded 
against a second criterion of transparency. This methodology ensured the most 
accurate comparison of data being made by a Chairman and/or CEO, with that 
contained in the remainder of the reports.  
The process for the first round of coding was that each relevant reference to 
safety was located in the document and descriptively coded (Saldana, 2011) against 
one of the four safety leadership criteria using the guidelines set out below. A sub-set 
of codes was also checked for consistency with two PhD supervisors to enhance 
inter-coder reliability (Creswell, 2009). A key task before coding each criterion 
involved referring to the definition developed by the researcher (based on existing 
literature) and outlined in Chapter 2, which was used as a guide during the coding 
process for vision, personal commitment, decision-making and transparency. 
 (1) Vision – any references to safety located in the annual report or CSR 
report (excluding the Chairman and/or CEO letter) were coded against this criterion 
if there was a clear statement of a company commitment to the general safety of 
employees or a commitment to creating a safe workplace. Any references to safety as 
a clear priority for the company or an espoused value, or where, for example, safety 
culture and safety leadership were expressed as being integral to the success of the 
organisation, were coded against this criterion.  In summary, this code included any 
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reference to aspirations, values, goals or visions regarding safety. The level of 
analysis for the coding of this criterion was organisational. 
(2) Personal commitment – the references for this criteria were limited to 
data collected from the Chairman or CEO letters as this was the only section of the 
document personally attributable to these senior leaders. The letters were closely 
analysed and any references to safety-related activities relevant to the research were 
coded within this criterion. Safety disclosures that included expressing a future 
vision for safety, linking safety performance to business excellence, safety statistical 
information or the board role and safety were coded against personal commitment. 
The level of analysis for the coding of this criterion was individual. 
(3)  Decision-making – any safety references in the annual reports and 
CSR reports (excluding the Chairman and/or CEO letter) to the role of the board in 
safety, the existence of a board sub-committee responsible for safety, the role of 
executives and employees in safety, or reference to safety documents and systems, 
were included within this criterion. The level of analysis for the coding of this 
criterion was organisational. 
(4) Transparency – any safety references in the annual reports and CSR 
reports (excluding the Chairman and/or CEO letter) to safety statistics, fatalities, 
legal action being taken against the organisation for safety breaches, links between 
remuneration and safety as well as internal and external recognition of safety awards 
were coded against this criterion. The level of analysis for coding of this criterion 
was organisational. 
Second round coding – focused coding  
Once the data had been collected for all companies, in each of the three years, 
and descriptively coded against the four safety leadership criteria, a process of 
focused coding (Saldana, 2011) commenced where emerging themes, or categories, 
were revealed. The process for focused coding involved analysing the results of the 
first, descriptive round of coding in detail. The researcher analysed each safety 
reference for each criterion and noted key themes that emerged from the data. These 
themes formed the basis for the identification of categories within each criterion. 
Through this process document extracts were reviewed a number of times to ensure 
they were allocated to the most appropriate category and regular consultations with 
the researcher’s two supervisors sought to enhance inter-coder reliability (Creswell, 
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2009). The second round coding allowed the researcher to focus directly on the 
source data most relevant to the research question and to clearly identify categories. 
This round of coding also allowed the researcher to conduct content analysis by 
noting, in a simple yes or no format, whether disclosures had been made in each of 
the identified categories. No assessment was made of the quality of such disclosures 
but rather that a disclosure had, or had not, been made. This was an important 
element of the content analysis phase to allow for direct comparison of the safety 
disclosures between industry sectors over time in order to address research question 
1. 
Once themes had been identified during the second round coding, it was 
possible for the researcher to narrow these themes into defined categories against 
each of the four safety leadership criteria. The final categories were confirmed and 
reconfirmed through closer analysis of the final coding phase. This was an iterative 
process with changes made by the researcher once it was apparent that some 
categories replicated others, or were more appropriately coded against a different 
safety leadership criterion.  In total 24 categories were identified from the four safety 
leadership criteria and they are set out in Table 9. The method for developing the 24 
categories was an evolving process and in many cases, such as the personal 
commitment criterion, an initial list of nine categories was reduced to six when 
complementary themes were grouped together. It was also evident that categories in 
the personal commitment criterion replicated other categories identified in the 
remaining three criteria. These duplications were retained in order to allow for a 
clear comparison of the categories included in the Chairman and/or CEO letters 
compared with the remainder of the report. Table	  9	  –	  Identified	  categories	  within	  each	  of	  the	  four	  safety	  leadership	  criteria	  
Vision Personal commitment 
Business excellence Business excellence 
Espoused values Espoused values 
Employee focus Employee focus 
Leadership and culture Leadership and culture 
Zero harm Board role 
Reputation Transparency 
  Decision-making Transparency 
Board role Safety statistics 
Board sub-committee Fatalities 
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Senior executive role Legal action 
Employee role Remuneration 
Documents and systems Workers compensation 
Safety committees Recognition 
 
3.3.5 Summary 
Study 1 was focused on conducting a thematic and content analysis of publicly 
available documents from within a sample of 76 ASX200 companies, in order to 
address research question 1. The research design assisted in building patterns of 
public disclosure around safety-related activities as well as identifying changes that 
were evident over time. On their own, however, these disclosures do not explain the 
phenomenon of safety leadership or the extent to which safety disclosures accurately 
represent what is occurring within an organisation. Therefore it was necessary to 
conduct in-depth case studies from within the sample in order to gain a deeper 
understanding to address research questions 2 and 3.  
3.4 STUDY 2  
Study 2 involved in-depth case studies with two companies from within the 
Study 1 sample in order to enrich the findings on safety leadership and to explore 
more thoroughly the extent to which public disclosures of safety-related activities 
reflect a company’s internal focus on safety. Study 2 enabled the researcher to 
further explore the role of the board in terms of safety leadership through the lens of 
four safety leadership criteria. Case studies allow researchers to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real life events (Yin, 2009), which was particularly 
illuminating for this research study in order to take the publicly available words and 
analyse the meaning behind them.  
A key strength of the research design was the use of case study organisations 
from two very different industry sectors – the financial services sector and the energy 
sector. This enabled an exploration of how safety leadership criteria may vary 
between industries where safety may be perceived to have a different level of focus; 
yet where safety remains highly relevant. While the outcomes of safety incidents in a 
high-hazard industry such as the energy sector can have catastrophic consequences, 
the incident rate of injuries requiring time away from work can be higher in financial 
services (Safe Work Australia, 2014) than in the energy sector (APPEA, 2014). For 
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example, in 2011/2012 the lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) in the banking, 
diversified financials and insurance industry group was 1.2 per million hours worked 
(Safe Work Australia, 2014). By comparison, the LTIFR rate in the energy sector 
over the same period was 0.8 per million hours worked (APPEA, 2014). The reasons 
for this may be due to the strong focus on safety in the energy sector, particularly 
after a number of high-profile disasters, which led to increased regulatory reform and 
management attention. Recent Australian legislative changes in workplace safety, 
which will now apply across all industry sectors, will most likely see similar 
significant improvements in safety outcomes. 
 One of the other advantages of this research study has been the ability to gain 
access inside the boardrooms of two large Australian companies and, through semi-
structured interviews held in Study 2, to test the applicability of the four safety 
leadership criteria to views of board members and senior executives.   Very little 
research has been conducted inside boardrooms since, as cynically suggested by 
Barratt and Korac-Kakabadse (2002), citing the work of Kahl, “those who sit 
amongst the mighty do not invite sociologists to watch them make decisions about 
how to control the behaviour of others”. Therefore, one of the strengths of the 
research design has been the opportunity to incorporate in-depth interviews with a 
large number of board members and senior executives to understand views within the 
boardroom to address the research questions. 
The case studies completed in this research study followed the methodologies 
recommended by Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt (1989b) and helped explain the 
phenomenon identified during Study 1.  One of the benefits of case studies is the 
ability to deal with a variety of evidence including documents, interviews, artefacts 
and observations (Yin, 2009). Building theory from case studies is a research 
strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical propositions from 
case-based, empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) and 
replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).  
There were three phases of research in Study 2 as set out in Figure 4. The first 
phase of Study 2 was an in-depth document analysis of public material to build on 
the research undertaken in Study 1. In addition to the analysis of annual reports and 
CSR reports already undertaken, the remaining available annual and CSR reports in 
the period 2001 - 2012 were analysed. In addition, corporate websites and Annual 
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General Meeting (AGM) presentations were reviewed. In the second phase of Study 
2, internal company documents were analysed to delve behind the public disclosures 
and observations. The third phase of Study 2 involved in-depth interviews with board 
members and senior executives. 
 Figure	  4	  -­‐	  Study	  2	  research	  phases	  
3.4.1 Multiple case study design 
The case study has generally been viewed as a valuable qualitative technique 
for identifying elements of an organisation’s safety culture, and in-depth interviews 
and participant observations are often used (Cox & Flin, 1998). A case study 
approach to addressing research questions 2 and 3 provided an understanding of the 
dynamics present within the single setting of the organisation (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
Conducting case studies also allowed for detailed within-case analysis coupled with a 
cross-case analysis for further patterns, allowing tentative themes and concepts to 
emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Overall, the approach to conducting the case studies 
was done in accordance with the procedure recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and 
Yin (2003).  
Yin (2009) suggested two possible designs for case studies - single case 
designs or multiple case designs. In making a decision as to whether a single or 
multiple case study design would be more appropriate in this instance, it was 
important to consider that evidence from multiple cases is often more compelling and 
therefore the study more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). What is particularly 
important with multiple case studies is to build a rich, theoretical framework which 
states the conditions under which the phenomenon being studied is, and is not, likely 
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to be found (Yin, 2009). A theoretical replication approach (Yin, 2009) was adopted 
in Study 2 because the cases to be selected were expected to predict contrasting 
results.  Two cases were used and each individual case study represented a whole 
study where convergent evidence was sought to make conclusions for each 
individual case (Yin, 2009).  
Case selection 
As 76 organisations were included within the sample in Study 1, it was 
necessary to determine which two companies would be included for analysis as a 
case study within Study 2. A screening procedure (Yin, 2009) was undertaken to 
identify the cases to be included within the sample before formal data collection in 
Study 2 commenced. An important focus was to identify organisations that appeared 
to have taken differing approaches to disclosure of safety-related activities so that 
rival explanations could be considered (Yin, 2009). This research study deliberately 
selected cases that were expected to offer contrasting findings (Yin, 2009) and a 
process of maximum variation sampling (Coyne, 1997) was used. After inviting all 
76 sample companies included within Study 1 to participate as an in-depth case study 
and discussing potential inclusion with a range of companies, one organisation from 
the financial services sector and one organisation from the energy sector agreed to be 
included as a case study. The other sample companies invited to participate declined 
to be involved. Assurances of confidentiality were an important strategy in seeking 
agreement by selected companies to participate as a case study. In order to maintain 
confidentiality of the two case study organisations, a coding system was developed 
for Study 2 where each case was allocated a pseudonym – case study 1 (FinanceCo) 
and case study 2 (EnergyCo). These pseudonyms are used throughout Study 2 and in 
Chapter 5 and 6 to identify the case study being referenced. 
A key aspect of a successful case study is to create a rich dialogue with the 
evidence, which requires a deep familiarity with an aspect of the world (Becker, 
1998; Yin, 2009). Further, while case study data collection follows a formal protocol, 
the specific information that may become relevant is not always readily predictable 
(Yin, 2009) so it was necessary for a wide range of evidence to be gathered. In order 
to ensure consideration of the potential design challenges around trustworthiness, 
multiple sources of evidence were sought using a chain of evidence approach to 
include as many complementary sources of evidence as possible (Yin, 2009). The 
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case study design incorporated internal and public documents, interviews and field 
observations. Using multiple sources of evidence maximised the opportunity to use 
different sources in order to develop converging lines of enquiry enabling 
triangulation and corroboration (Yin, 2009). Figure 5 shows the convergence of 
evidence in each individual case study using annual reports, CSR reports, corporate 
websites and AGM presentations (Phase 1), internal documentation and field 
observations (Phase 2) and semi-structured interviews (Phase 3). 
 Figure	  5	  -­‐	  Case	  study	  convergence	  of	  multiple	  sources	  of	  evidence	  (based	  on	  Yin,	  2009,	  p.	  117)	  
In order to understand the material that would help form a picture of the 
internal focus on safety within each case study, the researcher initially obtained and 
analysed large amounts of publicly available material for FinanceCo and EnergyCo. 
This was followed by collection and analysis of internal material and in-depth 
interviews. Each of the three phases of Study 2 will now be considered in detail and 
addressed separately as different analytical approaches were used. Together the three 
phases provided a full picture of each case study organisation in order to address the 
research questions. The first phase to be considered was the collection and analysis 
of additional public material for FinanceCo and EnergyCo. 
3.4.2 Phase 1 – Public material 
Data collection 
After selection of the two case study organisations, additional annual reports 
and CSR reports were collected. While the annual reports, and available CSR reports, 
for 2001, 2006 and 2011 had already been analysed in Study 1, it was considered 
necessary in Study 2 to expand the documents analysed to all intervening years 
Finding	  
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  
Annual	  reports	  
CSR	  reports	  
Internal	  documentation	   AGM	  presentations	  
Corporate	  website	  
Field	  observations	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between 2001 and 2012. Taking a deep, detailed approach allowed for a richer source 
of data to be collected for each case. All annual reports and CSR reports, including 
those already considered in Study 1, were analysed to understand in more depth the 
level of organisational safety disclosures. 
To further understand the public safety disclosures made by each company, all 
Chairman and CEO addresses to shareholders at Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
were also collected and reviewed. Any references to safety were noted, including the 
context in which the disclosure was made and how any such disclosures may have 
changed over time. In addition, the corporate websites of each case study 
organisation were analysed. While a review of current corporate websites did not 
allow for an analysis of historical changes that may have occurred on the website, it 
did enhance understanding of the public approach taken by the case study 
organisation to safety at a point in time. The corporate websites also provided access 
to board charters, which were examined to understand the case study organisations’ 
stated responsibilities of the board with respect to safety. Every annual report 
between 2001 and 2012 was analysed for FinanceCo and EnergyCo to understand in 
detail the quality of safety disclosures over time. This expanded considerably the 
analysis already undertaken in Study 1 by including a further eight years of annual 
reports in addition to the three years already analysed.  
Data analysis 
A similar process to data analysis was undertaken in this phase of Study 2 as 
was conducted during Study 1. Once all additional annual reports, CSR reports and 
AGM presentations had been collected and catalogued for the two case study 
organisations, the annual reports were analysed in detail by the researcher to find all 
references to safety and safety-related activities. Each of the case study organisations 
was treated as a unique case study and references to safety in the public documents 
were observed without pre-formed categories or themes. While Study 1 had initially 
focused on content analysis with respect to the mentions of safety against the four 
criteria of safety leadership, Study 2 analysed the references to safety in their context 
to understand in greater depth how the case study organisations made safety 
disclosures, without being limited by the four safety leadership criteria that had 
formed an important analytical tool in Study 1. This allowed for a much greater 
range of safety disclosures to be considered, and further, allowed for Study 2 to 
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ensure that meaning was observed within the natural world (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). A thematic analysis process was adopted with a focus on descriptive coding 
(Saldana, 2011) in order to examine the meaning and ideas that emerged from the 
context. 
3.4.3 Phase 2 – Internal material 
Data collection 
Internal documentation 
The second phase of Study 2, to answer research question 2, involved 
analysing internal documents from each case study organisation. The following list 
of documents were sought from each case study organisation where available: 
a) Safety culture surveys; 
b) Safety newsletters, safety alerts, safety-related emails (particularly 
those sent by the CEO); 
c) Serious safety incident reports / investigations; 
d) Safety reports to the board; 
e) Board meeting minutes specifically relating to safety issues, safety as a 
general topic or safety incidents; 
f) Board committee minutes and reports relating to safety issues; 
g) Safety policies in place across the organisation; 
h) Safety inductions; 
i) Safety strategies or safety strategic plans; and 
j) Other material the case study organisation thought may be relevant to 
the research. 
Where information was referenced in an internal document that appeared 
relevant and where a copy was not already obtained, the researcher made a direct 
request to the case study organisation for the documentation to be supplied. Both 
case study organisations were forthcoming in providing the researcher with access to 
any documentation that was requested. All safety policies were read in detail to 
understand the internal level of focus on safety and the safety decision-making 
Chapter 3: Research Design 107 
framework that had been established within the company. This included references to 
the role of the board members and senior executives with respect to safety.  
Field observations 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the offices of the two case study 
organisations and provided an opportunity for the researcher to make observations in 
the field. Field observations allowed the researcher to gain a nuanced understanding 
of the case study organisations that could only come from personal experience (Mack 
et al., 2005). In the field the researcher made intermittent observations of the natural 
environment while interviewing (Gold, 1958; Mulhall, 2003).  When conducting 
observations in the field, it was important to record field notes as close as possible in 
time to when events were observed (Mulhall, 2003; Yin, 2009). In order to ensure 
confidentiality, no field notes were taken of conversations overheard or of specific 
individuals. The researcher often took notes of any pertinent observations while in 
the offices of the case study organisations during breaks in interviews.  
The focus of observations was on the approach taken to safety taken by each 
organisation and how safety processes compared to what had been said would occur 
in internal documentation. This included observations of whether safety inductions 
were provided to visitors to the office (including the researcher), the level or extent 
of personal protective equipment worn by employees and visitors, visible safety 
signage, general housekeeping and the condition of the facilities being observed. 
Data obtained during field observations were useful to understand the physical, 
social, cultural and organisational contexts of the two case study organisations (Mack 
et al., 2005). It also provided an opportunity to understand whether what senior 
leaders expected to be happening in the field with respect to safety was in fact 
occurring.  
Data analysis 
During this phase large quantities of internal documents were obtained from 
the case study organisations, which were catalogued and analysed by the researcher. 
As each document requested from the case study organisation already related to the 
broad area of safety, the researcher was focused on analysing each document, 
including field notes, to understand the context in which safety leadership and safety 
governance was referenced within the case study organisation. While the four safety 
leadership criteria were not used as a coding tool in Study 2, they were used to guide 
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the researcher as a lens through which the data was analysed. Documents were 
analysed to understand how each case study organisation approached setting a vision 
for safety within the organisation, the manner in which decision-making structures 
were established, the expectations of board members and senior executives in 
relation to workplace safety and the means by which safety performance was 
communicated. Any other observations that emerged from the content with respect to 
how the organisation approached safety leadership and/or safety governance, was 
noted by the researcher. The researcher noted the language used in the internal 
documents and maintained a researcher diary of the extent to which internal safety 
material reflected the public material for the two case study organisations analysed in 
Phase 1. 
3.4.4 Phase 3 – Semi-structured interviews 
Data collection 
Study 2 involved 27 personal interviews with board members and senior 
executives from the two case study organisations. These interviews consisted of a 
series of open-ended questions designed to elicit rich and detailed descriptions from 
participants (Roger et al., 2010). It was anticipated that interviews would reveal 
whether the four criteria of safety leadership were evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives highlighting any inconsistencies that may have 
surfaced between what had been disclosed in Study 1 and what was observed in 
Study 2. Insider knowledge, gathered through open-ended interviews, would assist to 
bring views of safety leadership to the surface (Schein, 1990). Senior leaders are 
responsible for expressing values on behalf of their organisations (Kabanoff & Holt, 
1996) making their statements in regards to safety leadership particularly relevant to 
this research study.  
It should be noted that employee views were not included in the data collection 
of Study 2 for two reasons. First, previous research in the area of safety leadership 
has focused almost exclusively on the views of employees towards their supervisors 
and managers and this research sought to address an existing gap by focusing on the 
views of board members and senior executives. Second, most employees have no 
exposure to the workings of a board of directors, and board members have little to no 
visibility within an organisation limiting the value of employees views in the study. 
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Because Study 2 was interested in the personal views of board members and 
senior executives within an organisation, semi-structured one-on-one interviews were 
used to complement the information gathered with respect to safety disclosures in 
Study 1. The level of analysis for this phase was individual, with results aggregated 
to understand the operation of the board as a group (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). The 
advantages of this technique were that personal interviews could be targeted to 
specific individuals, the questions asked could be focused specifically on the 
research study and the responses would provide rich data since the interview 
responses would be in the participant’s own words (Guldenmund, 2010).  To 
commence the interview process, an initial meeting was conducted with a senior 
executive within each case study organisation to broadly understand the nature of the 
work of the company and to discuss the goals of the research. One of the outcomes of 
this initial discussion was to review the organisation chart and composition of the 
board to determine the board members and senior executives to be invited to 
participate in an interview.  
The researcher briefly explained the scope of the research study to the senior 
executive including the goal to interview all board members (including the 
Chairman), the CEO, and all senior executives reporting to the CEO. Using the 
snowball sampling technique (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Marshall & Rossman, 
2011), the senior executive was asked to suggest other senior leaders within the 
organisation whom they felt could add value to the research and in some cases these 
individuals were also invited to participate. Once the organisation had provided 
consent to be involved, all potential participants received an email from the CEO of 
the company alerting them to the research and inviting them to participate. A copy of 
the Participant Information Form is included at Appendix 1. Before the interview 
was conducted, the researcher obtained a signed consent form from all participants in 
accordance with the National Statement on Human Research Ethics. A copy of the 
Participant Consent Form is included at Appendix 2. 
Pilot study interviews 
An ASX listed organisation (that did not form part of the sample in Study 1) 
agreed to participate as a pilot study organisation (PSO) for the interview phase of 
Study 2. Individuals from the PSO who participated in the pilot study included board 
members, the Chairman, the CEO, and senior executives. All interviews were 
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recorded, transcribed and analysed to identify themes.  The purpose of the pilot study 
was to trial issues of content and process before commencing with the two formal 
case studies in Study 2. The three key methodological issues that became evident 
during the pilot study process were the category of participants to include in semi-
structured interviews, the need to refine the interview questions for each group of 
participants, and interview question wording generally.  
The pilot study process assisted in refining the semi-structured interviews for 
the two case study organisations. First, an unexpected group of senior executives 
emerged during the pilot phase from using the snowball sampling technique 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Marshall & Rossman, 2011). These were senior 
managers responsible for safety in the organisation that may not have reported 
directly to the CEO and so did not, at first, emerge within the senior executive group 
to be interviewed. These subject matter experts were subsequently invited to be 
interviewed. Second, the initial interview questions used during the pilot study were 
refined. It was clear after the pilot study that there were some senior executives who 
were not as aware of the role of the board as others, particularly around the 
compiling of the annual report, and so interview questions were tailored as such. 
Third, there were some questions used during the pilot study that were unable to be 
answered easily by participants and responses ranged significantly in terms of detail 
and concept. Therefore these questions were either excluded or re-worded during 
case study interviews. 
Case study interviews 
Once all necessary consents were obtained, the researcher travelled to locations 
within Australia to conduct semi-structured interviews with participants of 
FinanceCo and EnergyCo. One of the key strengths of Study 2 was gaining access 
inside the boardrooms of two large ASX listed companies. Access issues frequently 
hamper research of this kind and therefore the number of in-depth interviews 
conducted with board members and senior executives is one of the strengths of this 
research study.  
Within both case study organisations, the individuals invited to participate 
included all non-executive directors (including the Chairman), the CEO, senior 
executives reporting to the CEO and any other individuals identified during the 
preparatory phase. In FinanceCo, 13 individuals were invited to participate and 9 
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consented. In EnergyCo, 18 individuals were invited to participate and 18 consented. 
A total of 27 in-depth case study interviews were therefore conducted during Study 
2.   During case study interviews, participants were asked a range of open-ended 
questions and a copy of the questions are included at Appendix 3.  
The researcher had refined the interview questions after the pilot study. Each of 
the interview questions was designed to elicit information to address research 
question 3 by seeking to understand whether the four criteria of safety leadership 
were evident in the views of interview participants. After a preliminary question to 
understand the participants’ background with the organisation, general questions to 
introduce the topic were asked, without leading by the researcher, to understand the 
views of participants in terms of how they saw safety treated as an issue by the 
organisation, the role they saw the board playing in safety and whether the 
interviewees felt the board had a role in safety culture. Specific questions were then 
asked of interviewees about what they saw as the vision for safety within the 
organisation (linking to the vision criterion of safety leadership), whether they had 
personal experience of senior leaders demonstrating a personal commitment to safety 
(linking to the personal commitment criterion), how the board was kept informed 
about safety issues (linking to the decision-making criterion) and the extent to which 
participants felt the organisation was transparent around safety issues (linking to the 
transparency criterion).  In order to provide additional understanding of the findings 
from Study 1, specific questions were also asked around the process for annual report 
disclosures, links between remuneration and safety and whether there was an 
expectation that shareholders were interested in the safety of employees.  
Each of the interview questions was designed to gain an understanding from 
board members and senior leaders as to the role they saw the board playing in terms 
of safety as well as the extent to which safety leadership was evident in their views. 
A convergent interview technique (Dick, 1990) was used in that while twelve 
substantive interview questions were answered, the interview was only semi-
structured with additional questions being asked during the interview to assist in 
gathering as much data as possible for the study. Flexibility during interviews was 
important to gain the right information in the setting to ensure the research questions 
could be addressed. During the semi-structured interview, the researcher looked for 
two types of patterns emerging in the data – patterns of convergence and patterns of 
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discrepancy (Dick, 1990). Such patterns provided the researcher with the criteria 
from which to ask additional questions in order to identify the underlying factors in 
the responses. Using the patterns of convergence and discrepancy systematically 
provided the researcher with objective methods for refining subjective data (Dick, 
1990). While twelve formal interview questions were prepared before each 
interview, many more were asked during the course of the interview using the 
convergence and discrepancy approach. The average number of interview questions 
asked during case study 1 was 32 and the average number of interview questions 
asked during case study 2 was 27. This highlights the semi-structured nature of the 
interview process and the intent by the researcher to ensure that, first, through the use 
of probing questions all key information was obtained, second, as far as possible all 
convergence from prior interviews had been confirmed (or disconfirmed) and third, 
any discrepancies had been explained (Dick, 1990).  During interviews the researcher 
maintained a field diary noting any relevant areas for future investigation.  To ensure 
accuracy of interview responses, all interview transcripts were provided to interview 
participants to review and provide confirmation of the content.  
Data analysis 
Like many qualitative research projects, the challenge for researchers can often 
be one of data overload (Huberman & Miles, 1983). During Study 2, an issue for the 
researcher was one of significant words having accumulated during the course of 
semi-structured interviews, all of which required reduction in order for meaning to be 
drawn. The process of data reduction not only allows for analysis, but is analysis in 
the sense of an evolving sense of the data coming together in order to answer the 
research questions (Huberman & Miles, 1983).  
Thematic analysis is a method of identifying, analysing and reporting patterns, 
or themes, within the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Similar to Study 1, the final 
phase of Study 2 also adopted a theoretical thematic analysis approach in 
undertaking a detailed analysis of semi-structured interview transcripts driven by the 
four safety leadership criteria. Before analysis of the interview transcripts the 
researcher made a number of research design decisions, with regular reviews 
occurring during the analysis process. One such issue was to consider what would 
constitute a theme during the analysis of the interview transcripts. Braun and Clarke 
(2006) stated that:  
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A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set (p. 82). 
Any references in the interview transcripts that related directly to the four 
criteria of safety leadership were coded as such and were considered highly relevant 
themes. In addition, another theme identified in the data that warranted noting related 
to the relevance of the industry sector in which the organisation operated. While 
there are no agreed criteria with respect to the proportion of the data set needing to 
display evidence of a topic for it to be considered a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006), 
statements about the relevance of industry sector appeared in a large number of 
transcripts from both FinanceCo and EnergyCo and were therefore discussed in the 
research findings in Chapter 5.   
Practically, the phases of thematic analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke 
(2006) were used in analysing the data. In the first phase, the researcher became 
immersed in the data of the interview transcripts (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) by 
reading the transcripts multiple times to become familiar with the material and noting 
down initial ideas. In the next phase, the researcher systematically identified initial 
codes (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) across the entire data set, specifically collating 
data relevant to the four safety leadership criteria. Specific extracts of interviews 
relevant to the research question were extracted and allocated against identified 
codes. These codes were frequently ‘tested’ with the researcher’s supervisors to 
enhance inter-coder reliability (Creswell, 2009). In addition, any additional ideas that 
emerged from the data were noted and identified regarding how the data were 
coming together (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) as it related to safety leadership and 
safety governance. As coding is a “cyclical act” (Saldana, 2011, p. 8), this process 
was repeated in order to ensure familiarity with the data set and ensure all relevant 
extracts from the transcripts were captured. This process involved two levels of 
review – first, reading each of the extracts for each theme to look for patterns, and 
second, considering the trustworthiness of individual themes in relation to the entire 
data set to ensure additional themes had not been missed during earlier coding phases 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
The researcher then refined the specifics of each theme and detailed the overall 
story the theme told in relation to each of the four safety leadership criteria for both 
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of the case study organisations. A detailed analysis was conducted for each 
individual theme to consider in relation to the research question and to ensure that 
there was no overlap between them. Numerous concepts were identified during this 
phase and were useful for giving structure to the findings for each of the four safety 
leadership criteria. Lastly, the researcher found “vivid, compelling extract examples” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006; p. 87), which related back to the research question to ensure 
a rich and deep analysis of interview material in order to understand the views of 
board members and senior executives with respect to safety leadership and presented 
in the findings in Chapter 6.   
In an alternative design approach to Study 1, in Study 2 the personal 
commitment criterion was considered using all of the interview data. The reason for 
this is two-fold. First, if the personal commitment criterion in Study 2 was only 
considered in the context of interviews conducted with the CEO and Chairman of 
FinanceCo and EnergyCo, there was a risk of breaching confidentiality by only 
considering these individual’s interview themes. Second, the criterion of personal 
commitment as defined by SSTL (Barling et al., 2002) envisages the application of 
this dimension to all senior leaders. Therefore, the views of all those senior leaders 
who were interviewed were important. This is in contrast to Study 1 where only the 
letters to shareholders by the Chairman and CEO were personally attributable and 
why the distinction has been made. 
3.4.5 Summary 
Study 2 focused on gaining a deeper understanding of safety leadership and 
safety governance through the use of case studies with two companies from the 
Study 1 sample. Three phases in Study 2 allowed research questions 2 and 3 to be 
addressed. Phase 1 involved a document analysis of all annual reports and CSR 
reports, as well as AGM presentations and corporate websites, to more fully 
understand safety disclosures beyond the four safety leadership criteria. Phase 2 
involved a documentary analysis of available internal safety documentation with a 
particular focus on those documents that provided guidance as to the role of the 
board and senior leaders in safety. In this phase, field observations were also made. 
In Phase 3, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 27 board members and 
senior executives across both organisations. These interviews enabled an in-depth 
understanding to be gained about the views of senior leaders to the role of the board 
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in safety and to the four safety leadership criteria in particular. Issues of 
trustworthiness for both Study 1 and Study 2 will now be considered. 
3.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
An important consideration for the design of this research study was ensuring 
that the results were credible and trustworthy (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011). Validity has long been a key issue in debates over the legitimacy of 
qualitative research (Maxwell, 1992), however criticisms have often been levelled 
using positivist procedures to test validity (Mishler, 1990). As Maxwell (1992) 
pointed out, positivist tests of validity are not the only approach available. Brinberg 
and McGrath (1985) clarified the need for flexibility when considering validity in 
qualitative research: 
Validity is not a commodity that can be purchased with techniques… Rather, 
validity is like integrity, character, and quality, to be assessed relative to 
purpose and circumstances (1985, p. 13). 
Validity in this piece of qualitative research was tested using a number of 
methods to ensure rigour, including regular consultation with two PhD supervisors. 
The basic strategy to ensure rigour in qualitative research is ensuring a systematic 
approach to research design with respect to data collection, interpretation and 
communication (Mays & Pope, 1995). The tests used in the research study were 
designed such that the method and data used could stand independently in order that 
another researcher may be able to analyse the same data in the same way. It is timely 
to provide an explanation of the approaches taken to ensure rigour, trustworthiness 
and replication.  
The frequently used qualitative approach of systematic, non-probabilistic 
sampling was used in Study 1 (Mays & Pope, 1995). In contrast to the quantitative 
approach of random sampling, in this case the population sample of ASX200 
companies was identified as a group of similarly sized companies, from a range of 
industries that possessed the characteristics relevant to the phenomenon being 
studied. The final sample was tested to ensure that it was representative of the wider 
population.  
In order to maintain rigour and trustworthiness of the data that was collected, 
meticulous records of the process undertaken by the researcher were documented in 
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detail in order to assist in future replication of Study 1. This included the 
development of a coding manual during the first and second coding phases. In 
addition, researcher bias was minimised by seeking feedback from two PhD 
supervisors to ensure that objectivity during the coding process was maintained 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Lastly, the documentation used in Study 1 is publicly 
available making replication of this study possible for future researchers. 
The case study methodology in Study 2 was designed to ensure rigour using a 
number of common qualitative methodology strategies (Mays & Pope, 2009). 
Convergence of multiple forms of evidence was an important aspect of case study 
design to ensure that there were a number of measures of the same phenomenon 
(Yin, 2009). Seven sources of evidence were used in each of the two case studies to 
assist with construct validity including annual reports, CSR reports, field 
observations, internal material, corporate websites, AGM presentations, and semi-
structured interviews.  Rather than attempt to generalize to a larger population 
(Eilbert & Lafronza, 2005), case study organisations representing the financial 
services sector and energy sector formed the sample in Study 2. Lastly, reliability 
and confirmability of results was a focus of this research study through ensuring all 
procedures were documented (Yin, 2009). Meticulous records of interviews and field 
memos were maintained and the process of analysis was documented in detail (Mays 
& Pope, 1995). To that extent, each case study can stand on its own as an analytic 
unit to extend emerging theory. Seeking additional input from two PhD supervisors 
regarding the interview process used, and the themes identified from the data, also 
enhanced trustworthiness of the data analysis.   
3.6 RESEARCH DESIGN LIMITATIONS 
While qualitative techniques provide richness, they ultimately rely upon the 
researcher’s judgement and insight (Kabanoff & Holt, 1996) and therefore a risk 
always remains in terms of the existing biases of the researcher impacting the 
interpretation of the data (Yin, 2009). First, the decision of what to include as a 
reference to safety in the annual reports and CSR reports during Study 1 (and further, 
how to code each reference against the four safety leadership criteria during the 
descriptive coding phase) was ultimately left to the discretion of the researcher and 
so issues of subjectivity and bias were relevant. This is one of the risks of working as 
a single researcher (Yin, 2003). A method the researcher used to assist in overcoming 
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this risk was to use a research diary to help maintain objectivity (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011) as well as checking with others such as the researcher’s two PhD 
supervisors.  
Second, annual reports and CSR reports are carefully crafted documents 
primarily concerned with impression management for stakeholders. This may put 
some limits on how realistic or misleading the data obtained from the documents 
might be. However, it is reasonable to believe that the words used in publicly 
available organisational documents contain both image and substance (Kabanoff, 
Waldersee, & Cohen, et al., 1995). To test this, the research design sought to go 
‘behind the words’ of Study 1 during Study 2.  
Third, annual report disclosure is a complex, multi-faceted concept (Beattie et 
al., 2004). The researcher acknowledges that it would be insufficient to solely rely on 
a thematic or content analysis of annual reports or CSR reports in order to fully 
understand the area of safety-related disclosures. Therefore Study 2, in conjunction 
with Study 1, was essential to help build a deeper understanding of how and why 
those disclosures may be made.  
Fourth, case studies can be rigorous and trustworthy qualitative methods, Yin 
(2009) outlined limitations that are often cited when using case study methodology. 
A lack of generalizability (Yin, 2009) can potentially be an issue when only two case 
studies are undertaken, however, does not reduce the meaningfulness of the data that 
were gathered (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). First, case studies are only generalizable to 
theoretical propositions and not to entire populations (Yin, 2009) and therefore care 
has been taken to ensure broader generalizability is not claimed. Second, a risk that 
all researchers conducting case studies should be aware of is to ensure that limits are 
set on the quantity of documentation to be uncovered or the number of interviews to 
be conducted (Yin, 2009). This avoids long, detailed case studies being produced 
with lengthy narratives and little reference to the research question at hand. The 
researcher remained fully focused and committed to the three research questions to 
avoid such risks.  
3.7 RESEARCH ETHICS 
Study 1 primarily relied on using publicly available documents for thematic 
and content analysis and therefore there was no direct connection with individuals. 
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Regardless, it was still important to ensure that the document analysis was conducted 
with ethical consideration. This involved ensuring identifying characteristics of the 
companies involved in the research were removed since the purpose of this research 
was not to single out any particular organisation as having a particularly ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ approach to safety.  A naming protocol was used and only industry sector 
identifiers were used to distinguish companies in the sample.  
Because Study 2 involved the study of a contemporary organisation in its real-
life context, it was crucial to conduct the research to the highest ethical standard. 
This involved seeking informed consent from all participants, avoiding the use of 
deception as to the purposes of the study and protecting the privacy and 
confidentiality of the organisations and individuals involved.  Ethics clearance was 
granted by the University Human Research Ethics Committee (QUT Ethics Approval 
Number 1200000544) and the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research was complied with at all times. Confidentiality was maintained by using a 
naming protocol developed by the researcher for ensuring anonymity of interview 
participants.  
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined in detail the research design used to answer the 
research questions. Study 1 involved a combined thematic and content analysis in 
order to address research question 1. Study 2 involved a case study design with 
further document analysis and semi-structured interviews in order to address research 
questions 2 and 3. While a number of potential limitations have been considered in 
detail, this chapter has addressed each concern to ensure that the research is reliable 
and trustworthy. The multiple forms of evidence used and the detailed chain of 
evidence available will ensure that this study can be replicated if required. Chapter 4 
will provide detailed findings from Study 1 and research question 1 will be 
addressed. 	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Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of Study 1 that involved a documentary 
analysis of annual reports and CSR reports between 2001 and 2011. This chapter will 
present the findings of Study 1 and address the following research question: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
 In addressing this research question, each of the four safety leadership criteria 
will be considered. When presenting the findings for each criterion, each of the six 
categories identified during the coding process and introduced in Chapter 3 will also 
be included.  
Using content analysis it was possible to reveal the extent to which the sample 
of 76 companies made safety disclosures, in the context of the four safety leadership 
criteria, in 2001, 2006 and 2011. The data is based on the disclosures of safety-
related activities, which were categorised during coding against one of the four safety 
leadership criteria. The content analysis did not assess the quality of the disclosures 
but provided an indication of whether a disclosure was made by the company. The 
quality of disclosures, and themes that became apparent from such disclosures, were 
considered during the thematic analysis phase. As stated in Chapter 3, the sample 
was comprised of 76 companies from a range of industry sectors. The total number 
of companies in the sample, by industry sector, is set out in Table 10. 
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Table 10 – Companies in Study 1 sample 
Industry sector Number of companies 
Consumer discretionary 12 
Consumer staples 5 
Energy 5 
Financial services 21 
Health care 5 
Industrials 11 
Information technology 1 
Materials 12 
Telecommunication services 2 
Utilities 2 
 
N=76 
 
Theoretical thematic analysis identified a number of themes during Study 1. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, a process of focused coding identified 24 categories across the 
four safety leadership criteria. These categories were identified directly from the data 
and will be described in greater detail in this chapter since they provide a richer 
understanding of the content behind the safety disclosures being made. They also 
serve to provide additional meaning to each of the four safety leadership criteria. A 
reminder of the 24 identified categories, discussed in Chapter 3, is set out in Table 
11. Table	  11	  -­‐	  Identified	  categories	  within	  each	  of	  the	  four	  safety	  leadership	  criteria	  
Vision Personal commitment 
Business excellence Business excellence 
Espoused values Espoused values 
Employee focus Employee focus 
Leadership and culture Leadership and culture 
Zero harm Board role 
Reputation Transparency 
  Decision-making Transparency 
Board role Safety statistics 
Board sub-committee Fatalities 
Senior executive role Legal action 
Employee role Remuneration 
Documents and systems Workers compensation 
Safety committees Recognition 	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Figure 6 shows that all four safety leadership criteria were disclosed in each of 
the three years to varying degrees. Throughout this chapter, data will be presented 
showing a percentage of disclosures. The percentages used indicate the percentage of 
all companies in the data set that made a disclosure of the type indicated. Each of the 
four criterion saw increased disclosures over the ten-year period. The criteria of 
decision-making received the greatest number of disclosures across all sectors in 
each of the three time periods, followed by disclosures related to vision. The least 
disclosed safety leadership criterion across all sectors and in each of the three years 
was personal commitment as reflected in the Chairman and CEO letters to 
shareholders. The data also indicate that the rate of growth in safety disclosures was 
relatively stable across the two time periods of 2001-2006 and 2006-2011.  
 Figure	  6	  -­‐	  Comparison	  of	  safety	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  
Despite the steady increases in safety disclosures over ten-years, it is relevant 
to note that in the case of personal commitment, less than half of the sample 
companies made such a disclosure in any of the three time periods. This is compared 
to the criterion of decision-making from which more than half of the sample of 
companies, and 89% of the sample of companies by 2011, made such a disclosure. 
Therefore while the results of the content analysis indicate that large companies do 
publicly disclose their safety-related activities, and that such disclosures do reflect 
the four main criteria of safety leadership, the extent of such disclosures can vary 
considerably between each of the four criterions. The companies in the Study 1 
sample will now be assessed to understand the extent to which the four safety 
leadership criteria received attention.  
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4.2 VISION 
The first safety leadership criterion to be considered is vision. As outlined in 
Chapter 3, any references in annual reports or CSR reports (excluding the Chairman 
or CEO letters) which made a clear statement of organisational commitment to 
safety, to the general safety of employees or a commitment to creating a safe 
workplace, was included within this criterion. In addition, any reference to 
aspirations, values, goals or visions regarding safety was also coded against this 
criterion. The definition of vision set out in Chapter 2 was also used as a guide during 
the coding process. The six categories identified during the focused coding process 
for vision were business excellence, espoused values, leadership and culture, zero 
harm and reputation. Figure 6 above shows the disclosures in relation to vision, by all 
sectors, across the three years. While just under half the companies (49%) made a 
vision disclosure in 2001, this increased to 62% in 2006 and increased again to 76% 
in 2011. What can be concluded from Figure 6 is that vision is an aspect of safety 
leadership that is disclosed by a large number of companies and moreover, that these 
disclosures have increased over time. Figure 7 outlines a comparison of the 
disclosures between each of the identified categories of vision. It is evident that the 
highest category for disclosure is that which related to espoused values. In 
comparison, the category of reputation was the lowest disclosed category, however, 
slightly increased disclosures were evident by 2011.  Each of the six categories is 
described in detail below including examples of the disclosures made and a 
comparison between industry sectors. 
 Figure	  7	  -­‐	  Vision	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	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4.2.1 Business excellence 
The first category to emerge from coding was the link between succeeding in 
achieving a safety vision and higher levels of business excellence. During coding, 
any references linking safety and business success, the organisational goal of being 
best practice in safety, references to excellent safety results leading to cost 
minimisation, the concept of safe production, references to safety as social 
responsibility or the need for continuous improvement in safety were categorised as 
business excellence. An example of a disclosure with respect to business excellence 
was: 
(The organisation) values a healthy and safe workplace which stimulates and 
positively supports people to achieve outcomes in a safe manner, thereby 
contributing to operational effectiveness and business sustainability (CD12, 
2011).  
This statement clearly articulates a value of the company to be a safe 
workplace and highlights the link between safety, productivity and efficiency with 
the resulting impact it can have on value for shareholders. A further example 
reflective of this category was: 
(Safety) has a direct correlation on productivity and efficiency, increasing 
shareholder value (M12, 2011).  
A final example, which makes direct reference to the issue of ‘safe production’, 
which can indicate the decisions being made by senior leaders when conflicting 
priorities between safety and financial targets emerge, was:  
Our fundamental philosophy is that, if a conflict arises between safety and 
other business targets, the safety of the individual always takes priority (E5, 
2001). 
With respect to rates of disclosures of this theme, Figure 7 above shows that 
the disclosures linking safety and business excellence increased from 25% in 2001 to 
43% in 2011. Within each industry sector, the rate at which this theme was disclosed 
varied as shown in Table 12. By 2011, a number of industry sectors, including the 
energy, financials, industrials and materials sectors, had seen increases in disclosures 
in this category. Interestingly, the consumer discretionary and consumer staples 
sectors saw a reduction in the disclosures at various stages over the ten-year period. 
However, it must be remembered that the observed changes in such disclosures over 
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this period are limited to the three time periods reviewed and had each year of the ten 
year period been analysed, the results of this analysis may have altered. The health 
care sector and information technology sector did not make any disclosures in this 
category during any of the three time periods analysed. Table	  12	  -­‐	  Business	  excellence	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001  
% 
2006  
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 25 0 17 
Consumer staples 5 40 60 40 
Energy 5 40 40 80 
Financial services 21 10 29 29 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 36 27 64 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 50 75 92 
Telecommunication services 2 0 50 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.2.2 Espoused values 
A second category to emerge during coding in Study 1 was reference to the 
value placed on safety in the organisation, particularly where safety was expressly 
stated as an espoused company value. Disclosures of this kind included statements of 
safety being the number one priority, safety as a core value, safety being of critical 
importance or a primary focus. Any disclosure where the value or importance of 
safety was disclosed was coded in this category. Examples of espoused safety values 
included “[we have] an absolute commitment to safety” (HC5, 2001), “the first 
responsibility of our management is the safety of our employees…” (IN2, 2001), 
“the provision of a safe workplace is of paramount importance within the company” 
(CS1, 2006), “safety is our number one priority” (CS1, 2006),  “our core values are 
... safety” (IN10, 2011) and “there is no area of our business in which we will 
compromise on safety” (M11, 2011). These statements all articulate safety as an 
espoused value and while the terms used varied between priorities, goals, 
responsibilities and values, the underlying message from such disclosures was 
consistent.  
With respect to rates of disclosures of this theme, Figure 7 shows that the 
disclosures of safety as an espoused value increased from 45% in 2001 to 72% in 
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2011. Overall, this was the most disclosed category to emerge from coding during 
each of the three years in the safety leadership criterion of vision. The extent to 
which companies disclosed safety as an espoused value varied between industry 
sectors as shown in Table 13. By 2011, four industry sectors (health care, 
information technology, materials and telecommunication services) had 100% 
disclosure rates in this category. The financial services sector, which was identified 
as one of the sectors with the lowest disclosures of safety-related activities, showed 
increases of disclosures in this category with 14% of companies making a disclosure 
in 2001 and increasing to 52% of companies by 2011. The consumer staples and 
consumer discretionary sectors also increased their level of disclosures in this 
category between 2001 and 2011.  Table	  13	  -­‐	  Espoused	  values	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 33 33 42 
Consumer staples 5 40 100 80 
Energy 5 100 100 80 
Financial services 21 14 43 52 
Health care 5 20 60 100 
Industrials 11 55 45 91 
Information technology 1 0 100 100 
Materials 12 83 75 100 
Telecommunication services 2 50 50 100 
Utilities 2 100 50 50 	  
4.2.3 Employee focus 
A third category to emerge during coding was the importance of employees in 
achieving the firm’s safety vision. References to safety being used as a retention or 
recruitment tool, organisations seeking to make the work environment safe so that 
employees can enjoy their work and fully contribute to the success of the business, 
focus by companies on improving the safety behaviours of employees, having an 
organisational goal of providing the right skills, tools or training to employees to 
achieve safe outcomes and references to employee’s own responsibility in safety 
were all included in this category. An example of such a disclosure was: 
Good safety is good management, which reflects both the efforts of 
management and the diligence of our workforce (IN2, 2011). 
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A further example of a disclosure was: 
(TS2) is one of the largest employers in Australia, with a diverse workforce. 
We have a responsibility to provide our employees with a rewarding, fair 
and safe workplace where our people can reach their potential, and be 
empowered to provide great service for our customers (TS2, 2006). 
In both of these examples, the role of the employee is explicitly referenced as a 
critical element in any safety vision. With respect to rates of disclosures of this 
theme, Figure 7 shows that the percentage of disclosures did not vary between 2001 
and 2006; however, there was an increase in disclosures by 2011.  The rate of 
disclosures across all industry sectors varied as show in Table 14. The industry sector 
to make the highest percentage of disclosures of the employee role in safety 
throughout the three periods was the materials sector moving from 17% in 2001 to 
67% in 2011. There were low levels of disclosure in the consumer discretionary 
sector and no disclosures at all evident in the information technology sector. The 
industrials sector moved from 0% in 2001 to 45% in 2011 and both the financial and 
health care sector showed increases in disclosures during the ten-year period.  Table	  14	  -­‐	  Employee	  focus	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 8 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 40 0 40 
Energy 5 20 40 40 
Financial services 21 5 0 19 
Health care 5 0 0 20 
Industrials 11 0 9 45 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 17 25 67 
Telecommunication services 2 0 50 50 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.2.4 Leadership and culture 
A fourth category to be identified during coding was the importance of 
leadership and culture in achieving a safety vision. This category included references 
acknowledging the importance of senior leaders as well as statements that articulated 
the importance of a safety culture in achieving the company safety vision for safety. 
An example of such a disclosure included the statement that “Our leaders… always 
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put safety first” (IN10, 2011). A further disclosure referred to the safety strategy as 
being built on leadership and an active safety culture (U1, 2011). Another example of 
such a disclosure was: 
We are committed to creating…. a culture that does not tolerate risks that 
could jeopardise the safety of our people (CS5, 2011). 
A further example: 
For us, a culture of safety starts at the top. Uncompromising leaders see 
safety as their individual responsibility and encourage others to identify and 
mitigate the risks that exist within the industry (F18, 2011). 
And a final example: 
In order to improve the safe behaviours of all co-workers, strong leadership 
is critical (M2, 2006). 
These disclosures made direct references to the role of senior leaders in 
achieving the safety vision, as well as the importance of developing a strong safety 
culture in support of that vision. With respect to rates of disclosures of this category, 
Figure 7 showed that the disclosures with regards to leadership and culture did not 
change between 2001 and 2006 but saw an increase by 2011.  The rate of disclosures 
across industry sectors varied considerably as shown in Table 15. The materials 
sector showed the largest increase in rates of disclosure with 17% of companies 
making the disclosure in 2001 to 92% of companies by 2011. The utilities sector 
moved from 0% in 2001 compared to 50% in 2011 and while the energy sector did 
not make any disclosures with respect to leadership and culture in either 2001 or 
2006, by 2011 the disclosure rate was 60% of sample companies in the sector. The 
financials sector also increased disclosures over the period increasing from 0% in 
2001 to 19% in 2011.  Table	  15	  -­‐	  Leadership	  and	  culture	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  –	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 8 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 40 20 40 
Energy 5 0 0 60 
Financial services 21 0 5 19 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 27 9 27 
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Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 17 42 92 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 50 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.2.5 Zero harm 
The fifth category to be identified during coding refers to a frequently used 
safety term, zero harm, which encapsulates the broader vision of having no injuries 
in the workplace. Any references to achieving zero harm within a company or 
statements confirming the belief that all injuries are preventable were coded in this 
category.  Examples of such disclosures included “(E5) views all injuries and 
workplace-related health issues as preventable” (E5, 2001); “our ultimate goal is zero 
harm to people” (M4, 2001); “our ultimate goal is to see that no one is ever injured” 
(CS1, 2006); “we believe that all accidents are preventable” (E5, 2006) and “we 
remain committed to the belief that (M4) can be a business with no fatalities, serious 
injuries or occupational illnesses” (M4, 2011). While the wording varied between 
organisations, the intent to eliminate injuries in the workplace was consistent.  
With respect to rates of disclosures of this theme, Figure 7 shows that 
disclosures with regards to zero harm increased across the three years; from 7% in 
2001 to 22% in 2006 and 34% by 2011. The rate of such disclosures varied between 
industry sectors as shown in Table 16. The industrials sector increased from no 
companies making the disclosure in 2001 to 73% of companies doing so by 2011. 
The materials sector increased from 25% of companies making the disclosure in 
2001 to 67% of sample companies in the sector in 2006 and 2011. Other sectors were 
much steadier in their rate of disclosure with both the consumer staples and energy 
sectors increasing from 20% to 40% between 2001 and 2006 and remaining at 40% 
in 2011. The consumer discretionary, health care and information technology sectors 
did not make any reference to zero harm in their disclosure of safety-related activities 
across any of the three time periods. Table	  16	  -­‐	  Zero	  harm	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 20 40 40 
Energy 5 20 40 40 
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Financial services 21 0 10 19 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 0 27 73 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 25 67 67 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 50 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.2.6 Reputation 
The final category in the vision criterion identified during coding was in 
relation to the importance of safety performance on the reputation of a company. 
Statements that disclosed the company as having a long history of safe work, or 
disclosed the importance of having a reputation as a safe company, were coded 
against this category. Examples of such disclosures included stating the importance 
of a “strong safety reputation” (E2, 2011); “(E1) has established a reputation for 
safety” (E1, 2011) and: 
Apart from our belief that applying best industry practice in health, safety 
and environmental management is part of being a good corporate citizen, we 
believe establishing a track record of minimising health, safety and 
environmental impacts leads to higher levels of trust in the communities in 
which we operate, among the governments that regulate us and the 
organisations that monitor our conduct (M4, 2006). 
These disclosures all reflect a view of the perceived importance that safety 
performance – either good or bad – can have on a company’s reputation. However, 
such disclosures were only seen in two industry sectors (energy and materials). 
Reputation was the category with the least disclosures in this safety leadership 
criterion, however, given that it was disclosed in 80% of energy companies by 2011, 
it may indicate an emerging category for safety-related disclosures and reflect a 
theme that will continue to grow in the future which warranted inclusion. Figure 7 
shows that disclosures in this category increased slightly across the three years under 
review yet remained low overall. The rate of disclosure was 0% in 2001, increased to 
4% in 2006 and then increased slightly again in 2011 to 5%. Table 17 outlines the 
levels of disclosure in the category of reputation across the three years.  
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Table	  17	  -­‐	  Reputation	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 0 0 0 
Energy 5 0 20 80 
Financial services 21 0 0 0 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 0 0 0 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 0 17 0 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 0 
 
4.3 PERSONAL COMMITMENT 
The second safety leadership criterion to be considered in Study 1 was 
personal commitment. As outlined in Chapter 3, references to this criterion were 
coded from the content of Chairman and CEO letters only since it is the section of 
the annual report and CSR report that can be personally attributable to a senior leader 
of the company. All references to safety in the letters were analysed and so the 
categories that emerged during the coding process tended to replicate categories 
identified for other criteria. The definition of personal commitment set out in Chapter 
2 was used as a guide during the coding process. The six categories that emerged 
during the coding process for personal commitment were business excellence, 
espoused values, employee focus, leadership and culture, board role, and 
transparency. As the Chairman and CEO letters were used as the only source data for 
personal commitment, disclosures were limited to this criterion in order to more 
accurately understand the content of written personal commitments by Chairman and 
CEOs.  
Figure 6 shows a comparison of all disclosures of a personal commitment by 
the Chairman or CEO across all sectors and across the three years. Only 22% of all 
sample companies disclosed a personal commitment in 2001, this increased to 37% 
in 2006 and to 46% in 2011. What can be concluded from Figure 6 is that the 
personal commitment criterion is an aspect of safety leadership that is disclosed by 
some sample companies and that disclosures increased, however less than half of 
companies in the sample by 2011 made such a disclosure. Figure 8 provides a 
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comparison of the rates of disclosures across the three time periods for each of the 
categories. It is apparent that there was no single dominant category within the safety 
leadership criterion of personal commitment although business excellence, espoused 
values and transparency all received disclosures by at least one third of sample 
companies by 2011. The three remaining categories of employee focus, leadership 
and culture and the role of the board received the least disclosures across all industry 
sectors. Each of the six categories is outlined in more detail below including 
examples of the disclosures made and the disclosures between industry sectors. 
 Figure	  8	  -­‐	  Personal	  commitment	  disclosures	  -­‐	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  (2001	  -­‐	  2011)	  
4.3.1 Business excellence 
The first category to be identified in this criterion during the coding of 
Chairman and CEO letters referred to the link between a safe organisation and 
business excellence. Therefore, any disclosures as to how the business is run safely, 
references to safe production, goals for being best practice in safety and goals of 
continuous improvement in safety were included within this category. Any 
references made by a Chairman or CEO that referred to the importance of safety 
performance in the ongoing success of the company were also coded against this 
category. Examples of such disclosures included “we undertook to create value for 
shareholders by vigorously pursuing a strategy of lifting all aspects of our 
operational performance including… safety” (IN1, 2006). Another example of a 
Chairman or CEO disclosure in the category of business excellence was: 
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I believe that excellent safety, health and environmental performance is not 
only the right thing to do for the people who work and the community at 
large, but it also makes good business sense (M10, 2001). 
As shown in Figure 8, the rates of disclosures in the category of business 
excellence increased across the three time periods from 16% in 2001, to 26% in 2006 
and finally to 37% in 2011. The rate of disclosure varied between industry sectors as 
shown in Table 18. The energy, materials and industrials sectors all had the most 
disclosures in this category. Other sectors, such as consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples, health care, information technology and telecommunication services had no 
disclosures at all in 2011. This category revealed a striking difference between those 
sectors that did, and did not, disclose safety as being linked to business excellence in 
the Chairman and CEO letters.  Table	  18	  -­‐	  Business	  excellence	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 20 40 0 
Energy 5 60 60 100 
Financial services 21 0 10 10 
Health care 5 0 0 20 
Industrials 11 36 55 82 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 33 50 83 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 50 50 
 
4.3.2 Espoused values 
The second category to be identified during coding of the Chairman and CEO 
letters was safety as an espoused value or priority of the company. Disclosures in this 
category included statements that safety was a core value, or that safety was a critical 
issue or a key focus for the business. Essentially any reference made by the CEO or 
Chairman in their letter that espoused the importance of safety to the company was 
coded against this category. Examples of such disclosures included “safety is an 
absolute priority” (CS1, 2001); “a core value for (E2) is that no employee or 
contractor goes home injured, safety ... is an integral part of the culture” (E2, 2006) 
and “we remain firmly committed to our mission of enhancing the sustainability of 
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our operations by continually improving safety” (M12, 2011). Each of the 
disclosures coded against the category of espoused values indicated a statement by 
the Chairman or CEO clearly articulating the value placed on safety and reaffirming 
their own personal commitment to the safety of others in the company. 
The rate of personal commitments referencing espoused values across all 
sectors increased between 2001 (17%) to 2006 (18%) although the most disclosures 
were seen in 2011 (33%). The rate of disclosures between industry sectors, however, 
was again highly variable as reflected in Table 19. The industrials and materials 
sectors showed increases in disclosures of espoused values between 2001 and 2011 
with the industrials sector increasing from 27% in 2001 to 91% in 2011. The energy 
and consumer staples sectors remained consistent across each of the three time 
periods. The information technology, health care and telecommunication services 
sectors did not make disclosures in this category at all across any of the three time 
periods.  Table	  19	  -­‐	  Espoused	  values	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 17 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 20 
Energy 5 60 60 60 
Financial services 21 0 10 10 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 27 36 82 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 33 33 67 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.3.3 Employee focus 
The third category to be identified during coding of Chairman and CEO letters 
related to the role of employees and safety. This included references to the role of 
safety training, statements describing remuneration being tied to safety performance 
and references to the importance of safe behaviours by employees. Any disclosure 
made by the Chairman or CEO that indicated the role of, or importance of, safety 
with respect to employees was coded in this category. Examples of such disclosures 
were: 
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The Board would like to express particular appreciation for employee 
commitment, in particular the focus on care and safety during a challenging 
year (E1, 2011). 
 
Our focus on workplace programmes includes safety which is a strategic 
investment in our most important asset – our people (HC1, 2011). 
 
Rather than seeking short-term gains we have made significant investments 
for the long term, putting energy into safety awareness and training. During 
the year safety was an important focus (IN7, 2006).  
Each of these examples reflects the emphasis on the role that employees play in 
keeping themselves safe as well as the public commitment the company makes, 
through the Chairman and CEO letters, to keeping employees safe at work. The level 
of disclosures varied by industry sector although there was an increase in disclosures 
between 2001 (5%), 2006 (9%) and 2011 (14%). Table 20 sets out the variations 
between industry sectors with respect to this category. Similar to the categories 
already discussed, the traditionally high-hazard industries of energy, industrials, 
materials and utilities had the most disclosures. The industrials sector showed 
increased disclosures between 2001 (9%) and 2011 (27%) but declined in 2011 to 
18%. In 2011 the consumer staples sector, health care, information technology, 
telecommunication services and utilities sectors did not disclose in relation to this 
category at all.  Table	  20	  -­‐	  Employee	  focus	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 5 9 14 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 0 
Energy 5 0 0 60 
Financial services 21 0 14 5 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 9 27 18 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 8 0 42 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 0 
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4.3.4 Leadership and culture 
The fourth category identified during coding of Chairman and CEO letters was 
in respect of the importance of safety leadership and culture. Coded against this 
category were any disclosures regarding the role of safety culture in driving safety 
performance and specific references to safety leadership that were made by the 
Chairman or CEO. Examples of such disclosures were: 
The first responsibility of management is the safety of our employees, 
contractors and visitors to our operating sites (IN2, 2001). 
 
Safety is an integral part of the (E2) culture, with strong leadership and 
encouragement from the Board and senior management team (E2, 2006). 
 
This year, we focused on safety leadership, improving our operating 
disciplines and driving appropriate behaviours to embed a positive safety 
culture. We will continue to prioritise safety and drive uncompromising 
leadership through our business (F18, 2011). 
Each of these examples articulated a statement by the Chairman or CEO about 
the importance that senior leaders within the company have in maintaining the safety 
culture. The level of disclosures of this category was lower across all industry sectors 
than other categories with only a slight increase in overall disclosures between 2001 
(5%), 2006 (11%) and 2011 (14%). Table 21 sets out the levels of variation between 
industry sectors within this category. The low levels of disclosure of this category are 
evident in Table 21 with the consumer discretionary, health care, information 
technology and telecommunication services not making any disclosures across the 
ten-year period. In contrast, the industrials sector increased their disclosures from 
18% (2001) to 27% (2011) and the material sector increased their disclosures 
increasing from 8% in 2001 and 2006 to 64% in 2001. Table	  21	  -­‐	  Leadership	  and	  culture	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 0 0 20 
Energy 5 20 20 20 
Financial services 21 0 5 10 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
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Industrials 11 18 18 27 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 8 8 64 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.3.5 Board role 
The fifth category identified during coding of the Chairman and CEO letters 
included references made to the role of the board in safety. Safety commitments 
made on behalf of the board, references to a board sub-committee responsible for 
safety, or information on board reviews of safety incidents were coded in this 
category. When commenting on the deteriorating safety performance, a Chairman 
made the following disclosure, which was illustrative of this category: 
(The deteriorating safety performance) is unacceptable and the Board and 
management are committed to an improvement ... we are determined to 
improve our safety record this year and to help achieve this, the Board has 
decided to make safety improvement the sole target for the award of shares 
under the Employee Share Plan (E3, 2006).  
A further example is the statement “the Board and management are committed 
to the safety of our people” (F17, 2006) and “the Board and I remain committed to 
working towards our goals of identifying and eliminating the risk of injury in the 
workplace” (IN3, 2006). A final example: 
As part of the Board’s ongoing commitment to continuous improvement in 
the areas of safety and the environment, we have now established an 
Occupational Health and Safety and Sustainability Committee. The 
committee’s role is to continue the Board’s support of the work across 
(IN10) to make our company an even safer and more environmentally 
sustainable organisation (IN10, 2011). 
Overall the level of disclosures in this category increased across the three years 
from 5% (2001), 11% (2006) to 14% (2011), however, the levels of overall 
disclosure remained comparatively low. Table 22 below outlines the level of 
disclosures referencing the role of the board across sectors. The energy sector, for 
example, reduced disclosures in this category moving from 60% of companies in the 
sector in 2001 to 40% in 2006 and 2011. The industrials sector also had slightly 
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lower disclosures between 2006 (20%) and 2011 (18%). In comparison, however, the 
materials sector increased disclosures between 2001 (8%) and 2011 (40%). No 
disclosures were made at all, in any of the three time periods, by the consumer 
staples, health care, information technology or telecommunication services sectors. Table	  22	  -­‐	  Board	  role	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 0 0 0 
Energy 5 60 40 40 
Financial services 21 0 5 0 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 0 20 18 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 8 25 40 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
 
4.3.6 Transparency 
The final category to be identified during coding of Chairman and CEO letters 
was that of transparency. Any references made by the Chairman or CEO to fatalities 
that may have occurred during the year, safety statistics or the safety performance of 
the company was coded against this criterion. This category, after the category of 
espoused values, had the most disclosures within the safety leadership criterion of 
personal commitment. Examples of the transparency category included statements 
such as: 
Whilst we are encouraged with this (safety) improvement, we are not content 
with our current performance. We need to improve our safety systems to 
reduce further the number of incidents and accidents that occur on our sites 
and we need to be more effective in rehabilitation (M5, 2001). 
 
While the trend improved in the second half of the year through a concerted 
management focus, the statistics reinforce our belief that we must never take 
the safety of our people for granted (M4, 2006).  
 
Tragically, last year a contract worker at one of our mines was fatally injured 
in a single vehicle accident. In the most awful of circumstances we are 
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reminded about the importance of safety. As an organisation, providing a 
safe work environment is both our responsibility and our obligation – 
everybody has the right to return home safely each day. While all of our 
businesses prioritise and focus on safety, we can and must do better (CS1, 
2011). 
Across all sectors, disclosures reflecting the category of transparency increased 
from 2001 (16%), to 2006 (33%) to 2011 (39%).  Table 23 shows the breakdown of 
these disclosures across industry sectors. The energy and materials sectors showed 
increases in transparency disclosures between 2001 and 2011 with energy sector 
disclosures increasing over the period from 40% (2001) to 100% (2011). Materials 
sector disclosures also increased from 58% in 2001 to 83% in 2011. The industrials 
sector increased from 0% in 2001 to 82% by 2011 and the utilities sector similarly 
moved from 0% in 2001 to 100% in 2011. The consumer staples sector increased 
from 20% in 2001 to 60% in 2006 before reducing to 40% in 2011. Other sectors saw 
a reduction in disclosures in this category between 2001 and 2011. The consumer 
discretionary sector reduced from 17% in 2001 to 8% by 2011. No disclosures were 
made at all, in any of the three years, by the health care, information technology or 
telecommunication services sector.  Table	  23	  -­‐	  Transparency	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 17 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 20 60 40 
Energy 5 40 80 100 
Financial services 21 0 14 5 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 0 55 82 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 58 67 83 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 50 100 
4.4 DECISION-MAKING 
The third safety leadership criterion to be considered in Study 1 concerned 
decision-making. As outlined in Chapter 3, the references to this criterion were coded 
from the full content of annual reports and CSR reports (excluding Chairman and 
CEO letters). The definition of decision-making set out in Chapter 2 was used as a 
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guide during the coding process. Any references to the role of the board in safety or 
the existence of a board sub-committee for safety, board charter references to safety, 
safety reporting provided to the board, internal safety communications, safety 
committees or reporting structures, references to safety policies, safety documents 
and safety systems were coded against this criteria. This criterion had the highest 
number of safety-related disclosures amongst sample companies across the four 
leadership criteria. Figure 6 above shows the disclosures in relation to decision-
making across the three time periods. In 2001 there was already a relatively high 
level of disclosure, comparative to the other criteria, with 58% of all sample 
companies making such a disclosure. By 2006 this rate of disclosure had increased to 
86% and increased again in 2011 to 89%.  
After the process of descriptive coding was completed, a range of themes 
relevant to the criterion of decision-making was identified. The thematic analysis 
found that these disclosures could be coded against one of six categories. These 
categories included board role, board sub-committee, senior executives’ role, 
employees’ role, documents and systems, and safety committees. Figure 9 outlines a 
comparison of the disclosures between each of the categories. It should be noted that 
the categories of board role and board sub-committees were coded separately 
because it was relevant to understand in detail the way boards structure their 
decision-making processes around safety, and how these structures may form part of 
a safety governance framework. The existence, or otherwise, of a specific board sub-
committee was considered a critical aspect of safety governance for boards and so 
they were coded separately so that the level of usage of such sub-committees could 
be ascertained. Each of the six categories is outlined in more detail below including 
examples of the kinds of disclosures that were made in each category and the levels 
of disclosure between sectors. 
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 Figure	  9	  -­‐	  Decision-­‐making	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  (2001	  -­‐	  2011)	  	  
4.4.1 Board role 
The first category to be identified during coding of the decision-making 
criterion was the role of the board in safety. Any disclosures that included direct 
commitments by the board to safety, the inclusion of safety in the board’s list of 
responsibilities, details of safety reporting to the board by management, or 
information on board site safety visits were coded against this category. Examples of 
such disclosures included: 
The Directors recognise the importance of environmental and occupational 
health and safety issues. The Directors are committed to compliance with all 
relevant laws and regulations to ensure the protection of the environment, 
the community and the health and safety of its employees (CD4, 2001). 
 
We understand that good corporate governance practices and strong 
sustainability performance protect and enhance our value to shareholders. 
The Board receives quarterly sustainability reports, and monthly Safety, 
Health and Environment reports, that detail performance and issues across 
the Group (M10, 2011). 
 
Key responsibilities of the board include… monitoring occupational health 
and safety issues and considering appropriate reports and information (F6, 
2006). 
As shown in Figure 9, the levels of disclosures of the role of the board 
increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 34% of all sample companies across all 
Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 141 
sectors made a disclosure that referred to the role of the board in workplace safety. 
By 2006 this had increased  to 46% and by 2011 this further increased to 55%. This 
change possibly reflects the introduction of new workplace safety legislation in 2012 
in a number of States in Australia requiring company directors to undertake due 
diligence obligations with respect to safety.  Table 24 shows the variation between 
industry sectors with respect to disclosures about the role of the board. By 2011, 
every industry sector (excluding information technology) made a disclosure about 
the board’s role in safety. By 2011 these disclosures were mostly made in the 
traditionally high-hazard industry sectors of energy (80%), industrials (82%), 
materials (92%) and utilities (100%). However, other industry sectors also made 
disclosures and by 2011 included the consumer discretionary (50%), consumer 
staples (60%), financials (43%) and health care (40%) sectors. Interestingly, the 
consumer staples sector declined in disclosures over the 10-year period with 60% of 
companies in the sector making disclosures in 2011 after having made 100% 
disclosures in 2006. Table	  24	  -­‐	  Board	  role	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 33 25 42 
Consumer staples 5 60 100 60 
Energy 5 80 60 80 
Financial services 21 10 24 38 
Health care 5 20 60 20 
Industrials 11 55 45 64 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 50 83 92 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 50 
Utilities 2 0 50 100 
4.4.2 Board safety committee 
The second category identified during coding within the criterion of decision-
making relates to the existence of a board sub-committee responsible for safety. 
While closely related to the category of the role of the board outlined above, any 
statement with respect to the establishment of a board sub-committee specifically 
responsible for safety was coded against this category. The existence of a board 
safety committee was considered to be a significant statement by the company about 
the role of the board in safety decision-making and therefore important to identify 
142 Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 
separately. For data to be coded against this category the sub-committee needed to 
make a direct reference to safety in its responsibilities. A number of companies 
implied that board sub-committees may have been responsible for safety because of 
the nature of their other responsibilities, for example those sub-committees 
responsible for people issues, sustainability, social responsibility, risk and audit, but 
if safety was not expressly stated it was not coded in this category. Examples of 
disclosures in this category were: 
The Safety, Health and Environment Committee meets 4 times per year. The 
committee reviews and reports to the board on the management of the 
company's safety, health and environmental responsibilities. The committee 
receives regular reports from management, reviews the adequacy of 
management systems and performance, ensures that appropriate 
improvement targets and benchmarks are in place and monitors potential 
liabilities, changes in legislation, community expectations, research findings 
and technological changes (IN1, 2001). 
 
The Safety, Health and Environment Committee provides a conduit to ensure 
(M1) obligations to safety, health and environment compliance and issues 
are monitored by the Board. The committee has a broad role in reviewing 
safety, health and environmental matters across the Group (M1, 2006). 
 
The Board Safety, Health and Environment Committee assists the Board in 
the effective discharge of its responsibilities in relation to safety, health and 
environmental matters arising out of activities within the Company as they 
affect employees, contractors, customers, visitors and the communities in 
which it operates (M10, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 9, the levels of disclosures referencing a board safety 
committee increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 24% of all sample companies 
made a disclosure highlighting the existence of a board safety sub-committee 
responsible for safety. By 2006 this had increased to 32% and by 2011 this increased 
further to 46%.  The rate of companies in the sample disclosing the existence of, or 
the responsibilities of, a board sub-committee responsible for safety varied between 
industry sectors as shown in Table 25 below. Changes in disclosures relating to the 
existence of a safety sub-committee was evident across all sectors to varying degrees, 
with the exception of information technology, which was the only sector not to make 
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such a disclosure in any year. The most disclosures for the existence of a board sub-
committee were in traditionally high-hazard industries such as industrials (64% in 
2011) and materials (58% in 2011). Interestingly, even traditionally low-hazard 
industries such as the financial sector had increased disclosures of such a committee 
over the ten-year period from 5% (2001) to 38% (2011).  Table	  25	  -­‐	  Board	  sub-­‐committee	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 24 32 46 
Consumer staples 5 18 8 25 
Energy 5 40 60 40 
Financial services 21 5 14 38 
Health care 5 0 40 40 
Industrials 11 36 45 64 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 42 50 58 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 50 
Utilities 2 50 50 50 
4.4.3 Senior executives’ role 
The third category identified during coding related to the role of senior 
executives in safety decision-making. Any references to the role and responsibilities 
of senior executives with respect to safety were coded against this category. This 
included references to leadership initiatives such as safety training for executives or 
any information on senior executive participation in safety committees. This category 
was differentiated from the leadership and culture category under the vision criterion 
by being more focused in the tangible ways that senior executives were involved in 
safety. For example, the leadership and culture category within the vision criterion 
focused on disclosures highlighting the importance of safety leadership in achieving 
the safety vision of the company. In contrast, within the criterion of decision-making, 
the role of senior executives referred to specific measures taken to train or structure 
senior executives to be involved in decision-making around safety. Examples of such 
disclosures included: 
(CS2) released the Safety Leadership program that outlines the businesses’ 
non-negotiable commitments to safety and provides a framework in which to 
make decisions (positive and negative consequences) based on behaviours 
and safety outcomes (CS2, 2011). 
144 Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 
Our expectation is that senior management visibly demonstrates their 
commitment to safety by personally endorsing our safety initiatives and 
actively engaging with all of our stakeholders to ensure that health and 
safety is an integral part of our business (F18, 2011). 
 
A key to the improvement (in safety performance) has been a strong 
commitment from the executive team which reviews safety performance 
monthly (CS3, 2006). 
As shown in Figure 9, the levels of disclosures referencing the role of senior 
executives increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 20% of all sample companies 
made such a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 33% and by 2011 this 
increased again to 45%.   The rates of disclosure between industry sectors across the 
three years are shown in Table 26. These figures reveal that there is no discernible 
variation between traditionally high-hazard and low-hazard industries with respect to 
such disclosures. Increases in disclosures were seen across the three time periods in 
the consumer discretionary, financials, industrials, materials and utilities sectors. Table	  26	  –	  Senior	  executives	  role	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 17 
Consumer staples 5 20 40 80 
Energy 5 60 40 60 
Financial services 21 5 33 38 
Health care 5 20 40 20 
Industrials 11 27 55 55 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 42 42 67 
Telecommunication services 2 50 50 50 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
4.4.4 Employee role 
The fourth category identified during coding of this criterion relates to the role 
of employees in decision-making around safety. This category included any 
references to encouraging employees to make safe choices and demonstrate safe 
behaviours in the workplace, the need for employees to engage in formal safety 
committee structures, and the individual responsibility of employees for their own 
safety. Examples of such disclosures included: 
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(Programs include) encouraging employees to observe their workplace and 
draw attention to any hazards (E1, 2001).  
 
Annual safety plan objectives are promoted by actions including employees 
accepting workplace health and safety as an individual responsibility and as 
a pre-requisite in the planning of all activities (F17, 2006). 
 
Ensuring a high level of employee involvement in safety activities is an 
essential element of our approach to further reducing workplace injuries and 
incidents. (M9) is driving towards a culture of interdependence in regard to 
safety, whereby employees accept responsibility for their own safety but also 
actively care for the safety of one another (M9, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 9, the levels of disclosures referencing the role of 
employees increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 25% of all sample companies 
made such a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 38% and by 2011 this 
increased again to 49%.  The importance of employees with respect to safety was a 
frequently disclosed category in this criterion by 2011, which is reflected in Table 
27. While the level of disclosures of the role of employees varied between industries, 
all sectors made disclosures against this category by 2011 with the exception of 
telecommunication services. The traditionally high-hazard industries of energy, 
industrials and materials made the most disclosures however there were also 
relatively high levels of disclosure by the consumer staples, health care and 
information technology sectors.  Table	  27	  -­‐	  Employee	  role	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 20 60 80 
Consumer staples 5 80 40 80 
Energy 5 5 33 43 
Financial services 21 40 40 60 
Health care 5 36 36 45 
Industrials 11 0 100 100 
Information technology 1 50 67 67 
Materials 12 0 50 0 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 50 
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4.4.5 Documents and systems 
The fifth category identified during coding were disclosures made with respect 
to the existence of safety codes of practice, safety policies, safety standards, safety 
charters, safety procedures or safety resources within the company. This was a broad 
category and included any statement about the existence of protocols for managing 
safety within the organisation including information on the organisational safety 
management system. Examples of disclosures made within this category included: 
The Company has in place a risk management system to ensure that business 
risks are identified and properly managed and to safeguard the Company’s 
assets. Amongst the more critical control mechanisms is a group wide 
regulatory compliance program supported by approved guidelines and 
procedures covering… occupational health and safety (CD2, 2001). 
 
Our Health, Safety and Environment Management System provides a 
structured approach to managing global risk and effectively dealing with 
occupational health, safety and environmental issues. The focus is on both 
prevention and remediation of issues via ongoing training and external audits 
(HC5, 2006). 
 
The Company has many systems and processes in place to meet its safety 
obligations and recently restructured its Occupational Health and Safety 
function to boost the level of expertise, resources and consistency across the 
organisation (CD6, 2011).  
As shown in Figure 9, the levels of disclosures referencing documents and 
systems in the criterion of decision-making increased between 2001 and 2011. This 
category had the most disclosures in the decision-making criterion.  In 2001, 44% of 
all sample companies made such a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 75% and 
remained fairly consistent in 2011 at 76%.  As shown in Table 28, by 2011 every 
industry sector had made disclosures in respect of safety documents and systems. 
The financials sector saw increases in disclosures between 2001 (24%) to 2011 
(71%). The industrials (82%) and materials (92%) sectors were the industry sectors 
to make the most disclosures in this category amongst the traditionally high-hazard 
industries in 2011, with the energy sector (60%) and utilities sector (50%) also 
making such disclosures in the same year. 
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Table	  28	  -­‐	  Documents	  and	  systems	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 27 75 50 
Consumer staples 5 60 100 100 
Energy 5 80 40 60 
Financial services 21 24 67 71 
Health care 5 60 100 100 
Industrials 11 36 73 82 
Information technology 1 0 100 100 
Materials 12 75 83 92 
Telecommunication services 2 50 100 100 
Utilities 2 50 50 50 
4.4.6 Safety committees 
The final category to be identified during coding in the decision-making 
criterion focused on references to internal safety committees. The key factor for 
inclusion in this category was explicit reference to a safety committee designed to 
engage employees in decision-making around safety. To this extent, this category 
was distinguished from the board safety sub-committee category which was focused 
only on those disclosures that mentioned the role of the board. All employee safety 
committees, employee safety councils and other employee representative safety 
groups were coded against this category. Examples of these disclosures included: 
The [employee] OH&S Committee is now firmly established and a good 
working relationship has evolved between the Committee and those served 
by it (HC4, 2001). 
 
To help focus on and improve our health and safety performance, the 
majority of the Australian workforce, and 100% of employees within 
operations, are represented in joint management-worker Health and Safety 
Committees (CS5, 2006). 
 
The workforce is represented in formal joint management-worker Health and 
Safety Committees. These safety teams operate in the workplace and their 
functions are formalised through charters, procedures and legislative 
requirements where applicable (CS2, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 9, disclosures referencing employee safety committees 
increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 12% of all sampled companies made 
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such a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 14% and by 2011 it was 29%. 
Disclosures with respect to safety committees also varied by sector as shown in 
Table 29. The industrials sector had the most disclosures with respect to safety 
committees with an increase from 2001 (9%) to 2011 (64%). Other sectors to 
increase their disclosures of this category over the sampled time periods were the 
consumer discretionary, energy, financial services, materials and utilities sectors. The 
information technology and telecommunications services sectors did not make any 
such disclosures during the three time periods under review. Table	  29	  –	  Employee	  safety	  committee	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 20 
Energy 5 0 0 40 
Financial services 21 5 19 19 
Health care 5 40 0 20 
Industrials 11 9 9 64 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 33 42 42 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
4.5 TRANSPARENCY 
The fourth and final safety leadership criterion to be considered was 
transparency. As outlined in Chapter 3, the disclosures in this criterion were coded 
from the entire content of annual reports and CSR reports (excluding the Chairman 
and CEO letters). The definition of transparency set out in Chapter 2 was used as a 
guide during the coding process. References to safety statistics, fatalities, legal action 
being taken against the company for safety breaches, links between remuneration and 
safety, and internal or external safety recognition programs were coded against this 
criterion. Figure 6 shows the disclosures in relation to transparency across the three 
years. In 2001 there was a relatively low level of disclosure, comparative to the other 
criteria, with 33% of all companies in the sample making such a disclosure. By 2006 
this rate of disclosure had increased to 58% and to 72% in 2011. What can be 
concluded from Figure 6 is that transparency in safety issues is an aspect of safety 
leadership that is disclosed by sample group companies. 
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After the process of descriptive coding, within the transparency criterion six 
categories were identified. These were safety statistics, fatalities, legal action, 
remuneration, workers compensation and recognition. Figure 10 compares the 
disclosures between categories. Figure 10 shows that there was a wide variance of 
disclosures occurring within this criterion with the most disclosures in the category 
of safety statistics. Each of the categories for this criterion is described in more detail 
below including examples of the kinds of disclosures that were made and the 
percentages of disclosure by industry sectors. 
 Figure	  10	  -­‐	  Transparency	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  (2001	  -­‐	  2011)	  
4.5.1 Safety statistics 
The first category to be identified during coding related to disclosures of safety 
statistics such as a lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR), total recordable injury 
frequency rate (TRIFR) or all injury frequency rate (AIFR). References to other 
statistical safety performance such as medical treatment cases, all injury rates or any 
tailored internal company safety metrics were also coded against this category. It 
should be noted that in large organisations, particularly those operating in high-
hazard industries, extensive safety statistical data were often disclosed for each 
business unit or site in the group. Given that the focus for the current research study 
was not on the statistical safety outcomes but rather whether any statistical 
performance data were disclosed, statistical information was only coded once rather 
than for each individual site or operating companies. Examples of such disclosures 
included : 
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Regrettably, in the last 12 months people have continued to require the 
services of a medial practitioner as a result of workplace injuries. In some 
cases the impact on the person's health, lifestyle and family was considerable 
and is continuing (E5, 2001). 
 
 (IN5) achieved an LTIFR of (XX) reflecting a (XX)% improvement. 
Although this improvement is encouraging, the goal remains zero injuries 
(IN5, 2006). 
 
As a result of this focus, we were pleased to deliver ongoing improvements 
in our safety performance across the business in 2011, with all our safety 
measures delivering improved results on last year. Lost Time Injury 
Frequency Rate declined to (XX), a (XX)% reduction on last year. The hours 
lost associated with injury also declined by (XX)% (CD11, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 10, the levels of disclosures referencing safety statistics 
increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 29% of all sample companies made such 
a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 53% and by 2011 this increased to 67%.  
The level of disclosures with respect to safety statistics across industry sectors was 
also very high as shown in Table 30. By 2011, five sectors (consumer staples, 
energy, materials, telecommunication services and utilities) had 100% of companies 
making a disclosure for this category. The industrials sector had also increased 
disclosure rates from 27% in 2001 to 91% in 2011. The information technology 
sector did not make disclosures of any safety statistics during any of the three time 
periods. Table	  30	  -­‐	  Safety	  statistics	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 8 8 33 
Consumer staples 5 40 100 100 
Energy 5 80 100 100 
Financial services 21 5 38 43 
Health care 5 20 20 40 
Industrials 11 27 55 91 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 58 100 100 
Telecommunication services 2 50 50 100 
Utilities 2 100 50 100 
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4.5.2 Fatalities 
The second category identified during coding of the transparency criterion 
included references to workplace fatalities that may have occurred and were 
disclosed by the company. During the coding process it was apparent that where a 
fatality had occurred in an organisation during the reporting year, varying language 
was used to disclose the incident. As outlined in Chapter 3, excluded during coding 
were any references made to employee fatalities that may have occurred due to 
events in the wider community such as the Queensland floods, New Zealand 
earthquakes, World Trade Centre terrorist attacks or the Japanese tsunami. Examples 
of disclosures coded against this category were: 
We continue to maintain our focus on safety to reduce lost time and injuries 
on our sites. Unfortunately despite this focus there were eight deaths on 
(F18) sites during the last year (F18, 2001). 
 
It is with a profound sense of regret that (IN5) notes the involvement of 
these businesses in a number of road traffic fatalities during the course of the 
year. We extend our sincere condolences to the families and friends of the 
deceased (IN5, 2006). 
 
As the data illustrates, the objective of eliminating fatalities and permanent 
disabling injuries has not yet been reached. There were four fatalities within 
(IN3) in the past year ... While the number of workplace fatalities has 
decreased from previous years, these four fatalities were of great concern 
and regret to the Board (IN3, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 10, the levels of disclosures with respect to fatalities 
increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 11% of all sample companies made such 
a disclosure. By 2006 this had increased to 12% and by 2011 this increased to 16%.  
Unfortunately it is not possible to measure these results against the rate of actual 
fatalities since it is not mandatory for companies to make such a disclosure in their 
annual reports. The level of disclosures with respect to fatalities was relatively low 
across all sectors as shown in Table 31. Only five sectors made any disclosures with 
respect to fatalities, with the highest being consumer staples (40% in 2011) and 
materials (42% in 2011).  
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Table	  31	  -­‐	  Fatalities	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 0 20 40 
Energy 5 20 20 20 
Financial services 21 5 0 5 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 18 18 27 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 33 42 42 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 0 
4.5.3 Legal action 
The third category to be identified during coding were disclosures made about 
legal action, fines, enforceable undertakings or improvement notices being actioned 
against the company related to safety. This was also a very specific category 
dependent on whether a safety breach, resulting in legal action, had occurred. Despite 
the specificity, during the coding process varying methods of disclosure were used 
by organisations to reference such breaches. Examples included: 
(E3) has received a summons to appear in the Magistrates Court of (XX) 
after being charged with failing to provide a safe working environment 
following an incident in which an employee of a subcontractor working for 
(E3) was injured. (E3) will contest the charge (E3, 2001). 
 
Despite the Company's policies and actions to avoid occurrences which 
infringe regulations, there have been a small number of prosecutions against 
subsidiary companies for breach of occupational health and safety legislation 
(M5, 2006). 
 
 (IN6) recorded one penalty for a workplace safety related incident … The 
Magistrate’s Court noted that the company had good systems and policies in 
place, but these primarily failed because of the actions of one employee 
(IN6, 2011). 
As shown in Figure 10, the levels of disclosures referencing legal action 
declined slightly between 2001 and 2011. In 2001, 8% of all sampled companies 
made such a disclosure. By 2006 this had decreased to 5% and remained static at 5% 
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in 2011. Generally, the level of disclosures with respect to legal action was low 
across sectors as shown in Table 32. The consumer staples sector remained 
consistent with 20% of companies in that sector making disclosures in 2001, 2006 
and 2011. The materials sector had lower disclosures relating to legal action, 
decreasing from 25% in 2001 and 2006, to 8% in 2011. Similarly the energy sector 
disclosures relating to legal action decreased from 40% in 2001 to 0% in 2006 and 
2011. Table	  32	  -­‐	  Legal	  action	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 0 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 20 
Energy 5 40 0 0 
Financial services 21 0 0 5 
Health care 5 0 0 0 
Industrials 11 0 0 9 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 25 25 8 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 0 
4.5.4 Remuneration 
The fourth category identified during coding of the transparency criterion were 
references to any stated links between safety performance and remuneration, whether 
by means of individual or group key performance indicators (KPIs), short term 
incentives (STIs) or group bonuses. Examples included: 
We have put a major emphasis on safety in all our locations, and have 
revised our appraisal and incentive schemes to reward improved managerial 
leadership, financial performance and productivity (CS2, 2001). 
 
The STI plan includes individual performance indicators which must be 
genuine drivers of business performance, including safety performance, to 
support long term sustainability (IN1, 2006). 
 
Bonus targets include a safety improvement KPI for all executives which 
reinforces our commitment to the safety and welfare of our employees. 
Reduction in recordable cases from the previous year is weighted at 5% of 
the STI (M2, 2011). 
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The level of disclosures in this category is shown in Figure 10 to have 
increased over the three time periods. In 2001 only 7% of sample companies made 
such a disclosure. This rate had increased to 37% in 2006 and to 53% in 2011. The 
steep increase in disclosures may be attributed to the ASX requirements for listed 
boards to disclose their remuneration arrangements for the CEO and senior 
executives (ASX, 2003). The level of disclosures made in this category between 
industry sectors can be seen in Table 33. The highest levels of disclosure can be seen 
in the energy sector, which moved from one company from the sample making the 
disclosure in 2001, to all five companies in 2011. A similiar increase is seen in the 
industrials sector increasing from 9% in 2001 to 91% in 2011. High levels of 
disclosure were also evident in the consumer staples (60%) and materials (83%) 
sectors by 2011. No disclosures with respect to remuneration were made by the 
information technology or telecommunication services sectors during any of the 
three years. Table	  33	  -­‐	  Remuneration	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 42 
Consumer staples 5 40 60 60 
Energy 5 0 80 100 
Financial services 21 0 24 19 
Health care 5 0 0 40 
Industrials 11 9 64 91 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 17 75 83 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 0 0 50 
4.5.5 Workers’ compensation 
The fifth category to be identified during coding of the transparency criterion 
related to disclosures about the role of safety in reducing company workers 
compensation premiums. This included statements that self-insurance had been 
retained or obtained due to company safety performance. Excluded from this 
category were any references to provisions being made in the financial statements for 
workers compensation payments or a simple statement that the company was self-
insured with no accompanying details about the role that safety initiatives or the 
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overall safety performance of the company may have played. Example of disclosures 
in this category were: 
Whilst the number of actual workers compensation claims has increased … 
this is mainly related to minor cuts and strains as evidenced by the falling 
LTIFR (CS1, 2001) 
 
 (M9) Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) systems, practices and 
performance have been the prime reason for (M9) being granted Workers 
Compensation self–insurance status in all states where it is eligible (M9, 
2006). 
 
To successfully secure new federal government projects we are required to 
verify the effectiveness of our health and safety management systems 
through industry recognised certification and accreditation programmes. To 
achieve this, we have successfully maintained our self-insurance licence 
(TS2, 2011). 
The level of workers compensation disclosures is shown in Figure 10 and 
remained comparatively low across the three years sampled. In 2001, 9% of sample 
companies made such a disclosure. This rate remained at 9% in 2006 and increased 
slightly to 11% in 2011. Table 34 shows the sectors that made disclosures with 
respect to workers compensation. Low-hazard industries tended to make more 
disclosures than did high-hazard industries. The telecommunication services sector, 
for example, disclosed workers compensation information in both of the two sampled 
companies by 2011. The consumer staples and health care sectors also made 
disclosures regarding workers compensation in 2011.  Table	  34	  -­‐	  Workers	  compensation	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 8 0 8 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 20 
Energy 5 0 20 0 
Financial services 21 0 5 5 
Health care 5 20 0 20 
Industrials 11 0 9 0 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 25 17 17 
Telecommunication services 2 50 50 100 
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Utilities 2 0 0 0 
4.5.6 Recognition 
The final category to be identified during coding of the transparency criterion 
included disclosures of internal or external awards recognising safety achievements. 
Examples of such disclosures included: 
(F18) received two awards from (XX). To qualify for the prestigious awards, 
projects must achieve exceptional safety and environmental performance, 
including having worked over 500,000 hours without an incident (F18, 
2001). 
 
 (IN6) has introduced new company wide HSE awards which recognise HSE 
achievement and innovation across the company (IN6, 2006). 
 
 (M8) safety awards were established to measure and reward a range of 
activities, including hazard and near miss reporting, timely completion of 
safety improvement actions and meeting targets for safety and environmental 
performance (M8, 2011). 
The level of disclosures relating to internal or external recognition of safety 
performance can be seen in Figure 10. In 2001 the rate of disclosure in this category 
across all sectors was 13%. This increased to 20% in 2006 but was one of the few 
categories to decline in 2011 where the rate of disclosure decreased to 18%. Table 35 
shows the rate of disclosures in this category between sectors. The highest levels by 
2011 were seen in the consumer staples (40%) and energy (40%) sectors. In the 
materials sector 33% of companies made disclosures in 2001, increased to 75% in 
2006 but reduced to 33% in 2011. The health care, information technology, 
telecommunication services and utilities sectors did not make any disclosures with 
respect to internal or external recognition for safety performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 157 
Table	  35	  -­‐	  Recognition	  disclosures	  of	  all	  companies	  2001	  -­‐	  2011	  
 
N=76 2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Consumer discretionary 12 0 0 17 
Consumer staples 5 20 20 40 
Energy 5 0 20 40 
Financial services 21 5 5 10 
Health care 5 20 0 0 
Industrials 11 18 27 18 
Information technology 1 0 0 0 
Materials 12 33 75 33 
Telecommunication services 2 0 0 0 
Utilities 2 50 0 0 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the results of Study 1, which involved a document 
analysis of annual reports and CSR reports of 2001, 2006 and 2011 in order to 
answer the following research question: 
RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
The findings outlined in this chapter have confirmed that public disclosures of 
safety-related activities do reflect the four criteria of safety leadership – vision, 
personal commitment, decision-making and transparency – to varying degrees. 
While the disclosures relating to each criterion are, when considered individually, 
indicative of an approach to safety leadership within an organisation, safety 
leadership is considered to be most effective when all four criteria are evident. This 
is because while demonstrating transparency, on its own, is effective in publicly 
communicating the safety performance of an organisation, the commitment to safety 
will be further enhanced by publicly articulating the safety vision for the organisation 
in conjunction with a personal commitment by the CEO or Chairman. There appears 
to be some reluctance by organisations to move safety disclosures from a objective, 
organisational focused reporting to a more personal, leadership level.  
In addition, the levels of disclosure of the four criteria have been demonstrated 
by Study 1 to change over time and clear increases in disclosures have been seen 
across the four criteria over the ten-year period. By 2011, the percentage of 
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companies across all sectors disclosing the vision safety leadership criteria had 
increased from 49% to 76%. Similarly, the percentage of companies disclosing the 
decision-making criteria increased from 58% in 2001 to 89% in 2011. The 
transparency criteria also increased across all sectors from 33% in 2001 to 72% in 
2011. This trend may be due to the introduction of harmonised workplace safety 
legislation in Australia in 2012, with the increased disclosures seen in 2011 reflective 
of organisations preparing for the legislative changes.  Further research may seek to 
consider whether the trend continues once the legislation has been adopted and 
organisations have adjusted to its introduction.   
The only criterion not to be disclosed by the majority of companies across all 
sectors was the criterion of personal commitment by the Chairman or CEO. By 2011 
only 46% (from 22% in 2001) of the sample companies made such a disclosure. 
Therefore there still appears to be reluctance on the part of Chairman and CEO’s to 
use their annual reports to make a direct, personal statement about the importance of 
safety to the organisation. This appears to be an area of opportunity for future 
Chairman and CEOs to complement the organisational work being done with respect 
to safety including the introduction of safety reporting, safety policies and safety 
systems.  By contrast, it is apparent that vision and decision-making appear to be 
seen by the sample companies as safety leadership criteria warranting disclosure 
most often with 76% of companies disclosing the safety vision, and 89% of 
companies disclosing their safety decision making processes, by 2011.   
The findings from Study 2 will now be considered in detail in Chapter 5 where 
research questions 2 and 3 will be addressed. 
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Chapter 5: Study 2 Results 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of Study 2 which involved an in-depth case 
study of two companies from the Study 1 sample. As outlined in detail in Chapter 3, 
these two organisations were identified as potentially providing rich comparative 
data as they came from two different industry sectors. Case study 1 (FinanceCo) is an 
organisation in the financial services sector, which is considered a traditionally low-
hazard industry. Case study 2 (EnergyCo) is an organisation in the energy sector, 
which is considered a traditionally high-hazard industry sector. 
The research questions to be addressed by Study 2 were:  
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
These two case study organisations are from two industry sectors likely to 
provide the maximum level of variation in their approach to safety-related activities. 
Based on the data from Study 1 of this research, Figure 11 provides a comparison 
between the two industry sectors in terms of the average disclosures of the four 
safety leadership criteria across the ten-year period. There is a variation between the 
financial services and energy sectors as shown by the criterion of vision where the 
energy sector had average disclosures over the ten-year period of 100%. That is, 
every company in the energy sector sample made a reference to a safety vision in 
each of their three annual reports analysed at three time periods over the ten years. 
This can be compared to a rate of 43% in the financial services sector. Similarly, 
there is a variance between the percentages of disclosures in the financial services 
sector for personal commitment (13%) as compared to the energy sector (80%). The 
transparency criterion had an average disclosure rate of 32% in the financial services 
sector over the ten-year period compared to 93% in the energy sector. The closest 
criterion in terms of average disclosures between the two sectors is the decision-
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making criterion with an average of 93% disclosures in the energy sector compared 
with 60% in the financial services sector. 
 Figure	  11	  -­‐	  Average	  disclosures	  in	  energy	  and	  financial	  services	  sectors	  (2001	  -­‐	  2011)	  
Findings from the data analysed to address research questions 2 and 3 will be 
outlined in this chapter and a detailed discussion of the implications of the research 
will be provided in Chapter 6. The background of the two case study organisations 
will be provided and then findings reported against each research question. It should 
be noted that in order to maintain confidentiality of the two case study organisations, 
only limited descriptive information could be provided given that there are only a 
relatively small number of companies in the industry sectors that form the sample. 
Great care was taken not to provide any additional information that may reveal the 
identity of either case study organisation. 
5.2 CASE STUDY 1 (FINANCECO) 
FinanceCo is a long established, large national Australian-based organisation 
operating in the financial services sector. The organisation does not operate in what 
may be considered a traditionally high-hazard environment and so their approach to 
safety in the workplace, and the attitude of senior leaders as to how it might be best 
managed, was of particular interest. All employees of FinanceCo are employed 
within Australia and work in office environments in Australian capital cities.   
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As previously outlined in Chapter 3, this research provided an opportunity to 
understand the approach to safety leadership within an industry sector traditionally 
considered low-hazard. While the severity of incidents within FinanceCo may not be 
as catastrophic as an organisation operating in a high-hazard industry, the frequency 
of minor injuries is in fact higher. FinanceCo has a large number of office-based 
employees and the average lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) for the banking, 
diversified financials and insurance industry groups, to which FinanceCo belongs, 
was 1.2 per million hours worked in 2011/2012 (Safe Work Australia, 2014). This 
compares to an LTIFR of 0.8 per million hours worked for the energy sector 
(APPEA, 2014). 
Thirteen senior leaders within FinanceCo were invited to participate in the case 
study with a total of nine participants agreeing to be involved and interviewed. These 
included four board members (out of a possible six) and five senior executives (from 
a possible seven). Interviews were largely conducted within the offices of 
FinanceCo, however in two cases the interviews were conducted by telephone. The 
average length of interviews was 34 minutes (range 27 – 46 minutes). All interviews 
were recorded and at the conclusion of each interview they were transcribed and 
analysed to identify emerging themes. To maintain confidentiality, participant’s 
comments are identified by their case study number and their individual participant 
number. In the case of FinanceCo, all participants are identified with a prefix of CS1. 
5.3 CASE STUDY 2 (ENERGYCO) 
EnergyCo is a large Australian organisation operating in the energy sector. The 
organisation conducts their operations in what is considered a traditionally high-
hazard environment and so their approach to safety in the workplace, and the attitude 
of senior leaders as to how it might be best managed was of particular interest.  
While the energy sector is considered to be a high-hazard industry, the LTIFR for the 
energy sector is 0.8 per million hours worked (APPEA, 2014). High levels of focus 
and attention by senior leaders on safety in the energy sector has contributed to 
minor safety incidents reducing considerably from a rate of just over 3.5 per million 
man-hours in 1996 to 0.8 in 2011 (APPEA, 2014). However, the industry is still 
considered high-hazard because while minor injuries continue to reduce to even 
lower levels than that seen in the financial services sector, the risk of death or 
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permanent disablement is still very real with 22 fatalities reported by companies in 
ASX100 in the energy sector between 2005 and 2013 (Prior, 2013).  
Eighteen senior leaders within EnergyCo were invited to participate in this 
research and all 18 agreed to be involved and were interviewed. These included all 8 
board members and ten senior executives. Interviews were largely conducted within 
the offices of EnergyCo, however, six interviews were conducted by telephone and 
one by videoconference. The average length of interviews was 32 minutes (range 16 
- 48 minutes). All interviews were recorded and at the conclusion of each interview 
they were transcribed and analysed to identify emerging themes. To maintain 
confidentiality, participant’s comments are identified by their case study number and 
their individual participant number. In the case of EnergyCo, all participants are 
identified with a prefix of CS2. 
5.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
Study 2 has been designed to understand in much greater detail whether the 
public disclosures of safety-related activities outlined in Study 1 reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety. The findings from research question 2, to be outlined in this 
chapter, include an expanded documentary analysis of annual reports and CSR 
reports, websites, presentations at AGMs and field observations. Internal 
documentation was also analysed to compare internal policies, safety plans, board 
and sub-committee charters and safety committee structures within the organisation.  
5.4.1 Phase 1 – Public material 
Annual reports and CSR reports 
Study 2 involved a deeper analysis of the context of safety disclosures in order 
to compare the external focus on safety with the internal focus to address research 
question 2. There was a markedly different approach taken to public disclosures of 
safety-related activities by FinanceCo and EnergyCo in both quantity and quality. 
For example, the first reference to safety in the annual report of FinanceCo occurred 
in 2002 when a brief commitment to safety was made. This commitment was 
repeated in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2006, no mention of safety was made in 
FinanceCo’s annual report at all. In 2007 and 2008, FinanceCo disclosed the 
existence of a safety policy but no other details were provided. In 2009, FinanceCo 
returned to the earlier safety commitment in 2003-2005 but removed reference to a 
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safety policy. A change in approach was then seen in 2010 and 2011 when 
FinanceCo disclosed a commitment to safety and reported that safety was the 
responsibility of a board sub-committee. Yet by 2012, only the original commitment 
to safety was disclosed and reference to the board sub-committee was removed. This 
approach highlights a lack of consistency in safety disclosures over the period and a 
changing focus and attention on the areas of safety deemed relevant to disclosure. 
This can be contrasted with the approach to disclosures of safety-related activities 
taken by EnergyCo. 
  In every annual report between 2001 and 2012, EnergyCo made lengthy and 
detailed disclosures of their safety-related activities. Whilst the specific wording 
varied between years, a commitment to safety and a statement about the priority of 
safety in the organisation was made. Other references to safety by EnergyCo were 
made in the context of the vision for safety as well as company values around safety. 
References included safety management systems, safety procedures, safety training 
and safety performance, including statistical data. From 2003, EnergyCo made 
disclosures with respect to safety culture and in 2004 safety leadership was first 
introduced in the annual report as a measure to help drive safety outcomes. 
Recognition of the company for safety performance was disclosed in 2002, 2009 and 
2010. The safety of contractors and general engagement of the workforce in safety 
was a common area for disclosure throughout the period. In 2008 EnergyCo first 
outlined the role of the board in safety and this was repeated again in 2009. 
Therefore, in contrast to FinanceCo, the quantity and content of public disclosures of 
safety-related activities was much deeper and generally more consistent over the 
reporting period.  
With respect to CSR reports, FinanceCo did not publish any CSR reports 
during the period 2001 – 2012, although they did publish a corporate responsibility 
statement within their annual report outlining their social responsibility activities. 
There are numerous references to corporate social responsibility in the annual reports 
of FinanceCo and reference is made to a Code of Conduct which is stated to draw 
from, and expand on, the company’s espoused organisational values. Within the 
Code of Conduct is a direct reference to maintaining a fair and safe work 
environment. Therefore FinanceCo does make reference to the need to maintain a 
safe work environment, however no further details are provided. Similar to the 
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annual report comparison, the approach of FinanceCo is in stark contrast with that 
taken by EnergyCo. 
EnergyCo first began to publish CSR reports in 2010 and so the content of the 
CSR reports in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were analysed. The CSR reports for EnergyCo 
were very extensive and covered issues including the environment, community 
development, community health, stakeholder management as well as safety. The 
reporting on safety in the CSR reports provided EnergyCo with the opportunity to 
disclose considerably more detailed information about their approach. Similar to the 
detail of safety disclosures in annual reports, the context of the references to safety in 
the CSR reports were analysed and highlighted the depth, quantity and range of 
safety disclosures made. Table 36 provides an indication of the breadth of topics 
covered in their safety disclosures. The range of areas covered by EnergyCo 
highlights the integration of safety across the organisation with considerable focus 
and attention placed on ensuring full and detailed disclosures on safety are made to 
stakeholders. Table	  36	  -­‐	  CSR	  report	  safety-­‐related	  disclosures	  (2010	  -­‐	  2012)	  
 2010 2011 2012 
Board role with respect to safety  X X 
Commitment to safety X X X 
Continuous improvement in safety X  X 
Contractor safety X X X 
Employee safety committees X  X 
Internal safety resources   X 
Safe production X  X 
Safety and business excellence X  X 
Safety awards X  X 
Safety culture X X X 
Safety KPIs for senior executives X X X 
Safety leadership X X X 
Safety management systems X X X 
Safety policies and standards X X X 
Safety reporting to the board  X X 
Safety statistics  X X X 
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Safety vision and values X X X 
 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) presentations  
The Chairman and CEO address to shareholders at the AGMs for FinanceCo 
and EnergyCo (2001 – 2012) were analysed for any references to safety. FinanceCo 
made no direct references to safety in any of the AGM addresses during this period.  
In EnergyCo, the first reference made to safety at an AGM was made in 2003. Safety 
was then referenced in every AGM presentation in the reporting period, excluding 
2007, reflecting the importance EnergyCo placed on their safety reputation and the 
belief that their safety performance was perceived by the board as relevant to 
shareholders. The primary focus by EnergyCo in the presentations was providing 
safety statistics although references were also made to world class safety 
performance (2003 and 2004), safety as the number one priority of the organisation 
(2003), the link between safety and business growth (2004), safety performance 
within the various operations of the company (2005, 2008, 2010) and safety 
benchmarking against similar sized companies (2011, 2012).  
Corporate website 
In order to gain an understanding of the information provided by FinanceCo 
and EnergyCo on their corporate websites, both were reviewed by the researcher on 
30 May 2014 to understand at a point in time any variation between the two 
approaches. The FinanceCo website was heavily focused on the financial services 
offered. There was a section of the website that reinforced FinanceCo’s commitment 
to corporate social responsibility, however, there was no specific reference to safety 
of employees. There was a section on the website dedicated to those interested in 
starting a career with FinanceCo which included information on the company values 
but there was no specific reference to safety for those considering applying for 
employment with FinanceCo. A large section of the website was dedicated to 
investor information, including detailed biographies for all non-executive directors of 
the board as well as the CEO and senior executives. The charters for each of the 
board sub-committees were available to download, including that of the board sub-
committee listing a responsibility for safety.  
The EnergyCo corporate website included information on the company 
operations, job opportunities for future employees, information on EnergyCo’s 
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strategic focus and a significant amount of information on the company’s 
sustainability activities. The website had a page dedicated to safety and provided a 
copy of the company safety policy as well as current safety performance. There was 
a copy of the most recent sustainability report to download that included full safety 
statistical information. The website outlined the measures it had taken to achieve the 
safety vision of the company and included references to leadership, employee 
behaviours and safety systems. There was a large section of the website dedicated to 
investors and there were detailed biographies available for all non-executive 
directors and senior executives. The charter for the board, which incorporated the 
charter for each sub-committee, was available to download and the membership of 
each of the sub-committees was clearly explained. The board charter included safety 
as one of twelve specific responsibilities of the board. The role of the board sub-
committee responsible for safety was provided on the website as well as a copy of its 
charter. 
The approach of FinanceCo and EnergyCo to the provision of safety 
information, and general focus on safety, via their respective corporate websites 
appeared to reflect their focus on safety seen in their public disclosures via annual 
reports and CSR reports. This process of analysis has commonly been referred to as 
pattern matching (Yin, 2009) and provided a useful analytic strategy during Study 2. 
FinanceCo provided limited reference to safety on their corporate website with only 
a brief reference to safety in the charter of a board sub-committee. EnergyCo 
provided extensive information on safety on their website with the ability to access 
the most recent safety performance data as well as information on how they managed 
safety within the organisation. The full charter for the board sub-committee 
responsible for safety was also provided. These two websites confirmed that the 
extent of public disclosures on safety-related activities seen in a company’s annual 
reports and CSR reports was consistent with the information shared with the public 
on their corporate websites.  
The review of external material for FinanceCo and EnergyCo revealed vastly 
different approaches to safety disclosures in annual reports and CSR reports and a 
similar level respective of information on the corporate websites. This demonstrates 
the potential variation to the approach to safety disclosures by the financial services 
sector and energy sector. In order to answer research question 2, however, it was 
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necessary to look inside the case study organisations to understand whether the 
external focus on safety reflected the level of attention and focus on safety internally. 
5.4.2 Phase 2 – Internal material 
Internal safety documentation 
To understand what the internal focus on safety might be in FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo, the researcher requested a range of documentation from the case study 
organisations. Details of the information sought were previously outlined in Chapter 
3. Both case study organisations were forthcoming in providing hard and soft copy 
material covering all information requests to the extent it was available. The quantity 
of documentation provided by both organisations allowed for a rich analysis when 
comparing the external focus related to safety to an internal one. 
FinanceCo 
Upon a detailed examination of FinanceCo internal documents it was found 
that the company had a number of detailed safety policies in place including:  
§ Workplace health and safety policy; 
§ Workers compensation, return to work and rehabilitation policy; 
§ Work health and safety risk management policy; 
§ Work health and safety consultation policy; 
§ Managing safety risk policy; and 
§ Work health and safety induction, training and competency policy.  
The policies reinforced the commitment of FinanceCo to ensuring the health, 
safety and welfare of their employees.  The policies clearly stated the roles of senior 
executives who were responsible for implementing FinanceCo’s safety priorities. 
The policies were somewhat generic in their design yet they ensured the minimum 
requirements were in place to comply with workplace safety legislation. In a number 
of the policies, reference was made to the responsibility and accountability of the 
board for ensuring that health and safety was adequately managed within FinanceCo. 
Many of the safety policies accessed during this phase were quite new and had only 
recently been developed by the company to enhance their internal focus on safety. 
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FinanceCo had established a risk register which listed 14 identified risks in the 
office environment in which FinanceCo operated. These risks covered a range of 
potential hazards which may be expected in an office environment such as slips and 
trips, electrical safety, manual handling, ergonomics issues and contractor 
management. All risks were assessed as low with the exception of emergency 
procedures and the assessment of this risk was medium. The senior executive team 
had also prepared a safety strategic plan. The tasks contained within the safety 
strategic plan focused on ensuring compliance with legislation through 
implementation of appropriate safety policies, establishing safety performance 
reporting criteria, reviewing first aid procedures, integrating contractors and 
temporary staff into the safety training process, developing further safety training 
modules, completing a communications plan, developing a hazard reporting process 
and reviewing the emergency response manual. The strategic plan included an 
objective relating to leadership and commitment that was particularly relevant to this 
research study and confirmed the role of the board and senior executives in safety.  
EnergyCo 
EnergyCo had a sophisticated and extensive range of detailed safety policies 
and strategies in place, many of which had been in existence and embedded within 
the organisation for many years. The safety policies formed part of the safety 
management system, which was used to communicate the expectations of the board 
with respect to safety at EnergyCo. As well as a large number of specific safety 
standards, a range of policies also applied to all operations and activities of 
EnergyCo employees and contractors. An index of safety-related procedures and 
policies listed 9 safety policy areas and 80 internal documents in place within 
EnergyCo set out in Table 37. This reveals EnergyCo to have a very sophisticated 
and detailed safety management system in place as well as extensive documentation 
in place to support safety within the company.  Table	  37	  -­‐	  EnergyCo	  safety	  policies	  and	  strategies	  
EnergyCo safety policy area 
No. of 
documents 
Contractor safety management 5 
Incident management 5 
Management of change 4 
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Management, leadership & commitment 11 
Safety audit reviews 3 
Safety consultation 5 
Safety planning, projects & commissioning 19 
Safety training & induction 8 
Work execution & safe work methods 20 
TOTAL 80 	  
It was beyond the scope of the current research study to review all 80 safety-
related policies of EnergyCo, since many were of a very technical nature, however, 
11 documents within the EnergyCo safety system related specifically to 
management, leadership and commitment to safety. The Management, leadership 
and commitment to safety policy was designed to provide direction to the 
organisation to ensure that safety leadership, consultation and accountability was 
understood, demonstrated and widely communicated throughout the organisation. 
The policy expressly stated that : 
Management must establish the vision, set the corporate expectations, safety 
policy and provide strong, visible leadership, participation, and commitment 
towards world-class safety performance (EnergyCo internal document 10). 
The policy made it clear that safety was the responsibility of people at all levels 
of the organisation. The policy stated “when leadership is integrated into 
everybody’s daily decision-making, a committed and positive safety culture result 
will be maintained” (EnergyCo internal document 10). Specific safety leadership 
skills were specified in the policy against which leaders would be held accountable 
including: 
§ demonstrating correct safety behaviours and attitudes; 
§ clearly defining safety roles and responsibilities; 
§ providing appropriate resources; 
§ implementing robust planning processes; and 
§ monitoring, measuring, reviewing and continuously improving safety 
systems and performance (EnergyCo internal document 10). 
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EnergyCo also had a policy setting out individual safety responsibilities that 
were designed to ensure there was a full awareness of safety-related duty of care 
responsibilities across the organisation. The policy explicitly stated it applied to the 
board of directors, CEO and all other managers, supervisors, employees and 
contractors in the business. The policy set out the responsibilities of the board which 
included: 
§ setting company safety policy and monitoring compliance with that 
policy; 
§ reviewing and discussing risks deemed “material to the Board” as part 
of the Risk committee; and  
§ reviewing safety audits as part of the Audit committee (EnergyCo 
internal document 11).  
The policy also provided for the additional responsibilities of the CEO, which 
included: 
§ advising the board on the organisation’s safety performance against 
achieving policy objectives; 
§ ensuring documented systems and processes exist for managing safety 
risks; 
§ demonstrating visible leadership and commitment to safety; and  
§ monitoring compliance with the organisational safety policies across 
the organisation (EnergyCo internal document 11). 
In addition, EnergyCo had a safety policy that was a signed commitment by the 
CEO and Chairman to seek to achieve safe operations. Twelve specific commitments 
were outlined in the document detailing the measures that would be taken to ensure 
the safety of employees, contractors and the general community (EnergyCo internal 
document 8). Some of the measures included promoting safety objectives, safety 
leadership, responsibilities and behaviours as integral duties of all managers and 
employees. Additional commitments referred to compliance with applicable laws, 
reporting and evaluating safety risks and hazards, and selecting and engaging 
contractors who had a similar commitment to safety (EnergyCo internal document 
8).   
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EnergyCo provided the researcher with a range of different safety investigation 
reports to review. Nine incident reports were reviewed and each investigation offered 
detailed background to the incidents, key findings relating to cause of the incident, 
photos of the relevant scene, corrective actions taken to prevent a re-occurrence and 
overall recommendations. Where available, safety alerts relevant to the cause of an 
incident were reviewed and were demonstrated to provide the wider workforce of 
EnergyCo with a short summary of the incident, an outline of the severity or 
potential severity of the incident, lessons learnt, key lessons for the workforce and 
any corrective action that may be required. The alerts contained a commitment to the 
safety values of EnergyCo and often contained safety lessons from other 
organisations. EnergyCo also provided a range of internal safety tools used by the 
workforce to assist in their roles. These included Job Hazard Analysis forms and 
various internal safety observation tools.  
The breadth, depth and quality of internal documents appeared to strongly 
reflect the external focus on safety within EnergyCo seen in annual reports, CSR 
reports and published on the corporate website. The focus on the role of the board 
and the personal commitments of the CEO and Chairman to safe operations also 
reflected the public level of attention given to safety. The internal safety documents 
of FinanceCo and EnergyCo also highlighted a distinct variation in the focus on 
safety between the organisations. While the FinanceCo list of safety policies may be 
relatively new and somewhat generic in nature, those of EnergyCo revealed an 
organisation with a deeply embedded safety culture and safety management system 
integrated with every aspect of the organisation.  
Board and safety sub-committee reporting 
FinanceCo 
The board of FinanceCo reported being briefed by a legal firm at the start of 
2012 on the introduction of new safety legislation before it was enacted. This 
briefing explained the legislation in detail, including the responsibilities of board 
members and senior executives. The briefing reinforced the responsibility of the 
board to ensure the health and safety of their employees with a focus on risk 
management. The first recommendation was to implement a safety management 
system to manage risk that included identifying hazards and assessing risk. The 
second recommendation was to create a plan to develop a safety culture. The legal 
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briefing reminded directors that they cannot leave it to senior executives to manage 
safety and that under the legislation they must be actively engaged in safety to ensure 
that safety tools and processes are in place to ensure compliance. The reporting of 
this briefing highlighted the strong internal focus within FinanceCo on ensuring 
compliance with safety legislation.  
FinanceCo had a sub-committee of the board responsible for people and 
remuneration issues and health and safety matters fell within its charter. The charter 
of the sub-committee expressly stated the purpose was to “assist the board to carry 
out the following functions more efficiently (including) … compliance with 
occupational health and safety regulations” (FinanceCo internal document 2). Formal 
safety reports were provided to the sub-committee four times per year and to the full 
board twice per year.  Six independent non-executive directors sat on the main board 
of FinanceCo, which included the Chairman. Three non-executive directors formed 
the sub-committee responsible for people and remuneration issues, including safety. 
After a legal briefing that FinanceCo needed to develop a safety culture, the main 
reporting being provided to the sub-committee focused on compliance issues. The 
safety report to the sub-committee (FinanceCo internal document 3) outlined the 
safety management system in place, statistics of employees who had completed a 
safety induction, details on hazard reporting, safety compliance, incident reporting, 
risk profiles and risk register, safety profiles, safety training completion status 
reports, property safety inspection reports, workers compensation performance, 
contractor management and emergency response plans. The content of the reporting 
to the sub-committee was aligned with safety legislation, which imposed various 
safety-related legal obligations on the board and senior executives. It was evident 
that compliance with safety legislation was a key priority for FinanceCo in the 
development of an approach to safety and had been the main driver of a changing 
focus to safety in the organisation. 
EnergyCo 
With respect to EnergyCo, a number of documents provided to the Board in 
relation to safety were reviewed. These included monthly safety reporting, “safety 
moments” addressing a safety incident that may have recently occurred and board 
minutes. While the new legislation also impacted EnergyCo, its introduction was not 
raised with the researcher when compiling the internal documentation. This may be 
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due to EnergyCo viewing compliance as the minimum standard for safety within 
their organisation and therefore any legislation, while important to be aware of, was 
not driving the development of their approach to managing safety.    
Safety reporting to the full board appeared to be very thorough with a monthly 
report incorporating information on safety statistics across the organisation, 
comparison of safety performance to previous reporting periods, commentary from 
management on safety incidents including causal factors, and presentations on 
specific safety incidents of the previous month.   Every EnergyCo board meeting had 
a ‘safety moment’ where the senior executive responsible for safety briefed the board 
on a relevant risk or process within the organisation. The safety moment outlined for 
the full board the background to a particular risk or safety issue, identified how the 
risk had been identified and what mitigation steps had been taken. Any action 
required by the Board was also considered. An additional policy relating to the 
development of safety plans and key performance indicators (KPIs) stated that the 
board was responsible for reviewing and approving company safety performance 
KPIs on an annual basis. The policy clarified that the Managing Director, in 
conjunction with the senior management team, was to develop the proposed safety 
KPIs for approval by the board (EnergyCo internal document 9).  
The board safety sub-committee in EnergyCo had been through a period of 
change. Having been introduced in 2002, it existed until 2006 at which time the sub-
committee was disbanded and safety responsibilities were dealt with by the full 
board. At the time of the case study the safety sub-committee was in the process of 
being re-formed and was formally re-established after interviews with participants 
had been completed. A copy of the new charter for the safety sub-committee of 
EnergyCo was made available on the corporate website. This charter summarises the 
responsibilities of the sub-committee as monitoring safety performance, overseeing 
safety strategies and processes adopted by senior executives, and reviewing whether 
the company’s safety performance is in accordance with the board’s expectations and 
policies (EnergyCo internal document 18).  
Employee safety committees 
FinanceCo 
During interviews with FinanceCo senior executives it was apparent that the 
intended objectives of the employee safety committee was to ensure compliance with 
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safety legislation. The committee was largely intended to demonstrate employee 
engagement in safety and bring to the attention of the manager responsible for safety, 
any hazards in the workplace that needed rectification. The employee safety 
committee within FinanceCo had experienced considerable turnover of members due 
to structural changes within the business. In the minutes of a recent FinanceCo 
employee safety committee meeting, of eighteen members of the committee, eleven 
had resigned, three members did not attend and only four members were in 
attendance (FinanceCo internal document 5). No members of the senior executive 
team attended the safety committee meetings. Senior executives within FinanceCo 
identified that there was a need to reinvigorate the leadership support and visibility 
with respect to the safety committee to ensure that it functioned effectively.   
EnergyCo 
One of the defining elements of EnergyCo’s safety management system was 
the safety committee structure, which cascaded formally from the board level to the 
employee in the field. There were a number of clearly defined safety committee 
levels within EnergyCo and each had a Chairman who sat on the committee above it 
so that safety information could be communicated freely up and down the 
organisation. An analysis of minutes from these meetings revealed that all meetings 
commenced with a ‘safety moment’, which addressed a safety incident that may have 
recently occurred. The focus of the ‘safety moment’ was on learning from the 
incident in order to prevent its reoccurrence. Analysis of the meeting minutes 
revealed that discussion within the meeting covered areas such as site visits by 
leadership, safety resourcing, changes to safety documentation, specific safety issues 
within the business, reviews of organisational safety statistics and performance, 
updates of safety campaigns and initiatives, and consideration of safety issues 
requiring reporting to the board. A list of action items from each safety committee 
meeting was maintained, formal minutes kept and attendance noted.  
The operation, structure, culture and depth of safety committee meetings 
between FinanceCo and EnergyCo were clearly very different. FinanceCo had a 
relatively ineffective committee in place that was not supported by senior executives 
and subsequently not consistently attended by individual committee members. 
EnergyCo had a committee structure that was deeply embedded within the 
organisation, which involved all levels, including the board. The committee structure 
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was a vital structure in the communication of safety issues within EnergyCo and the 
meetings were well run with action items minuted and acted upon.   
Field observations 
Given that the interviews were mostly conducted on the premises of FinanceCo 
and EnergyCo, field observations were able to be made by the researcher. Because 
the interviews for FinanceCo and EnergyCo were held in the same environments; 
that is, large office buildings in capital cities, it was also possible to make a direct 
comparison. Upon arrival at the offices of FinanceCo and EnergyCo the researcher 
took notes of any observations in regard to safety practices, safety signage, safety 
behaviours and any other safety-related issues. This process was helpful in 
understanding whether the image that had been portrayed in annual reports and 
internal documents aligned with what was evident in the field. The researcher spent 
three days in the offices of FinanceCo and five days in the offices of EnergyCo to 
conduct the interviews.  
When visiting FinanceCo, the researcher was not provided with a safety 
induction and was not asked to sign a visitors’ book.  There were no visible artefacts 
relevant to workplace safety in the public areas where the researcher spent all of her 
time.  Other field observations included that the office was generally very clean and 
well maintained although that finding may be reflective of only having access to the 
public, client-facing areas of the building. The researcher did not tour the working 
floors of the organisation. 
On visiting the office locations of EnergyCo, a Visitors Safety Guide was 
provided on every occasion and a brief safety induction given. The researcher needed 
to sign a Visitors Book before commencing interviews and was required to wear a 
visitors badge at all times. Emergency exits were clearly marked and safety 
magazines and periodicals were available for review by visitors waiting in reception. 
Visible safety signs were evident in one of the locations including photos of hazards 
relevant to that particular office. While FinanceCo had no visible focus on safety 
when visiting the office, EnergyCo had clearly adapted their safety focus to the 
office environment with visitors books, safety inductions and safety signage all being 
evident. This was a very distinct difference in the focus on safety between the two 
companies. 
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5.4.3 Summary 
The second research question, and the first to be addressed during Study 2 was: 
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
One of the strengths of Study 2 has been to be able to undertake a case study 
analysis of organisations from two very different industry sectors – financial services 
and the energy sector. The former sector is considered to be traditionally low-hazard 
while the latter operates in a highly high-hazard industry. While the perception from 
those interviewed is that workplace safety is likely to be more relevant to an 
organisation operating in the energy sector, the workplace safety statistics reveal that 
low-hazard industries such as financial services have higher levels of lost time 
injuries. This research study has therefore been important to ensure a focus on 
workplace safety has considered experiences from two different organisations to 
understand more clearly the varying approaches to safety leadership within the 
sample companies. 
From the findings of Study 1 and Study 2, it is clear that the internal focus on 
safety in each case study reflect their level of public disclosures. FinanceCo had a 
compliance-focused approach to safety and had made low levels of safety 
disclosures. Within FinanceCo safety policies existed, however, they were new and 
largely generic in nature. The corporate website of FinanceCo did not provide any 
additional safety information although there was reference to the safety 
responsibilities of the board sub-committee. The internal safety committee of 
FinanceCo was not functioning effectively and had no leadership support. Field 
observations revealed no focus on safety for visitors to their buildings. In summary, 
it was confirmed that the low level of public disclosures of the financial services 
sector in Study 1, to which FinanceCo belongs, did reflect the focus on safety 
internally within FinanceCo. 
In contrast, EnergyCo belongs to the energy sector that was revealed in Study 1 
to have high levels of public safety disclosures. EnergyCo had a sophisticated focus 
on safety, which was embedded throughout the organisation including clear 
statements and expectations of board members and senior executives. The safety 
committee structure was deeply embedded throughout the organisation and was 
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supported by an extensive range of safety policies and documentation. The website 
of EnergyCo offered detailed safety information including access to a safety policy, 
safety statistics and a charter of the sub-committee responsible for safety. Field 
observations revealed that the focus on safety in EnergyCo was not only espoused 
but also evident when visiting EnergyCo’s offices. Therefore research question 2 can 
be addressed with the finding that in these two cases, public safety disclosures are 
reflective of the internal focus on safety.   
5.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
The final phase of Study 2 has been designed to explore in detail, directly with 
board members and senior executives, whether the four criteria of safety leadership 
are evident in their views with respect to safety. The findings from research question 
3, to be outlined in this chapter, will analyse the content of 29 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with board members and senior executives of FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo. The four safety leadership criteria will be addressed and unlike Study 1, 
the personal commitment criterion will be considered in the context of all senior 
leaders who were interviewed rather than just the CEO and Chairman. It should be 
noted that the Chairman and CEO were each interviewed from both FinanceCo 
(CS1) and EnergyCo (CS2), however, for confidentiality and ethics reasons their 
interview comments have not been identified separately from those of other 
participants. Before commencing an analysis of the interview data and the four safety 
leadership criteria, a brief consideration of the influence of industry that emerged 
during interviews will be discussed. 
5.5.1 Industry context 
A key theme identified in interviews held with FinanceCo participants was the 
influence of the industry to which FinanceCo belonged in determining the approach 
taken to safety. Every interviewee discussed industry as a factor in FinanceCo’s 
approach to safety and this issue will therefore be briefly considered before 
addressing the four safety leadership criteria.  The view of many interviewees was 
that FinanceCo was unique and “not a BHP” (CS1001) and if they were BHP the 
board’s role around safety “would be a different kettle of fish” (CS1006). There was 
a view that they did not need to spend as much time on safety as other organisations 
might do because the risk of harm is different (CS1002). Safety was not seen as an 
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issue because “nobody has died” (CS1008) and so without the “constant reminders” 
(CS1008) of fatalities, safety tended to be focused on compliance. Because 
FinanceCo was largely an office-based business, safety was not “top of mind” 
(CS1004). The financial services industry was not seen as one that naturally lends 
itself to thinking about physical safety (CS1006) compared to working in mines, for 
example, which can mean a matter of “life or death” (CS1006). It was felt that safety 
was not part of the DNA for an office-based organisation (CS1004). Ultimately there 
was a sense from interviewees that safety expectations were different for 
organisations working in this industry (CS1009). 
Interviewees recognised there were a number of risks to having an attitude that 
safety was not relevant within their industry. There was a sense that FinanceCo could 
be “a bit complacent because we don’t have accidents all over the place” (CS1009). 
One interviewee stated that the board had to work really hard to get regular reporting 
on safety since they felt the attitude of management was “it is not an issue here; we 
are in brand new offices; safety is not an issue” (CS1008) and because they are so 
“white-collar oriented” they became “less conscious of the breadth of your staff 
wellbeing obligations compared to blue-collar where you have industrial accidents” 
(CS1009). There was also a tendency for participants to qualify that while they were 
not approaching safety in the same way that mining industry companies might, they 
were leading practice within their own industry (CS1001) and that they thought 
about safety a lot more than other organisations in their sector (CS1006). There was 
also recognition that legislative changes have meant that the financial services 
industry is being made more aware of the importance of safety (CS1005). A number 
of interviewees had direct experience in high-hazard industries and they also drew a 
distinction between the financial services industry and industries of other 
organisations in which they have worked. Those interviewed felt that the approach to 
managing safety needed to be quite different between industry sectors. One 
interviewee commented that they did not think someone would stop them from 
crossing a busy road while using their mobile phone at FinanceCo; however, it had 
happened on a site they visited within a high-hazard industry (CS1004).  
The interviewees in EnergyCo acknowledged that “industry is very important” 
(CS2002) for safety, however, for the opposite reason to that stated by interviewees 
in FinanceCo. Within the energy sector there was an “enormous safety focus” 
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(CS2002) and “people that are brought up in the industry tend to be quite passionate 
about safety because that’s the only reason they have survived” (CS2002). The 
energy industry “generally is pretty committed and sophisticated in the way it 
approaches safety” (CS2009) and “the industry has a tendency to have a much 
stronger focus on safety than (other industries)” (CS2010). There was a relatively 
pragmatic reason for the significant focus on safety in the energy sector because “the 
consequences of poor practices can be fatal” (CS2018). 
These brief preliminary comments on industry relevance to safety are 
illustrative of the widely differing views towards safety between industry sectors. 
The perceived risks, and consequences of those risks, determine the focus applied to 
safety within each organisation. These findings are useful for placing in context the 
analysis to follow that will consider whether the four safety leadership criteria are 
evident in the views of board members and senior executives more generally. Each 
of the four criteria will be addressed individually and by case study organisation to 
highlight any variation in views. 
5.5.2 Phase 3 – Semi-structured interviews 
Vision 
The safety leadership criterion of vision will be considered when addressing 
research question 3 in the context of the definition set out in Chapter 2. The vision 
criterion considers how senior leaders influence others in the organisation by placing 
emphasis on safety. This can be achieved by articulating a safety vision; setting 
safety goals and designing systems and processes to achieve that vision (Hofmann, 
2011; Lu & Yang, 2010). It is the senior leader who passes on their values to 
employees as a means of shaping behaviour and directing the focus of the 
organisation (Berson et al., 2008; Schein, 1992) and therefore their views on the 
vision for safety in their organisations are highly relevant to this research. 
FinanceCo 
A clear theme from interviews with FinanceCo participants was that there was 
no clearly articulated vision for safety within the organisation (CS1001, CS1002, 
CS1004, CS1007). Participants had different views as to what they felt the vision for 
safety within FinanceCo might be.   Some participants had a safety vision that 
involved “a situation of effectively zero harm in the workplace” (CS1002, CS1008) 
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or one that meant everyone was aware of their obligations under the legislation 
(CS1003). Another participant felt that “we have the safest environment for our 
employees that allows them to achieve their own goals” (CS1003). One interviewee 
clarified that while FinanceCo had not articulated a vision for safety, if they did it 
would be in terms of not causing harm to anyone, however, this vision would not 
currently be something which is “active, lived daily and role modelled” (CS1008). 
When asked what an employee might say was the vision for safety at 
FinanceCo, the answers were consistent in that the average employee would not 
know (CS1003, CS1004, CS1005, CS1006). One participant stated that some 
employees would answer there was no safety vision and there is only a “compliance 
or regulatory focus” (CS1003) while others could see safety as simply “common 
sense or adherence to the regulations” (CS1006).  Individually those interviewed had 
their own personal visions for safety at FinanceCo. In one case, the vision for safety 
related to the caring culture of the organisation and the interviewee said their vision 
for safety “is what I would expect from my family and friends” (CS1009). Others 
had a more pragmatic approach to what may be achieved in terms of safety within 
FinanceCo. One goal was to have safety “integrated into the business rather than off 
to the side” (CS1001) and to have “safety as part of the dialogue and not just an 
agenda item” (CS1001). There was also a vision for safety not to be “something that 
just falls away when someone leaves. We want to entrench the culture and make sure 
people are aware of it and know what they need to do” (CS1007).  
In a similar way, there was a view amongst some interviewees that FinanceCo 
has no safety culture at all (CS1007). Some participants resisted the notion that a 
safety culture was relevant to FinanceCo and maintained that the term safety culture 
was more likely to be “applied to mines than offices” (CS1005). The safety culture 
within FinanceCo was considered to be “reasonably undeveloped” (CS1008). There 
was general agreement that the notion of safety came under the auspices of the 
broader organisational culture, which placed value on caring for others – whether 
employees or clients (CS1004).  As a “conservative company”, one participant 
believed that notion manifested itself in the way leaders in FinanceCo “look after 
staff and the conversations we have around safety” (CS1006). In this context, 
participants saw safety as another element of the caring culture of FinanceCo 
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(CS1004, CS1009) rather than being a sub-set of the culture in and of itself 
(CS1006).   
One participant found it challenging to generate interest in safety within the 
organisation since it “does not have a profile” (CS1007) and safety is not something 
of which people are aware (CS1007).  Further, safety is seen as “boring and 
disinteresting” to some in the organisation and a compliance activity with little focus 
on the value that safety may bring (CS1007). One interviewee stated that “no one has 
any interest in safety – it is not sexy. It is not a great new programme or something to 
implement. It is just safety” (CS1007). Another stated that “safety should be one of 
the key issues in an organisation – I don’t think it is top of mind here” (CS1008). It 
was suggested that if the executive team was asked to list ten priorities, safety would 
be very low on the list since safety is just not part of “the way things are done – it is 
not in the DNA” (CS1008).  
An interviewee stated that “other than being conscious of personal safety on 
the commute to and from work, once employees arrive at work personal safety is 
forgotten” (CS1008). There was acknowledgement that the entire asset base of the 
organisation is people and that “100% of our assets walk in and out of the building 
every day and if we are not looking after those assets from a safety perspective on 
their way, at work, at home, then we are negligent” (CS1009). In addition, one 
participant commented that the organisation has a “moral obligation” with respect to 
the health and safety of their employees (CS1001).   
EnergyCo 
During interviews in EnergyCo, safety was variously described as “a core 
value” (CS2001), “enormously valued” (CS2002), “paramount” (CS2002, CS2016), 
the “number one priority” (CS2003, CS2005, CS2013), treated “very seriously at all 
levels in the company” (CS2006), “the organisation takes pride in its safety 
performance” (CS2009) and at “an extremely high level” (CS2009, CS2015). 
EnergyCo was described as having a very strong and positive culture (CS2005, 
CS2013) with safety being “front and centre” (CS2009). An interviewee felt that the 
board had a key role with providing the executive management team with a clear 
vision for safety in the organisation (CS2010).  One interviewee stated that at 
EnergyCo, “everybody lives and breathes the safety culture” (CS2015) and that 
safety is “woven throughout the fabric of the organisation” (CS2018).   EnergyCo 
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had an aspirational safety vision to prevent all incidents and harm to people. The 
safety vision was clearly described by all interviewees as a core aspect of how the 
importance of safety was communicated throughout the business. The safety vision 
was described as “fundamental” (CS2001) and that employees understand and accept 
that the meaning behind it was a “core part of our business” (CS2001).  It was also 
recognised that the safety vision is an “aspirational goal” (CS2004).  
Throughout all interviews with the board and management, there was a high 
level of awareness of the focus on safety across the organisation and the reasons why 
safety was so important. Interviewees believed safety made good business sense and 
the commitment to safety at all levels was clear. As well as the need to ensure all 
employees return home uninjured there was an acknowledgement that failure to 
maintain a safe organisation could lead to the loss of social licence to operate 
(CS2009). One interviewee felt that safety was the one area of operations in the 
business that “gets the most attention consistently” (CS2001). Another interviewee 
stated that a visitor to EnergyCo “does not need to be on our site for very long to 
understand that culture is just interwoven in everything that you do” (CS2002).  
The integration of safety with all other operations and processes within the 
business was a clear theme that emerged from interviews reflecting the category of 
business excellence identified in Study 1. For example, one interviewee stated that 
safety is a core imperative not just to ensure safe outcomes but also because “if you 
do things in a way that enhance safety then you are doing things efficiently” 
(CS2007). There was a broad acceptance that there are clear “business benefits” 
(CS2010) from genuinely caring and looking after people. One interviewee felt that 
if safety results are positive and employees are focused on safety “your actual 
operating performance is also much, much better” (CS2011).  Further, that those 
organisations that are “good at safety have a pretty good bottom line” (CS2015). One 
interviewee believed the reason for this was because “managers that worry about 
safety are managers that worry about everything – they are focused on the entirety of 
the business” (CS2015).  
Ultimately the board was seen to understand that safety is much more than just 
“the stats” (CS2009) and that “good safety management is akin to good business 
management” (CS2009). Another interviewee stated that EnergyCo has “for a long 
period prioritized safety and I think sees it as a real measure of its operating 
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capability in that kind of environment” (CS2012). One interviewee stated that 
EnergyCo “would be right up there in the top two companies … in terms of the 
seriousness with which they look at (safety)… culturally it is right up there” 
(CS2018). A further comment from an interviewee was that the safety culture at 
EnergyCo was “just part of the broader culture” (CS2010). Rather than emphasise 
safety metrics or “hammer” a safety message (CS2010), the focus at EnergyCo was 
on building a culture where people felt they were contributing, valued and that the 
organisation cared for them (CS2010). In addition, safety at EnergyCo was “very 
much hearts and minds and not just compliance”. (CS2007) and “culturally (safety) 
is certainly very deeply embedded” (CS2012).  
EnergyCo has an aspirational safety vision to prevent all incidents and harm to 
people. While EnergyCo had not achieved zero injuries or harm in any year of its 
operation, this did not take away from the senior leader commitment to work towards 
that vision and to reinforce it during all safety communications. The goal of zero 
incidents was reinforced in every interview held with EnergyCo participants. One 
interviewee expressed that because of the very strong commitment to safety, and the 
significant effort and resources placed on safety initiatives within the organisation, 
there was “frustration when performance is not what it has been historically… 
frustration from the executive level that we are not getting the traction that we are 
looking for” (CS2009). One interviewee reflected this frustration with the 
observation that at EnergyCo they might have “all the right attitudes (towards safety 
but)… if we are hurting people then we are still failing” (CS2001).  One of the 
challenges acknowledged during interviews was trying to convince employees that 
achieving zero harm is in fact possible.  It was acknowledged that trying to reach 
such a goal is a “very difficult achievement” (CS2011). Yet another interviewee 
commented on the need for all employees to have a “genuine belief” (CS2010) that 
the focus is on everyone returning home safely, rather than simply a focus on safety 
metrics (CS2010).  
Safety culture was perceived to be driven primarily by senior executives 
(CS2001, CS2002, CS2007, CS008, CS2012) although it was important for safety to 
be reinforced by all levels of the organisation, including the board (CS2002, CS2005, 
CS2006, CS2007, CS2008, CS2009, CS2010, CS2011, CS2018). The safety culture 
of EnergyCo was viewed to be well embedded and the board played a role in 
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supporting that culture (CS2018) despite it not being a formal role outlined in a 
board charter. It was acknowledged that the board has a “really difficult job around 
safety” (CS2010) because safety, and safety leadership, was seen as very much 
around “credibility and relationships and it is really hard for a board to do that” 
(CS2010).  
Personal commitment 
The safety leadership criterion of personal commitment was considered in 
Study 2 more broadly than in Study 1. As outlined in Chapter 3, the research design 
for Study 1 sought to identify the content of annual report references to safety that 
were directly attributable to a senior leader of the organisation. In an annual report or 
CSR report, letters to shareholders by the CEO and/or Chairman are a frequently 
used tool of analysis for researchers (Costa et al., 2013). It was therefore a useful 
way to apply the criterion of personal commitment in an otherwise content-rich 
document only attributable to the organisation at large. Study 2 provided the 
opportunity to apply the criterion of personal commitment to a much broader range 
of senior leaders to answer research question 3. Consideration will now be given to 
whether this criterion was evident in the views of those interviewed; specifically in 
terms of demonstrating sincere commitment to safety (Zohar, 1980) either personally 
or symbolically (Lu & Yang, 2010). 
It should be acknowledged that a distinction emerged during the interview 
phase between those interviewed from FinanceCo and those interviewed from 
EnergyCo. In the FinanceCo interviews, interviewees were often reporting their 
perception of what the board should do (frequently based on experiences gained 
outside of the organisation). In comparison, those interviewed from EnergyCo were 
focused more closely on what was currently happening within the case study 
organisation.  
FinanceCo 
There was a clear view in FinanceCo on the importance of the CEO in leading 
the organisation with respect to safety. It was expected that the CEO would set the 
example and discuss safety in team and leadership meetings in order for the message 
about the importance of safety to flow down (CS1007). Interviewees stated that the 
CEO needed to be a role model for safety and ensure that safety as an issue was “on 
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the agenda” within the organisation (CS1007). It was also felt that the authenticity of 
the CEO’s view on safety was important so that the CEO was “seriously interested in 
safety and not just treating it as a formality” (CS1002). The CEO was expected to 
hold the executive team to account (CS1001) and to take the lead on safety in a 
practical sense, for example, such as potentially filming a video for all new 
employees on how FinanceCo values their people and want them all to go home 
safely (CS1002).  
In FinanceCo, the role of board members was seen as setting the tone (CS1002, 
CS1004), playing an inquisitive and questioning role with management (CS1004, 
CS1008), understanding the strategy of the organisation (CS1002, CS1004), 
understanding directors’ obligations with respect to safety (CS1004), monitoring the 
management team (CS1002, CS1008), enunciating a vision for the organisation 
(CS1002), setting the culture in pursuit of the vision (CS1002) and establishing 
reporting to measure what is being achieved (CS1002, CS1004, CS1008). The board 
also sets the boundaries of what is permissible by “holding a mirror up to the 
organisation” (CS1004).  The board was seen as a “sounding board” (CS1006) and 
visionaries for the organisation who “open up possibilities” (CS1001) for the senior 
executive team. 
The board of FinanceCo was viewed as having a “leadership role, through 
behaviour and interaction with executives, to show they take safety seriously” 
(CS1003). One participant saw the board’s role to be that of “guidance and 
governance” (CS1009) and to ensure that an “interactive conversation about safety” 
(CS1009) was occurring. Another participant stated that the board had made 
commitments with respect to safety and wanted board members and senior 
executives to generate discussion on how safety is being managed and led within the 
organisation (CS1001). One interviewee felt that “as an organisation we have to 
make clear that safety is important and while risks might be lower it can still happen 
- we need the Board to convey that message through the leadership team” (CS1002).  
Another participant wanted the board to continue to ask questions about safety 
(CS1006) and the more questions the board asks, including making sure safety is on 
the agenda, “dictating what they want to hear about and when” (CS1007) was a 
positive action “showing (the board) is committed and they get it” (CS1007). 
Another comment made during interviews was that buy-in around safety on the 
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board would only happen once the “personal dimension” (CS1004) could be 
attached. That is, “when you make it (safety) real and personal then it is not just 
another job that a board member has to do along with everything else” (CS1004).  
EnergyCo 
The importance of safety as a core value “from the top” (CS2001) was a clear 
theme to emerge from interviews with EnergyCo. There was recognition that the 
senior executive team’s leadership of safety was critical with safety culture being 
“driven primarily out of the executive” (CS2002). There was also a comment that 
only those senior executives who had safety at the core of their values were 
successfully integrated as part of the team (CS2001) indicating the strength of the 
safety culture at EnergyCo. The executive team was viewed as having a genuine 
passion for safety (CS2002) and it appeared those who did not share the same 
enthusiasm for safety within the organisation were unlikely to “survive in the 
business, you would just have a cultural misfit” (CS2002).  There was a view that the 
passion for safety demonstrated by all leaders within the organisation was not just 
“management speak…not just a fad” (CS2010) but a genuine wish to “care and look 
after people” (CS2010). Safety leadership was seen by one interviewee as a 
reflection of their actions; “what we do, what we stop, what we talk about” 
(CS2001). This role modelling of safety leadership behaviours was viewed as 
important because it was junior leaders in the organisation, the people who can 
influence all employees on site on a daily basis, who “make all the difference” 
(CS2003). There was a sense that all levels of leadership across the organisation 
“completely buys into (safety) and does what it can across numerous levels to get the 
message out” (CS2010). 
One of the strongest themes to emerge during interviews with EnergyCo 
participants was the role of the CEO and in particular his or her personal 
commitment to safety. One of the roles that the CEO is seen to have with respect to 
safety was to “beat the drum and believe the message” (CS2003). It was clear that 
“safety culture is driven from the top in this organisation… (the CEO) is absolutely 
passionate about safety, safety performance and not hurting people” (CS2004). This 
passion in turn “cascades down through the organisation … the more you talk about 
it, particularly with the workforce – the workforce’s perception of what’s important 
is what you talk to them about” (CS2004). The CEO was seen as being “at the 
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forefront (of safety)… out there talking to people all the time and goes out to the 
field to visit” (CS2005). It was apparent that the CEO regularly made time to visit 
workers in the field “to talk to people about the work they are doing. It is good for 
morale and if it is good for morale, its generally good for safety outcomes too” 
(CS2008). 
During interviews it was stated “the most important safety messages come 
from (the CEO) and when our safety performance dipped… (the CEO) got very 
clearly on the front foot and got the executive team engaged as well” (CS2006). The 
influence on the executive team was reinforced with the view that “(the CEO) 
generally leads from the front (in safety)… the culture or that behaviour rubs off onto 
the rest of the executive team” (CS2008). In addition, “you do sense that (the CEO) 
has used safety as a bit of a benchmark for the operating performance of the 
company … very aware that that safety is a leading indicator for problems elsewhere 
as well” (CS2012). 
 The reason for the CEO’s high level of engagement in safety may be because 
“(the CEO) really has to own the safety outcomes of the company… ultimately they 
are accountable for those safety outcomes” (CS2008) and if the CEO was not as 
committed to safety “there would be a lot less emphasis on safety in the organisation 
and poorer outcomes as a result” (CS2008). The CEO looks to the executive team to 
“show initiative, to help define how we can better achieve good safety outcomes” 
(CS2008). It was acknowledged during interviews that safety performance is about 
more than just leadership, however, “without leadership it doesn’t happen” 
(CS2012). 
Within EnergyCo the board was expected to demonstrate safety leadership 
(CS2006, CS2017) and further, the board needed to “convince management” 
(CS2010) that they believed in safety. The view that “you are only as safe as what 
you walk past” (CS2011) was seen as a standard that the board set as senior leaders 
in the organisation. However, there was a prevailing view that the role of board 
members was not a visible leadership role within the organisation since “people 
would get confused if the Chairman suddenly started taking a leadership role” 
(CS2007). One interviewee stated: 
It would unsettle me if the leadership around something as important as 
health and safety was coming out of a board. You would expect the CEO to 
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own and lead it. Then you would look to the board for encouragement, 
oversight, maybe agreement around the incentives etc. If the board’s leading 
or directly intervening that suggests they are part of an organisation that 
needs an awful lot of help (CS2018). 
In addition, the reality was that “at the end of the day a board is not there every 
day, not able to take day-to-day responsibility for safety” (CS2012) and so the role of 
the board becomes one of guiding, coaching and steering (CS2017) senior 
executives. Within the boardroom, however, the board was expected to be “pushing 
and driving safety from a governance point of view” (CS2008). Outside of the 
boardroom, the ability for management to reference the support of the board on 
safety, in conjunction with senior executive commitment, added “extra weight” 
(CS2009) to the issue. Similarly, if the board was not “onside on safety” (CS2011) it 
became much more challenging for the executive team and other managers to “enact 
the safety vision” (CS2011). 
A key role of the board was seen to support senior executives in the work they 
do to drive the safety culture (CS2002, CS2003, CS2006, CS2007, CS2011). One 
interviewee felt that the new harmonized safety legislation in Australia had 
“encouraged boards to move to a role of … encouraging and supporting 
management” (CS2012, CS2017). It was viewed as “fundamental that the board and 
management have the same commitment (to safety)” (CS2006). However, in respect 
to safety the board were seen as “followers not leaders” (CS2002). While it was 
acknowledged that in some cases a board may be seen as the leaders of a safety 
culture within an organisation “that would be really quite hard” (CS2002). One 
interviewee felt an important role of the board was to acknowledge that as the 
organisation changes the support of the board was there and that the message is 
received by senior executives that “we are behind you” (CS2003).  
Because a board demonstrates to the business “what matters most” (CS2001) 
one interviewee admitted that they were “fascinated by what interests my boss” 
(CS2009) reflecting the powerful influencing role senior executives and board 
members play in focusing attention on safety. Another interviewee commented that 
the board has a vital role in driving the culture of the organisation because “if the 
management team thought they were working for a board that didn’t care I think 
there could be an attitude – if the board don’t care so why should we care? Let’s just 
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worry about production and get the lion’s share of our bonus on that” (CS2015). 
Ultimately, culture “comes from the top… whether it is good or bad” (CS2001) and 
“the attitude of the board, and the values that the board brings, is important to the 
organisation” (CS2005). The board was seen as setting a tone across the organisation 
with respect to safety and “if that is not a genuine tone then it allows management to 
treat (safety) with lip service” (CS2009).  One interviewee felt that a central role of 
the board was to ensure there was visibility within the organisation of the board’s 
interest in “safe outcomes and safety in general” (CS2008).  
Decision-making 
The third criterion of safety leadership, decision-making, will now be 
considered in light of the interviews conducted in Study 2. While the literature 
focuses on engagement of employees in decision-making around safety (Lu and 
Yang, 2010), this research study has extended that focus to the roles of board 
members and senior executives. The interviews conducted in Study 2 will now be 
analysed to understand the view of senior leaders with regard to the role of different 
players within the organisation, including the board, around safety-related decisions. 
FinanceCo 
In FinanceCo, the board was seen by interviewees as important in “holding 
management to account” (CS1001, CS1003) as well as helping the executive team to 
gain insight (CS1001) and raising the bar for management (CS1001). The expertise 
that board members are seen to bring from their work in other organisations and 
industries was valued by the senior executives who look for insights from other 
companies to answer the question of “what works well, what not so well, what can 
we be doing better?” (CS1001). The board also played a role in “challenging the 
status quo” (CS1003). There was an acknowledgement that the board can only 
“guide and govern – they don’t do” (CS1009). 
The interviews in FinanceCo also revealed the extent to which board attention 
on an issue can make it a priority for senior executives. One participant stated that 
the “rhythm of the organisation” (CS1004) is reflected by the tone and questions a 
board asks. Another participant made the observation that “if the board is not 
engaged in an issue then it does not get the same sort of traction that it would 
otherwise get” (CS1003). Further, that the “CEO and senior executives take their 
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lead from the board. If the board tells us these three things are important then that is 
what we will concentrate on” (CS1003).  The interaction between senior executives 
and the board was seen as “critical” (CS1001).  With respect to the board’s role in 
managing safety, the fact that the board of FinanceCo had recently prioritized safety 
was seen as a “huge step” (CS1001). Another participant stated: 
(I) would like the role of the board (in safety) to be a leadership role – if it 
came from the top then it would have more gravitas in the organisation, but 
at the moment it is more of a compliance role (CS1007).   
The level of safety reporting to the board was a theme that received strong 
focus from participants. It appeared that a shift was occurring within FinanceCo 
during the period of the case study which involved a move away from reports with a 
high level of detail that “did not lead to decisions or insights” (CS1001) to more 
meaningful reporting. The industry context of FinanceCo was raised by interviewees 
in discussions about safety reporting since one participant felt there was a need to 
balance what the board wants to measure since “we are not a mine but we also want 
to be satisfied that we are at a certain level which is appropriate for the business we 
are in” (CS1005). The process for reviewing the format for ongoing safety reporting 
was seen as an “iterative process” (CS1008) between the board and management. 
It was clear during the interview process that while safety culture and attitudes 
to safety within FinanceCo were considered important (CS1003, CS1006), the 
reporting to the board was not designed to report on culture or attitudes. One of the 
reasons offered by a participant was because it is “easier to discuss data than insight” 
(CS1001). The conundrum was reinforced by one participant who stated that they 
would like to see “ten things that we think can be measured – incidents each month, 
how fast people are returning to work, types of incidents, reasons for incidents – all 
monthly” (CS1005).  In addition, this participant also wanted to see a formal review 
every six months which outlined the organisation’s safety program, whether what 
had been committed to by senior executives had been completed, whether the safety 
committees were set up and were convened, and whether the organisation had met 
their compliance requirements (CS1005). It was proposed that this reporting go 
through the board sub-committee and then on to the full board for review (CS1005, 
CS1008). 
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One of the sub-committees of the FinanceCo board had been delegated 
responsibility for safety “unless there was a significant enough issue to come to the 
full board” (CS1004). While safety reporting went to the sub-committee at each of 
their quarterly meetings, it was only presented to the full board twice per year 
(CS1004, CS1008). At the sub-committee level, the responsibilities with respect to 
safety appeared to become much more practical. One interviewee commented that 
during discussions, the committee wanted to see evidence that all new employees 
were receiving safety training. They also wanted to understand employee attitudes to 
safety and to know that the executive team are doing what they need to be doing as 
well as the reaction they were getting from employees (CS1002). In addition, a view 
was expressed that the board still needed to clarify their role in respect to “reviewing, 
assessing and monitoring” safety information from the sub-committee (CS1002). 
Employee involvement in safety appeared to be relatively undeveloped in 
FinanceCo. Interviewees stated that every employee had the ability to make 
decisions around safety (CS1002) but there was less confidence that employees 
would know how to raise a safety issue (CS1001) or view safety as anything other 
than “tick the box and annoying” (CS1007). Structural solutions to ensure employee 
involvement in safety management such as the company-wide safety committee had 
“fallen by the wayside” (CS1007) and after recruiting new members to the safety 
committee in recent months there was some surprise from senior executives that 
employees were actually interested in being involved at all (CS1007). It appeared 
that employees were open to discussing safety issues (CS1001) however safety was 
not integrated into the organisational culture of FinanceCo but rather seen as a 
separate task to be focused around compliance which reflected the nature of the 
organisation across a range of other operational areas.  
The financial services sector is “used to being asked whether we are compliant 
with legislation” (CS1005). Safety was perceived as a “compliance thing” (CS1008) 
and there were briefings on changes in workplace safety legislation (CS1004) 
although it was acknowledged that the legislation was “just the tip of the iceberg” 
(CS1001). Safety was seen as a “separate silo” (CS1003) and was viewed as another 
stream of regulations to be complied with rather than being built into existing 
processes (CS1003). One interviewee stated that since the board’s recent focus on 
safety, reporting and compliance processes had been adjusted but “we have not gone 
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outside of that silo and made (safety) relevant to the rest of what we do” (CS1003) 
and we were still at “a compliance level rather than a leading edge level” (CS1004). 
The organisation identified the need to employ a safety specialist to identify 
risks for all types of workers (CS1007) and support safety initiatives. One participant 
made the observation in terms of the board’s commitment to safety that if “you say 
you are serious about safety and then invest nothing in training, tools and equipment, 
the cynicism in the organisation is huge” (CS1004). As part of the renewed approach 
to safety within FinanceCo – “almost starting from scratch” (CS1007) - there had 
been recognition that there had been some structural barriers in place to date. Safety 
had previously been viewed as an “add on to someone’s role which they did 
begrudgingly” (CS1007). Therefore there was a stated goal to take a holistic 
approach to workplace issues facing employees and not see safety as an “add on” 
(CS1001) with safety just “another piece we need to build in to all our other 
processes” (CS1003). 
EnergyCo 
In contrast, EnergyCo had a highly structured process, a “sophisticated meeting 
hierarchy” (CS2009) for safety communications throughout all levels of the 
organisation. It was compulsory for all employees and contractors to attend a detailed 
safety-focused meeting at least once per month as part of this process (CS2001, 
CS2002, CS2006). From the senior executive team through to the workforce on site, 
there were various opportunities for employees to contribute safety ideas and 
feedback, share safety learning’s and hear about relevant changes to safety policies 
and procedures. The principle behind the safety committee structure was that safety 
information and messaging was designed to “cascade up and down” the organisation 
(CS2001, CS2007). One interviewee acknowledged that there was “probably more 
messaging down than up than you would like, but it is there” (CS2007).  
During interviews it appeared to the researcher that the board and senior 
executive team had worked hard to create a culture where stopping work for safety 
reasons was something employees felt able to do if the situation required it. For 
example, workers who stop work when the situation was felt to be unsafe were 
congratulated so that it was promoted across the organisation (CS2002, CS2007). 
Some interviewees went further and explained that employees “have not just the 
right but the expectation that you will stop the job if you don’t think it is safe” 
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(CS2007). Another interviewee emphatically stated that “no production is worth 
somebody being injured or killed” (CS2014) and encouraged this message to be 
communicated from the top so that work would be stopped if the need arose 
(CS2014).  
Despite the strong communication to all employees to stop work if they felt 
safety was being compromised in any way, there was a sense from one interviewee 
that some individual workers may still be hesitant to do so because they are uncertain 
about “whether a situation really is unsafe” (CS2010) or concerned as to how they 
may be treated if they stopped work because of conflicting views about productivity 
versus safety (CS2010). Despite this, there was a strong and clear view during 
interviews that every employee had the authority to stop work if they believed a 
situation was unsafe, and were encouraged to do so.  
The board was viewed as being “responsible for everything that goes on in the 
business” (CS2002) including safety (CS2004, CS2009). The board “sits at the top of 
the organisation” (CS2008). How this responsibility was exercised, particularly with 
regard to safety, included oversight (CS2001, CS2004, CS2009) and directing 
company safety policies (CS2005, CS2017) although there was acknowledgement 
there was a tension for the board between playing an oversight role and doing 
“checks and balances” (CS2001). Ultimately it was not the role of the board to 
become more actively involved in the business and delve into significant levels of 
detail (CS2011). This was made more challenging for those board members who had 
only just left senior executive roles themselves since they tended to seek more 
detailed reporting (CS2006) and “what you do not want is the board involved in the 
operational part of the business” (CS2004). This concern could be reflected in the 
response of one interviewee who saw the board’s role as working with the CEO to 
“agree on priorities, agree on metrics, agree on incentives or disincentives, and then 
monitor the process and intervene as required” (CS2018). 
Through probing and challenging questions, boards “indicate their degree of 
interest and challenge” (CS2009) and their level of interest in safety. The board’s 
role was considered to involve quality assurance and direction setting (CS2001) and 
needing to demonstrate commitment to safety through being prepared to allocate a 
budget to help reduce risk (CS2004, CS2009, CS2011). The board was also expected 
to articulate what they wanted to see from senior executives to demonstrate safety 
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was being managed well (CS2009, CS2010) and then hold the executive 
management team accountable for those outcomes (CS2008, CS2010). The 
combined governance and management of safety to this extent was seen as a “licence 
to operate” issue (CS2009). The board was seen as needing to “work together with 
management and provide the framework for overall policies for the safety of the 
organisation’s operations” (CS2106). 
The board also played an oversight role where they may “grill” (CS2013) 
senior executives about the management of safety within the organisation. One 
interviewee felt that employees in the organisation “have a right to know that people 
care about their welfare” (CS2014). When the board was not happy with the way 
safety was being managed or the safety performance results, it was seen as the role of 
the board to challenge management (CS2015) and  “raise the bar and just say… this 
is not good enough” (CS2014). 
Other interviewees saw that the board represented the expectations of 
shareholders (CS2002, CS2008) and therefore needed to be “on the front foot” when 
it came to safety (CS2002). One participant looked for the board to provide strong 
guidance (CS2003) and define the boundaries within which senior executives could 
operate with safety being an “integral part of that” (CS2008). In addition, and with a 
focus on an external relations perspective, the board was expected to provide a 
“robust realistic doctrine, which says to the market and to the workforce that we are 
serious about (safety) (CS2003)”. This was seen as fulfilling the duty of the board to 
provide a return to shareholders since “part of that return … is around safety” 
(CS2003). 
During interviews it was clear that the relevant background of individual board 
members was important when assessing the potential value they could add in helping 
reinforce and drive EnergyCo’s safety culture. A number of interviewees felt that an 
important role of board members was to bring their experience and insights of safety 
from other organisations to help improve their own processes and procedures 
(CS2005, CS2006). Another stated that if a board member did not have a strong 
operating background they found it much harder to understand that safety is more 
than just “lag indicator statistics” (CS2001) or “recognizing poor performance” 
(CS2001). In particular, two interviewees commented that boards often do not get to 
the core of safety behaviours or underlying safety behaviours (CS2001, CS2004). 
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One member of the executive management team stated that getting the (safety) 
attitude right across the organisation was a huge part of the battle (CS2001). Another 
stated that “understanding how behaviours influence underlying safety performance 
… is not as well or widely understood by our board as, certainly, the management 
group would like” (CS2004). 
During the interview phase of Study 2, the EnergyCo board sub-committee on 
safety was in the process of being re-established. It had previously been a sub-
committee of the board but was disbanded when it was felt that safety was “too 
important an issue to be delegated” (CS2012) and required attention by the full 
board. With the introduction of new board members with strong industry 
backgrounds and deep experience in safety who were considered “particularly 
committed on the safety front” (CS2009), the board resolved to re-establish the board 
sub-committee. Other reasons for re-establishing the board sub-committee were 
stated to be the influence of the “broader environment about board accountability 
(with respect to safety)” (CS2009), an “evolving understanding about needing to lead 
from the top” (CS2009) and “the business itself getting more complex… so to get 
good at stuff you need to be focused on it” (CS2009).  
In addition there were specific safety issues occurring in the organisation and 
the board “felt that we ought to be giving the operational aspects, safety, 
environment and the like, a real level of focus” (CS2012).  Specifically, when a 
safety incident did occur it highlighted to the board that a very lengthy board report 
was to be received and “realistically that report would be better reviewed by a 
committee whose terms of reference focus specifically on that and you had a bit 
more chance to look at the detail. If it had been simply another item on a board 
agenda … it wouldn’t get the necessary attention” (CS2012). One of the tasks of the 
renewed safety sub-committee was to review safety reporting to the board (CS2014). 
During interviews it was reinforced that the creation (or re-creation) of a board sub-
committee on safety should not “take away at all from the board’s responsibilities” 
(CS2012) but rather “reinforces the board’s concerns that safety remains a very 
important part of the culture of the company” (CS2012).  
Transparency 
The final criterion of safety leadership, transparency, will now be explored. 
Using a similar definition to that used in Study 1, this criterion will be considered to 
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the extent that interview participants formed views on the purpose of safety 
disclosures, the value of safety statistical data and links that are made between safety 
performance outcomes and CEO and senior executive remuneration.  
FinanceCo 
During interviews with participants in FinanceCo, it was apparent that public 
disclosures of safety-related activities were not considered a priority for the 
organisation. This was largely due to the nature of the industry in which FinanceCo 
operated since it was not anticipated by those interviewed that external stakeholders 
would expect an organisation like FinanceCo to be impacted by safety (CS1005). 
Those interviewed expected that key stakeholders, such as investors, would assume 
that workplace safety was not an issue (CS1005) since safety was not likely to 
materially impact the capability of the organisation (CS1005). In general terms, 
interviewees stated that what was prioritized for inclusion in annual reports would be 
driven by external stimuli such as legislative changes making certain disclosures 
mandatory (CS1002) or the emergence of different topics important to government, 
industry or lobby groups (CS1005). Interviewees felt that over the years, different 
external stimuli had led to a different emphasis on issues given external 
circumstances or the needs of the business (CS1005). Consultants were also engaged 
to advise on best practice for annual report disclosures (CS1009) and could influence 
the information included. Given stakeholders would not expect a financial services 
organisation to have a poor safety record (CS1005), public disclosures of safety-
related activities had not become a significant issue to be reported on in annual 
reports.  
It was apparent that capturing the safety statistical data to include within safety 
reports for the board was challenging. There were three different ways that an 
employee of FinanceCo could lodge a safety issue that became “confusing” for 
employees (CS1007). As a result, concerns were raised that incidents may be 
unreported and near misses or small incidents potentially only heard of “through the 
grapevine” (CS1007).  One vision for safety reporting within FinanceCo was to get 
“to the point that it is looked at in the same way as the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) compliance reporting” (CS1003). It was understood 
that FinanceCo was at a “basic level” of safety reporting and they had “a long way to 
go” (CS1005). 
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One recurring theme in FinanceCo interviews was the perceived challenge in 
identifying meaningful lead indicators for safety within an office-based environment 
(CS1004) given “what gets measured gets done” (CS1004). Some lead indicators had 
been identified such as levels of attrition, absenteeism, top talent who had left the 
business, employee morale, how many people were using the Employee Assistance 
Program (EAP) and how many women returned from maternity leave (CS1005), 
however, none of these directly related to safety performance or safety culture. 
There were no safety-specific KPIs in place for the CEO or senior executives 
within FinanceCo. Safety was perceived as “part of the process of your day-to-day 
job – you are expected to do these things” (CS1005). With respect to safety, an 
interviewee stated that “if the board is not engaged in safety then it is unlikely that 
(financial) incentives are linked up against safety and we will do what we need to do, 
but we will be prioritizing other things and not safety” (CS1003). 
EnergyCo 
In direct contrast to FinanceCo, a theme to emerge from the interviews with 
EnergyCo participants was recognition that external stakeholders, such as investment 
analysts and shareholders “understand that good safety performance is fundamental 
to this industry” (CS2002).  The public disclosures of safety-related activities in 
annual reports and CSR reports therefore had increased importance. In addition, 
safety “is one of the first things that’s evaluated to get on to shortlist to win work. So 
if you report good safety performance, it improves your chances of getting additional 
work” (CS2010). There was recognition that safety performance was being used to 
make decisions as to whether sub-contractors were engaged and that “I know that 
when I’m looking at a shortlist of contractors, I’ll grab the latest annual report and 
have a look at what they are saying about themselves” (CS2010). It was important 
for EnergyCo to “promote an image as a company that was first and foremost safe in 
its operation, for its employees and to protect and promote its image as a safe 
company” (CS2016). Positive safety outcomes were “seen to be a contributor to the 
reputation and image of EnergyCo as well as evidence of a company with good 
controls and good processes in a tough industry” (CS2018). One interviewee was 
more pragmatic and stated “We know safety is important to us and our investors. If 
you look at some of our public disclosures…you would be dumb not to get (our very 
good safety performance) out there in lights” (CS2002).  This was also because 
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“companies with a good safety performance are likely to have a greater opportunity 
commercially than companies with a bad safety performance” (CS2002). Therefore a 
good safety reputation was considered relevant to the share price of EnergyCo. There 
was an acknowledgment that not all investors care about safety (CS2017) but some 
understand it is a “proxy for reliability, quality, doing what you say you can do. If 
you manage safety well, you manage your business well. So it’s a bloody good 
measure” (CS2017). This was reinforced with the view that the “reputation and 
image of the company is most important, not only to the general public, but it is most 
important to the shareholders of the company … (we) have to make sure EnergyCo 
has a clean reputation” (CS2016). 
During EnergyCo interviews it was clear that extensive reporting is undertaken 
within the organisation with a heavy focus on learning from safety incidents as they 
occurred. EnergyCo participants were of the view that EnergyCo has a “fantastic 
reporting culture” (CS2002) which was “second to none… we’re quite open” 
(CS2003).  One interviewee did make the observation that rather than being 
concerned incidents are not being reported, the concern was that the organisation 
reports on “a whole bunch of very low level stuff that has insignificant 
consequences… and we miss the big stuff” (CS2004). Another participant raised the 
concern that “much of the issues around safety are not well reported, or they are 
reporting the wrong bits and pieces because their expectations are that they will 
concentrate on lost time injury, frequency rates or TRIFR… that is failure reporting. 
The stuff that is important to us is much more the lead indicators.” (CS2011). There 
was concern that in the boardroom “there seems to be a much greater emphasis on 
lag reports than the key leading indicators which drive a safety outcome” (CS2011).  
When there was a decline in safety performance, the board was expected by 
senior executives and individual board members to be sufficiently analytical about 
the reason for the change in trends including whether there had been changes in the 
organisation’s operating philosophy that may have contributed to the decline 
(CS2008). Another interviewee stated that when an incident occurs the board needed 
to understand why it happened, then understand what senior executives were doing to 
minimise the chances of the incident happening again rather than “beating up on 
people when things go wrong” (CS2010). The board was looking for “evidence of 
competence development, improved processes and procedures being in place” 
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(CS2015) after an incident to ensure that the incident never happened again 
(CS2016). Another interviewee explained that after a safety incident “it is important 
for the board not to treat any (safety) review as a witch hunt … treat it as a learning 
experience so that we don’t make the same mistakes again.” (CS2011). 
The issue of remuneration linked to safety outcomes was a clear theme 
identified during interviews with EnergyCo participants since it was an issue that 
was yet to be fully resolved within the organisation. There was general agreement 
that remuneration and bonuses should be linked to safety performance since “if you 
don’t measure you can’t manage it … if you are going to reward people for the 
bottom line then reward them for managing safety” (CS2013). However, as one 
participant observed “we really struggle with the way we remunerate and the 
expectations we set around safety” (CS2001) because linking remuneration to safety 
runs the risk that, if done poorly, you “drive reporting underground” (CS2001). The 
area of contention within EnergyCo related to whether remuneration should be tied 
to lag or lead safety indicator targets.  
Historically, EnergyCo had always based key performance indicators on the 
TRIFR rate, a lag indicator, although a process safety component was recently added 
(CS2004). The risk with using a lag indicator was seen that it could become a 
“demotivating factor” (CS2006) because people did not see the targets as achievable 
(CS2007). This occurred particularly when a target may not have been reached and 
therefore “you have already lost your bonus component for safety which is a big 
share of the total bonus pool” (CS2006). A target may not have been reached because 
“a 5-10% improvement on your best previous performance … there is only so much 
that you can do before you have to radically change how you were doing things. That 
may be adding lots more supervision. It may have a cost outcome, with consequences 
which are not supported elsewhere in the budget” (CS2007). There was a concern 
that the way metrics were set for safety-based remuneration or bonuses was flawed 
(CS2010).  
With regard to using lead indicators, many interviewees made the comment 
that members of the board believed lead indicators to measure behavioural 
performance which was a normal part of business and should be done anyway 
(CS2004, CS2006, CS2007, CS2011) and so not be financially rewarded. It was 
agreed that “it is very hard to actually come up with measures that … the board feels 
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stretch management and should be rewarded” (CS2006). However, one interviewee 
maintained that “the most important thing for us to get right are the lead indicators; 
getting that right will mean that the lag indicators will be impacted” (CS2011). 
Furthermore, it was argued that the board needed to move towards a target that was 
“softer and which is probably much more telling on the culture and the performance 
of safety” (CS2011). 
5.5.3 Summary 
The second research question to be addressed during Study 2 was: 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
Semi-structured interviews with board members and senior executives of 
FinanceCo and EnergyCo provided a valuable opportunity to understand the extent to 
which the four criteria of safety leadership were evident in their views with respect to 
workplace safety. The criterion of vision was identified during interviews with 
FinanceCo participants in the context of a lack of clarity as to what the safety vision 
of FinanceCo may in fact be. There was no agreement between those interviewed as 
to how the vision of safety may be articulated in an office-based environment and the 
role of industry in the formation of this challenge was reinforced. By way of contrast, 
those interviewed from EnergyCo were all able to clearly state the safety vision of 
the organisation and that it formed a core value within the company.  
With respect to the criterion of personal commitment, there was 
acknowledgment by those interviewed from FinanceCo and EnergyCo on the 
important role the CEO played in demonstrating a personal commitment to safety. In 
EnergyCo, one of the strongest themes to emerge from interviews was the role of the 
CEO in safety and numerous examples were provided of the CEO demonstrating a 
personal commitment. The role of the board was also clearly articulated with most 
participants commenting on the important influence the board has in the safety 
leadership of the organisation in setting the safety culture from the top. 
Participants from FinanceCo and EnergyCo were able to talk in some detail 
about the criterion of decision-making including the role of the board and any sub-
committees created with a responsibility for safety. One significant variation between 
the two organisations in terms of decision-making around safety was the involvement 
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of employees. While EnergyCo had a sophisticated system of employee-based safety 
committees to engage them in decision-making around safety, there was little 
confidence amongst those interviewed from FinanceCo that employees were 
particularly focused on safety. There was also no senior executive participation in the 
employee-based safety committee.  
Lastly, the criterion of transparency was evident in the views of those 
interviewed through their diverging opinions on the importance of disclosing safety-
related activities to stakeholders. Those in FinanceCo were of the view that their 
external stakeholders were unlikely to be focused on safety issues, largely due to the 
nature of the industry to which they belonged. In comparison, EnergyCo was 
attentive to ensuring stakeholders were aware of the work being done within the 
organisation to manage safety as well as to ensure evidence of safety performance 
was disclosed. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined in detail the case studies conducted in Study 2. Two 
organisation’s from different industry sectors agreed to participate in Study 2 in 
order to understand whether an organisations public disclosures of safety-related 
activities reflected their internal focus, and whether the four criteria of safety 
leadership were evident in the views of board members and senior executives. Study 
2 has allowed for an examination of the extent to which public disclosures of safety 
related activities reflect a company’s internal focus on safety. In addition, Study 2 
has provided multiple pieces of evidence to help gain a deeper understanding of the 
application of safety leadership to the views of board members and senior executives. 
With respect to RQ2, the research findings reveal that the level of public 
disclosures with respect to safety by FinanceCo and EnergyCo did reflect their 
respective internal levels of focus on safety. Study 2 provided the opportunity to 
examine the public disclosures of safety-related activities for both case study 
organisations in far greater detail with the full ten years of annual reports and CSR 
reports (where available) being analysed. In addition, further evidence was 
considered in Study 2 by reviewing the corporate websites of both organisations as 
well as AGM presentations to shareholders by the CEO and Chairman. FinanceCo 
had a relatively new safety governance framework in place with largely generic 
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safety policies and an ineffective employee safety committee in operation. In 
comparison, EnergyCo had a sophisticated range of safety documentation including 
detailed safety management systems and a cascading employee safety committee 
structure through the organisation.  
These multiple pieces of evidence provided a much deeper examination of the 
two individual organisations’ approach to public disclosures from the sample in 
Study 1. FinanceCo, a member of the financial services sector, made relatively low 
levels of safety-related disclosures in their annual reports and on their corporate 
websites. No CSR reports were published and no mention of safety was made in their 
AGM presentations. In contrast, EnergyCo, a member of the energy sector, made 
consistently high levels of safety-related disclosures both in their annual reports and 
CSR reports. In addition, the CEO of EnergyCo made numerous references to safety 
during AGM presentations over the ten-year period and the CS2 corporate website 
provided further information on safety, which stakeholders and members of the 
public could access. This reflects the respective levels of public disclosures identified 
by the financial services sector and energy sector in Study 1.  
With respect to RQ3, interviews with participants from FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo provided the opportunity to understand in much greater depth the views of 
safety by those individuals central to this research; board members and senior 
executives. Each interviewee was asked a range of questions to elicit data on whether 
the four criteria of safety leadership were evident in their views. Industry context 
again emerged as a key issue for those interviewed and particularly within 
FinanceCo in seeking to explain the organisations’ approach to safety.  Each criterion 
of safety leadership was then identified in the answers of the interviewees with a 
different focus emerging from the two case study organisations. With respect to the 
vision criterion, while FinanceCo interview participants were not able to readily 
identify a safety vision, there was acknowledgement of its importance. By contrast, 
EnergyCo participants clearly understood the safety vision of the organisation and 
expected that it could be clearly communicated by all employees.  
When considering the personal commitment criterion, both FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo participants emphasised the important role of the CEO in setting the tone 
for safety, closely followed by the role of other senior executives and the board. The 
criterion of decision-making was clearly identified by participants from both 
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organisations with a range of views on the role of the board. The responsibilities of a 
board sub-committee focused on safety also received attention by interviewees. 
However the involvement of employees in decision-making around safety varied 
considerably between FinanceCo and EnergyCo.  
Finally, the criterion of transparency was evident in the views of those 
interviewed from both organisations, however, with further divergence appearing 
between FinanceCo and EnergyCo on the expectations of stakeholders due to the 
industry sector in which the organisation belonged. Such expectations appear to have 
resulted in low focus on public disclosures and reporting on safety within FinanceCo 
with a correspondingly high level of focus within EnergyCo. Chapter 6 considers a 
more detailed discussion of the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 and concludes this 
research. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION  
Transformational leadership, and more specifically safety leadership, has been 
the theoretical foundation of this research project. Chapter 2 identified a number of 
models of safety leadership that have been developed within the literature, most 
frequently tested in relation to middle level supervisors, with very little research 
undertaken with the most senior leaders of an organisation (Flin & Yule, 2004; Lu & 
Yang, 2010; Reid et al., 2008). Even more lacking in consideration of safety 
leadership is research focused on the role of the board (Smallman & John, 2001). 
This absence is surprising given the influence the board has been shown to play after 
investigations into major accidents, particularly catastrophic accidents more likely to 
occur in high-hazard industries, such as the Texas City refinery explosion (BP Baker 
Report, 2007) and the Pike River mine disaster (Panckhurst, 2012). Given the 
breadth of liability applied to directors in terms of workplace safety and the focus in 
industry on the role of the board (AIM, 2011; Downes, Pugsley & Dunn, 2012), such 
a gap in the literature warrants consideration.  
The current research has explored the applicability of four safety leadership 
criteria – vision, personal commitment, decision-making and transparency – to the 
attitudes of the most senior leaders of an organisation; that is, board members and 
senior executives. First, this research has applied the four criteria of safety leadership 
to the written word by applying safety leadership in an empirical way to the public 
disclosures of safety-related activities of large ASX listed companies. Second, the 
four safety leadership criteria have been considered in the views of senior leaders, 
particularly board members and senior executives. This chapter will discuss findings 
from the three research questions to consider the contributions the research study has 
made and will conclude with a discussion of anticipated contributions to practice, 
research limitations and opportunities for future research. 
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1  
The first research question to be addressed was: 
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RQ1  Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect the four 
criteria of safety leadership, and if so, how have these disclosures 
changed over time? 
Using a combined approach of content and thematic analysis of annual reports 
and CSR reports during Study 1, it was possible to code all disclosures of safety-
related activities according to the four safety leadership criteria. A summary of the 
results of Study 1 is shown below in Table 38. As outlined in Chapter 4, each criteria 
was disclosed across each of the three years to varying degrees. The percentage 
figures in Table 38 indicate the total percentage of companies that made at least one 
disclosure against each of the four safety leadership criteria during the given year. 
These results demonstrate that the four safety leadership criteria were mentioned in 
each year at least once indicating that all the criteria were considered to be of varying 
levels of importance to the sample. However, not all companies mentioned each 
criterion in each year, indicating the circumstances or company context may impact 
on what safety criteria are disclosed at any given time. It is also apparent that vision 
and decision-making appeared to be considered worthy of disclosure most often by 
sample companies.  Table	  38	  -­‐	  Comparison	  of	  safety	  disclosures	  across	  all	  criteria	  and	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  	  
 
2001 2006 2011 
Vision 49% 62% 76% 
Personal commitment 22% 37% 46% 
Decision-making 58% 86% 89% 
Transparency 33% 58% 72% 
    
In a further contribution to safety leadership, six categories were identified 
within each of the four safety leadership criteria to extend understanding of how the 
safety leadership criteria may be operationalised in practice. Each of the four criteria 
will now be discussed in greater detail. 
6.2.1 Vision 
By 2011, Study 1 found that 76% of all companies across all industry sectors 
had made at least one disclosure that could be coded against the safety leadership 
criterion of vision. This criterion was developed from the transformational leadership 
(and SSTL) dimension of inspirational motivation (Barling et al., 2002; Bass, 1985;). 
It was evident during the systematic review of safety leadership models in Chapter 2 
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that this criterion had already been identified in the literature as an important 
dimension of safety leadership (Blair, 2003; Bryden, 2002; Carrillo, 2002; Cooper, 
1998; Dunlap, 2011; Geller, 2000; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Krause & Weekley, 2005; Lu 
& Yang, 2010; Shang, 2011; Simon & Carrillo, 1999). The following definition of 
vision was developed during this research study: 
Vision is the ability of a senior leader to publicly articulate shared safety 
goals that resonate across all levels of an organisation. Senior leaders 
demonstrating vision will inspire others, set high standards for safety 
behaviours, establish safety expectations and solicit commitments to safety 
from others. 
The current study has contributed to existing applications of vision in safety 
leadership. Kelloway and Barling (2010) suggested that leaders manifest this 
dimension by articulating an inspiring safety vision. This research has provided 
empirical evidence, through the mechanism of public disclosures, to support the 
proposition that articulating an inspiring safety vision is a relevant dimension of 
safety leadership. De Koster et al. (2011) suggested that this dimension 
communicates the importance of safety, increases the motivation of employees to 
care, raises awareness of safety issues and increases the motivation of employees to 
enact safety-oriented behaviours. Study 1 also provided evidence that senior leaders 
of organisations are using public documents such as annual reports and CSR reports 
to communicate an inspiring safety vision to external stakeholders.  
As discussed during Chapter 4, six categories were identified in the first 
criterion of vision during the coding process in Study 1. These categories included 
the connection between safety and business excellence, espoused safety values, a 
focus on the safety of employees, the role of leadership and culture in safety 
outcomes, the goal of zero harm and the link between safety and reputation. These 
categories had not been identified in the literature previously and are therefore 
important for deepening understanding of safety leadership beyond the existing four 
dimensions of SSTL. These categories also allow for further understanding of what 
vision can mean in a safety leadership context and how it may be manifested in 
public disclosures.  
Table 39 summarises the disclosures across each of the six categories within 
the criterion of vision. As highlighted in Chapter 4, these findings demonstrate that 
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by 2011, the most disclosed category in this criterion was espoused safety values, 
with 72% of companies across all sectors making such a disclosure. Espoused values 
are therefore an important issue for senior leaders to communicate when 
demonstrating their commitment to safety through documents such as annual reports 
and CSR reports. Table	  39	  -­‐	  Vision	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  	  
 
2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Business excellence 25 32 43 
Espoused values 45 57 72 
Employee focus 9 9 33 
Leadership and culture 11 11 34 
Zero harm 7 22 34 
Reputation 0 4 5 
 
The findings from this research study also reinforce the view of leading 
organisations focused on safety, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which emphasise the importance of safety values being demonstrated to all 
employees (IAEA, 2005). The research undertaken through this analysis of safety 
leadership and safety governance has provided empirical evidence that Australian 
organisations are largely heeding this call to ensure that safety is referred to within 
the vision of the organisation (Geller, 1994). 
An interesting finding has been the suggestion that an organisation may never 
be able to avoid the polarity between absolute safety (at any cost) and competing 
economic values (Schein, 2011) or conflicting objectives (Crilly & Ioannou, 2014). 
An inherent value conflict or tension has long been considered to define an 
organisation (Kabanoff & Holt, 1996) and often espoused values are so abstract that 
they can be mutually contradictory (Schein, 2010). However, a critical role of senior 
executives is to enable their organisations to pursue two objectives simultaneously 
(Crilly & Ioannou, 2014). This is particularly important when the competing 
objectives are, for example, choices between fast-paced production; and doing things 
potentially more slowly, but safely. Focusing on a single dimension of performance, 
such as production, will likely lead to prioritising the pursuit of shareholder value as 
opposed to the more discretionary dimensions of, for example, safety (Crilly & 
Ioannou, 2014). Yet high sustainability companies that integrate social issues, such 
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as workplace safety, into their businesses outperform those that do not in terms of 
share price performance and operations (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Senior 
executives who are able to “hold two conflicting ideas in constructive tension” 
(Martin, 2007, p. 7) may also be able to generate superior solutions (Crilly & 
Ioannou, 2014). 
Study 1 has shown that disclosure of espoused safety values are widely used 
and companies appear to be attempting to overcome the competing objectives of 
safety and economic values by making the direct link between safety and business 
excellence, including meeting economic goals. By 2011, 43% of companies 
disclosed espoused safety values, making it the second most disclosed category 
within the vision criterion. The existence, or otherwise, of the criterion of vision 
indicated the temporal perspective (Crilly & Ioannou, 2014) of the organisation. 
Those companies that did not disclose a safety vision could be argued to have a 
present temporal perspective and therefore be highly influenced by situational 
pressures (Kabanoff & Keegan, 2009), including meeting shareholder demands for 
earnings and dividend payments. This short-term focus is likely to increase perceived 
trade-offs between immediate pressures including shareholder value and long-term 
objectives, which may have a less obvious impact on immediate organisational 
survival (Crilly & Ioannou, 2014).  
6.2.2 Personal commitment 
In contrast to the safety leadership criterion of vision, the disclosure of the 
criterion of personal commitment by the Chairman and CEO remained the least 
disclosed safety leadership criterion across all time periods.  As outlined in Chapter 
4, by 2011 less than half (46%) of all Chairmen and CEOs were making a personal 
commitment to safety in their letters to shareholders. The criterion of personal 
commitment reflects the transformational leadership, and SSTL, dimension of 
idealised influence (Barling et al., 2002; Bass, 1985). In the SSTL model, leaders 
who are high in idealised influence convey safety as a core value through their own 
personal commitment and focus on being a safety role model (De Koster et al., 2011; 
Mullen et al., 2011; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009).  In addition, through role modelling 
safety, leaders are said to be able to raise employees’ awareness of safety issues 
thereby increasing their knowledge of safe behaviours (De Koster et al., 2011). The 
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following definition of personal commitment was developed during the research 
study: 
Personal commitment is a sincere, visible and genuine dedication to 
workplace safety that demonstrates care for the safety and welfare of others. 
Senior leaders with a personal commitment to safety exemplify a positive 
attitude towards safety, role model safe behaviours and help solve safety 
issues on behalf of employees. 
Chapter 3 detailed the coding process through which six categories of the 
personal commitment criterion were identified. It was evident that categories in the 
personal commitment criterion replicated other categories identified in the remaining 
three criteria. These duplications were retained in order to allow for an analysis of 
the categories included within Chairman and/or CEO letters to shareholders. The 
categories identified in personal commitment were business excellence, espoused 
values, a focus on employees, leadership and culture, the role of the board and 
transparency. Table 40 sets out a comparison of personal commitment category 
disclosures across all sectors. These findings demonstrate that by 2011, the highest 
category to be disclosed, transparency, was still only identified in 39% of all 
Chairman and CEO letters within annual reports across all sectors.  Table	  40	  –	  Personal	  commitment	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  	  
 
2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Business excellence 16 26 37 
Espoused values 17 18 33 
Employee focus 5 9 14 
Leadership and culture 5 7 20 
Board role 5 11 14 
Transparency 16 33 39 
 
It is helpful to consider a direct comparison between identified categories at 
this point to help draw meaning from this data.  For example, in considering the 
category of espoused values, within the vision criterion, disclosures were made in the 
body of annual reports and CSR reports by 72% companies in 2011. However, in the 
same year only 33% of Chairman and CEO letters in the same documents made such 
a disclosure. This can be compared to the category of business excellence that saw a 
much closer rate of disclosures. In this case, 43% of companies made a disclosure 
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linking safety and business excellence in the body of their annual reports and CSR 
reports by 2011 and 37% of Chairman and CEO made such a disclosure in their 
letters. Both these findings illustrate a potential reluctance or lack of awareness by 
Chairman and CEOs to make a personal written commitment to safety in their letters 
to shareholders. This may reflect a belief that safety is not a matter for the Chairman 
and CEO to communicate and is more appropriately reported in the main section of 
the report.  
Chairman and CEOs’ letters are said to provide an opportunity to understand 
the senior leader’s “mindset, aspirations, ideologies and strategic thinking” (Amernic 
& Craig, 2007, p. 26) and findings from Study 1 indicated the potential for Chairmen 
and CEOs to use their letters to shareholders to communicate the importance of 
safety within the organisations they lead. In order to improve the standard of 
corporate responsibility for safety, it is necessary to raise the level of safety 
awareness from those who are in senior positions to give greater prominence to the 
place of safety on the corporate agenda (Flin & Yule, 2004) with Chairmen and 
CEOs ideally suited to this task. The personal commitments to safety provided by 
Chairmen and CEOs in their annual letters to shareholders could be an important tool 
for communicating the priority boards place on safety. In his investigation of the 
Piper Alpha disaster, Lord Cullen noted that “it is essential to create a corporate 
atmosphere or culture in which safety is understood to be and is accepted as, the 
number one priority” (Cullen, 1990, p. 300). This research has revealed the relatively 
low levels of disclosures of this nature and the opportunities for safety leadership to 
be enacted by Chairmen and CEOs via public disclosures in the future.  
6.2.3 Decision-making 
The third safety leadership criterion identified in this research was decision-
making, which aligns closely with the transformational leadership dimension of 
intellectual stimulation (Bass, 1985). In the SSTL context (Barling et al., 2002), this 
dimension often refers to employee involvement in safety (Simard & Marchand, 
1994), the need for leaders to maintain effective communication channels with 
employees (Cooper, 1998) as well as to ensure that team members are assigned 
appropriate safety issues and projects to manage (Simon & Carrillo, 1999). Other 
explanations for the involvement of employees in decision-making have included the 
need for leaders to ensure they are empowered to make decisions regarding safety, 
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and to ensure their suggestions are taken on board (O’Dea & Flin, 2001). In the 
SSTL model (Barling et al., 2002), intellectual stimulation occurs when leaders 
challenge their followers to confront long-held assumptions and motivate them to 
think in innovative ways to enhance safety. Furthermore, Barling et al. (2002) stated 
that in doing so, leaders encourage their employees to address safety issues, safety 
practices and safety policies and to enhance information sharing about safety risks. 
The following definition of decision-making was developed during this research 
study: 
Decision-making promotes sound assessment of safety issues while also 
providing an opportunity for open communication between all levels of an 
organisation. Senior leaders promoting decision-making ensure safety 
concerns are heard and employees are included in safety planning processes.  
During Study 1, consistent with existing literature, the criterion of decision-
making included any references to the role of employees in safety decision-making. 
However, considering safety decision-making with respect to the board has made an 
important contribution to the literature. References to the role of the board or the 
existence of a board sub-committee responsible for safety were coded against this 
criterion. In addition, references to safety responsibilities within a board charter, 
information on safety reporting provided to the board, details of internal safety 
communications and references to safety policies, documents and systems were also 
coded against this criterion given the role they play in helping senior leaders make 
decisions about safety. Through expanding the safety leadership concept of decision-
making to include the role of the board, Study 1 sought to address a gap in the 
literature, which is particularly important given the increasing focus on the board’s 
role and responsibilities in the aftermath of major workplace accidents. 
Similar to the earlier criteria of vision and personal commitment, the decision-
making criterion of safety leadership identified six categories through the coding 
process detailed in Chapter 3. These categories included the role of the board, the 
existence of a board sub-committee, the role of senior executives, the role of 
employees, the existence of safety-related documents and systems and the existence 
of safety committees.  Table 41 sets out of a comparison of disclosures across each 
of the six categories. These findings show that by 2011, more than three-quarters of 
all companies (76%) across all sectors were making at least one disclosure with 
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respect to the existence of safety-related documents and systems. In comparison, at 
the lower end of categories disclosed, only 26% of companies made a disclosure by 
2011 with respect to employee safety committees. Table	  41	  -­‐	  Decision-­‐making	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  	  
 
2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Board role 34 46 55 
Board sub-committee 24 32 46 
Senior executive role 20 33 45 
Employee role 25 38 49 
Documents and systems 44 75 76 
Safety committees 12 14 29 
 
The preparation of reports, charters, documents and systems relating to safety 
are, in many ways, more tangible and readily able to be disclosed than more 
nebulous statements of leadership and culture. Traditionally, a structural view of 
safety seen through policy statements and safety manuals (Hale & Hovden, 1998) 
had formed the standard approach to safety management within an organisation. The 
results of Study 1 indicated that the prevailing view remained that the existence of 
safety policies, documents and systems is information most suited to being disclosed 
in an annual report. Policies, documents and systems tend to be tangible and 
measurable as compared to more overarching concepts such as leadership and 
culture. The findings from the current study also revealed that low-hazard industries 
such as consumer staples, information technology and telecommunication services, 
were more likely to disclose in this category than high-hazard industries. The energy 
sector, one of the sectors to make the highest number of safety-related disclosures 
overall, actually declined in the level of disclosures they made in this category from 
80% in 2001 to 60% in 2011. These results suggest support of the findings from the 
study conducted by Smallman and John (2001) suggesting that organisations evolve 
through a number of stages of maturity in safety practice moving from a compliance 
focus, where evidence of documents and systems would be a key driver, to external 
competitiveness. In this stage, organisations understand that having a good safety 
record produces a competitive edge in winning new, and retaining existing, business 
(Smallman & John, 2001, p. 234).  
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Given the traditional focus in annual reports on providing information to 
shareholders on economic value, the Study 1 findings support the view that the 
annual report is used as a tool to provide information that shareholders would 
reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the company’s operations, 
financial position and business strategies (Corporations Act, 2011). Disclosures of 
the existence of safety documents and systems may be argued to be a natural 
extension of that information whereas commentary on the importance of leadership 
and culture, particularly if the organisation has adopted a present temporal 
perspective (Kabanoff & Keegan, 2009), could be considered to be outside the realm 
of information relevant for shareholders. This research has empirically explored that 
assumption and confirmed that a preference for disclosures relating to safety 
documents and systems prevails within large Australian companies. 
6.2.4 Transparency 
The final safety leadership criterion considered by Study 1 was that of 
transparency. The addition of this new criterion (to the existing SSTL model) was in 
itself an extension of existing safety leadership literature and primarily emerged as a 
result of a gap identified during the systematic review of safety leadership models in 
Chapter 2. The review revealed that a number of safety leadership traits were not 
readily addressed by the existing four dimensions of SSTL (Barling et al., 2002). The 
safety leadership traits had been described in various ways in the literature including 
as safety controlling (Wu, 2005), safety monitoring (Griffin & Hu, 2013) and 
accountability (Bryden, 2002; Dunlap, 2011). The inclusion of the criterion of 
transparency in this research project was intended to reflect these additional safety 
leadership behaviours not included within the four dimensions of SSTL. The 
following definition of transparency was developed during this research study: 
Transparency refers to senior leaders being open to scrutiny of safety 
performance through monitoring and communicating the effectiveness of 
safety initiatives. Leaders demonstrate transparency through formal and 
informal communications, which celebrate safety successes, as well as 
openly communicate safety challenges as they emerge. 
Study 1 found that 72% of companies by 2011 were making disclosures in their 
annual reports and CSR reports which could be coded against the safety leadership 
criterion of transparency. This confirms that transparency is a relevant criterion for 
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consideration within safety leadership, particularly as it applies to written 
communications. As outlined in Chapter 4, six categories were identified during the 
coding process including safety statistics, fatalities, legal action, remuneration, 
workers compensation and recognition. Table 42 sets out a comparison of disclosures 
between these categories and shows that by 2011, 67% of all companies across all 
sectors were making disclosures with respect to their safety statistics. This was the 
highest category of disclosure, confirming the earlier finding of a preference in 
annual reports for disclosing matters such as documents and systems, statistical data 
and tangible performance measures. Given the challenges associated with judging an 
organisation’s safety performance (Cox & Flin, 1998), safety statistics are one 
method of providing senior leaders and other stakeholders with an indication of the 
safety performance of an organisation and are often one of the first measures that a 
company establishes to report on safety.   Table	  42	  -­‐	  Transparency	  disclosures	  –	  all	  companies	  (N=76)	  and	  all	  sectors	  	  
 
2001 
% 
2006 
% 
2011 
% 
Safety statistics 29 53 67 
Fatalities 11 12 16 
Legal action 8 5 5 
Remuneration 7 37 53 
Workers compensation 9 9 11 
Recognition 13 20 18 
 
Study 1 confirmed the emphasis that is placed within organisations on using 
safety statistics to measure safety outcomes, yet highlights the ongoing need for 
researchers and industry to work towards an agreed measure of safety performance 
so that the high levels of disclosures may be able to be compared between, and even 
within, industry sectors. Doing so will help provide meaning to the data and answer 
the call of investors seeking to make objective assessments of company safety 
performance (Brown & Butcher, 2005; O’Neill, 2010; O’Neill et al., 2011; Safe 
Work Australia, 2013; Vuontisjarvi, 2006) and seek to achieve a consistent approach 
to measuring organisational safety performance (Geller, 1994). The focus by sample 
companies on lag indicators such as lost time injuries, total recordable injuries, 
customised injury measures, and medical treatment cases confirmed that focusing on 
the outcome (rather than the process) results in organisations focusing on statistics 
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rather than behaviours and attitudes (Geller, 1994). This research project has 
reinforced that finding and extended it through exploring the relatively high levels of 
outcome-based reporting – such as statistics or documents and systems – as 
compared to process-based reporting focused on leadership and culture. 
Before concluding a discussion of research question 1, it is useful to briefly 
recall that the fourth dimension of transformational leadership (and SSTL), 
individualised consideration, was not included as a criterion in the current study. 
This dimension was not expected to be as directly relevant given it related to paying 
special attention to employees’ needs for achievement (Clarke, 2013; Kelloway & 
Barling, 2010) and focused on the role of coaching (Hoffmeister et al., 2014). 
Further, individualised consideration has recently been argued to not be as effective 
as other approaches in promoting safety at work (Hoffmeister et al., 2014). In the 
context of this research, it was expected that this dimension of transformational 
leadership would not have provided sufficient data for analysis since the focus at a 
board and senior executive level is generally not on individual employees or in 
coaching. Greater focus was therefore placed on the traits of safety leaders that were 
revealed during the systematic literature review and expected to be relevant to senior 
leaders. 
Relevance of signalling theory 
Before completing a discussion of the findings from research question 1, it is 
useful to consider the relevance of signalling theory to this research study. Signalling 
theory is concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two parties 
(Connelly et al., 2011). In their research focused on the board as a signal in the 
context of an Initial Public Offering (IPO), Certo et al., (2001) discussed information 
asymmetry in the sense of an issuing firm being more informed about its prospects 
for growth and profitability than any other market participants. The challenge for the 
issuing firm becomes one of demonstrating value so that shareholders might 
maximise the price at which they can sell their shares during the IPO process. In their 
research, Certo et al., (2001) investigated whether a board comprised predominantly 
of independent directors signalled that effective control systems were in place, giving 
the perception to the wider market of effective monitoring of management. This 
research considered whether independent directors would be hesitant to join the 
board of a low-quality organisation for fear of damaging their reputation and 
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therefore when independent directors with developed reputations joined a board, it 
sent a signal conferring legitimacy, quality and performance on the potential 
organisation to be formed out of the IPO process (Certo et al., 2001). 
Signalling theory has been applied to corporate governance research to help 
explain the influence of information asymmetry in a wide range of contexts 
(Connelly et al., 2011). This research study has considered corporate governance 
disclosures in the context of workplace safety and therefore a brief discussion on the 
relevance of signalling theory is timely. The essence of signalling theory is that 
insiders, such as senior executives, obtain information – both positive and negative – 
about an organisation that is not available to outsiders. Insiders must then decide 
whether to communicate this information to those outside the organisation. In the 
context of workplace safety, senior executives typically hold considerably more 
information on the safety practices, safety performance and safety issues of an 
organisation than an outsider. Signalling theory focuses primarily on whether the 
organisation, through their senior executives, makes a deliberate communication of 
positive safety information in order to convey positive organisational attributes 
(Connelly et al., 2011). A key point to signalling is that outsiders stand to gain from 
making decisions based on information obtained from these signals (Connelly et al., 
2011). 
The findings from research question 1 have shown that companies in the 
sample used annual report and CSR report disclosures to signal to the wider market 
positive, and to a lesser extent negative, information on workplace safety. The level 
of such signals has also been shown through this research to vary quite considerably 
between industry sectors, indicating the difference in perceived importance of such 
signals depending on whether organisations are operating in high-hazard and low-
hazard industries. Across the ten-year period however, where signals have been 
given they have increased suggesting that information asymmetry in the context of 
workplace safety is being reduced. An area for further research might be to consider 
the impact of workplace safety signals on share price over time to understand in 
greater depth the impact of this signalling approach and the extent to which outsiders 
stand to gain from such disclosures. 
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6.2.5 Summary 
The findings from research question 1 have therefore made a range of 
contributions to existing safety leadership literature, espoused values literature and 
annual report disclosures literature. Whilst already represented by the SSTL 
dimensions of inspirational motivation, idealised influence and intellectual 
stimulation, through vision, personal commitment and decision-making respectively, 
Study 1 has provided empirical evidence that these criteria can be applied to written 
communications. In addition, safety leadership has been extended through the 
inclusion of the fourth criterion of transparency highlighting a gap in the current 
literature.  Importantly, and in a novel contribution to the literature, this research 
study has also applied safety leadership to boards, a group of senior leaders that has 
been a “neglected species” (Flin & Yule, 2004, p. ii48) in relation to workplace 
safety. In addition, six categories have been identified within each criterion of safety 
leadership (24 categories in total) to further enhance academic understanding of their 
application to senior leaders and how safety leadership is operationalised in practice.  
It is important to note that this research has considered the concept of safety 
leadership as comprising four key criteria. Each of the four criteria are considered 
important for inclusion in the concept due to the unique attributes they bring to safety 
leadership. However, this research was not intended to allocate weighting to each 
criterion. Rather, these four criteria will hopefully provide further research 
opportunities in the future for the criteria of vision, personal commitment, decision-
making and transparency to be considered as part of a potential index for safety 
leadership in multi-level analysis at organisational and individual levels. 
Study 1 has also considered the literature with respect to espoused values 
(Schein, 1990) by confirming the extent to which espoused safety values can be 
identified in public disclosures. In addition, the current research has found that 
companies seek to overcome conflicting objectives (Crilly & Ioannou, 2014) 
between espoused safety values and economic outcomes by making direct links in 
annual report and CSR report disclosures between safety and business excellence. 
Furthermore, the research has contributed to knowledge on annual report disclosures 
(Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006; Neu et al., 1998) by confirming that the nature of 
material disclosed in annual reports tends to reflect tangible, structural information 
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such as statistical data, documents and systems rather than more intangible issues 
such as leadership and culture.  
6.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
The first research question to be addressed in Study 2 was: 
RQ2 Do public disclosures of safety-related activities reflect a company’s 
internal focus on safety, and if so, how? 
This research question was addressed during Study 2 where in-depth case 
studies were undertaken with two companies to explore in greater detail how the 
level of disclosures uncovered during Study 1 reflected the level of internal focus on 
safety within the company. Through an expanded document analysis of annual 
reports and CSR reports, corporate websites, AGM presentations, internal 
documentation and field observations, the level of internal and external focus on 
safety could be assessed. The findings from data to address research question 2 will 
now be considered.   
6.3.1 Internal and external focus on safety 
Research question 2 sought to explore whether a variation in approaches to 
safety disclosures as reflected by the industry sector to which a case study 
organisation belonged was also reflected in the internal focus on safety of the two 
organisations. The Study 2 findings revealed that the extent of internal focus on 
safety did reflect the external safety disclosures. Similar to their low level of safety 
disclosures, FinanceCo had a low focus on safety internally, while EnergyCo had a 
very high level of focus on safety internally, which was reflected in the high levels of 
public disclosures.  
The findings from data analysed to address research question 2 supported the 
literature in terms of industry variation. The two case study organisations originated 
from different industry sectors and the findings confirmed that a company with a low 
level of safety disclosures, in this case FinanceCo, was also likely to have a low 
internal focus on safety. Similarly, a company with a high level of public disclosures 
of safety-related activities, such as EnergyCo, was likely to have a high internal 
focus on safety. In order to understand the reasons for this variation, the theory of 
organisational attention (Simon, 1947) will be briefly considered, since issues 
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receiving attention internally, whether by board members or senior executives, are 
also likely to receive attention when communicating externally with shareholders. 
This research study has confirmed this proposition in the case of two case study 
organisations from divergent industry sectors.    
The approach taken to safety by an organisation can be attributed to the 
attentional perspective of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) which originates from Simon’s 
(1947) theory of organisational attention. Study 2 has found that the level to which 
an organisation focuses on safety, both internally and externally, does relate to the 
pattern of organisational attention that the issue is given by senior leaders. There is a 
strong level of congruence between the external levels of public disclosures of 
safety-related activities with the level of internal focus on safety indicating that the 
attentional perspective within the organisation towards safety is determined by 
whether safety is seen as one of the organisational goals. In FinanceCo, safety was 
not viewed as a dominant goal of the organisation and therefore subsequently low 
levels of attention were evident both internally and externally. In contrast, safety 
received significant levels of attention in EnergyCo reflecting the focus of top 
management teams (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) and a history of high levels of attention 
on safety (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). 
Study 2 considered the extent to which the levels of attention placed on safety 
within an organisation was reflected in the level of attention placed on safety 
externally through disclosures in annual reports and CSR reports. The Study 2 
findings reflect the view expressed by Ocasio (2011) where the level of attention 
placed on safety internally reflects the goals, views and prior attention of the senior 
leaders of the organisation. This in turn is most clearly represented in the level of 
attention given to safety in the public documents representing to stakeholders the 
goals and views of the organisation through the company annual report and CSR 
report.  
The findings may also provide further evidence to support the suggestion that 
there is an evolution for organisations through a number of stages of maturity with 
respect to workplace safety (Smallman & John, 2001, p. 234). The first stage, where 
the focus is on compliance, strongly reflects the focus on safety at FinanceCo. In this 
stage reporting and control for safety runs parallel with, but separate from, senior 
executives (Smallman & John, 2001). This was seen in the nature of the internal 
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framework for safety at FinanceCo, which was a standalone issue within the business 
and not integrated with the wider operations. FinanceCo could be argued to be 
attempting to move to the second stage identified by Smallman and John (2001) of 
internal efficiency once recognition has been made within the organisation that 
business can only be effective if efficiency is maximised, and poor workplace safety 
will hinder such maximisation (Smallman & John, 2001, p. 234). FinanceCo had 
become aware of the need to ensure a greater level of focus on safety, albeit the focus 
appeared to be driven primarily by a desire to comply with relevant workplace safety 
legislation.  
As an organisation, EnergyCo reflects the final stage of the Smallman and John 
(2001) model, external competitiveness. In this stage, companies like EnergyCo have 
a sophisticated view of the contribution of workplace safety to their competitiveness 
(Smallman & John, 2001). In the Smallman and John (2001) study, only one 
company from the seven included in the study fell into this stage and the company 
concerned “not surprisingly (had safety) as the first issue cited on their website” 
(Smallman & John, 2001, p. 235). A consistent focus on workplace safety (internally 
and externally) was shown by EnergyCo through their sophisticated internal safety 
governance framework, involvement of all levels of the organisation in safety 
committees, and consistent references to safety in AGM presentations, annual reports 
and CSR reports. Similar to the Smallman and John (2001) findings, the level of 
disclosures and focus on safety on EnergyCo’s website was also very high. 
6.3.2 Summary 
Research question 2 explored the extent to which there was consistency in a 
company’s focus on safety between what is disclosed externally with what is evident 
internally. The research question has considered the findings in the context of 
attentional perspective (Ocasio, 1997) by exploring the extent to which there is a 
high degree of congruency between the level of attention on safety both within and 
outside an organisation. At a point in time, Study 2 found a high level of congruency 
with external disclosures appearing to be reflective of the internal goals, views and 
attention placed on safety by senior leaders of the organisation. Research question 2 
has explored the variation evident between two different industry sectors – financial 
services and energy – confirming that differing perceptions of safety from different 
industries does exist (Prior, 2009; 2010).  In each case study, where an organisation 
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had a low level of public disclosures of safety-related activities (FinanceCo) there 
was also a corresponding low level of focus on safety internally. In addition, where 
an organisation had a high level of public disclosures of safety-related activities 
(EnergyCo) there was also a correspondingly high level of focus on safety internally. 
These findings support the study conducted by Smallman and John (2001) and 
highlight that organisations evolve through various stages of maturity with respect to 
safety.  
6.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 3  
The second research question to be addressed in Study 2 was: 
RQ3 Are the four criteria of safety leadership evident in the views of board 
members and senior executives with respect to safety, and if so, how? 
This research question addressed a gap in the literature by analysing the role of 
senior leaders with respect to safety (Flin & Yule, 2004) and more particularly 
exploring the role of the board (Smallman & John, 2001). Study 2 contributed to 
existing theory by extending the application of safety leadership to senior leaders and 
enhancing knowledge beyond corporate governance theory of board responsibilities. 
The findings from Study 2 provided evidence that the four safety leadership criteria 
used were reflected in the views of those interviewed, albeit to differing degrees and 
with significant variation evident between FinanceCo and EnergyCo.  
Study 2 has gone beyond previous academic and industry focus in this area by 
conducting in-depth interviews to understand the perceived role of safety leadership 
in the boardroom. The views of 29 board members and senior executives from two 
case study organisations operating in very different industry sectors have enabled a 
depth of understanding not previously available. Each of the four safety leadership 
criteria will now be discussed in further detail to understand the extent to which each 
criterion was present in the views of board members and senior executives 
interviewed.   
6.4.1 Vision 
During interviews in Study 2, the safety leadership criterion of vision was 
evident with FinanceCo and EnergyCo participants. This finding confirmed Schein’s 
(1990) work on espoused values and also introduced basic assumptions. At the core 
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of Schein’s organisational culture framework are basic assumptions that are usually 
unconscious and determine perceptions, thought processes, feelings and behaviour 
(Schein, 1990). For Schein (1990), values are still negotiable whereas basic 
assumptions are not. Basic assumptions tend to be embedded and difficult to debate 
and so are extremely difficult to change (Schein, 2010) as they guide behaviour and 
tell group members how to perceive, think and feel about things (Argyris & Schon, 
1996; Schein, 2010).  Within FinanceCo, the basic assumption about safety was that 
safety was not as relevant in the financial services sector as elsewhere. A number of 
espoused safety values were provided but with varying levels of commitment or 
evidence in behaviours and practices. In contrast, those interviewed from EnergyCo 
exhibited strong basic assumptions about safety in their organisation. Personal 
commitments were given on the value, importance and priority placed on safety as 
well as the articulated vision for safety in EnergyCo.  
The findings from Study 2 have confirmed existing theory with respect to the 
existence of espoused values, and basic assumptions, and provided a further link with 
the safety leadership criterion of vision. Within Study 1, espoused values were the 
most widely disclosed category of this criterion with 72% of all sampled companies 
making such a disclosure by 2011. The findings from both case studies have enriched 
the understanding of this phenomenon through finding that there was variation 
between the espoused values and basic assumptions of FinanceCo and EnergyCo. In 
those companies where the importance of safety was a basic assumption, such as 
EnergyCo, interviewees were more likely to identify the safety leadership criteria of 
vision. Those organisations where safety was a basic assumption were likely to have 
a greater level of public disclosures of safety-related activities, as shown from the 
findings from research question 3. 
Similarly, Study 2 provided a deeper understanding of the vision criterion 
through finding that those interviewed in FinanceCo were less likely to be able to 
identify or articulate the organisational safety culture of their organisation. In 
contrast, those interviewed in Study 2 were able to talk in some depth about the 
organisational safety culture of EnergyCo and furthermore, detail the responsibility 
of senior leaders in driving and reinforcing that culture. This is an important finding 
from Study 2 since it deepens the findings from Study 1 in which leadership and 
culture was identified as a category for disclosure, but at relatively low levels over 
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the ten-year period. The semi-structured interviews conducted during Study 2, and 
the resulting contrast in results between FinanceCo and EnergyCo, highlighted the 
variance between the individual and group safety values and attitudes of each 
organisation. While FinanceCo interviewees were largely unable to provide feedback 
on the safety attitudes of employees, those interviewed in EnergyCo acknowledged 
that addressing attitudes to safety was an issue that required constant focus and 
attention by senior leaders. This in turn highlights the variation between the 
organisational cultures of both companies and the extent to which this will be 
reflected in the level of public disclosures with respect to safety-related activities.   
6.4.2 Personal commitment 
The findings from research question 3 have confirmed the importance of the 
safety leadership role of the CEO. Transformational leadership, from which safety 
leadership has emerged, encourages leaders to inspire employees to go beyond their 
self-interest and focus on norms, values and goals of the organisation to perform 
beyond expectations (Bass, 1985). The literature was reinforced by the findings 
where consistency was evident between those interviewed in FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo in their views as to the role of the CEO in setting the example with respect 
to safety and to ensuring attention is placed on the issue. One key variance between 
the two case study organisations when discussing the safety leadership role of the 
CEO, was that those interviewed in EnergyCo provided clear examples of the CEO’s 
behaviour reflecting Bass’ (1985) definition of transformational leadership. Those 
interviewed in FinanceCo tended to provide more theoretical and generic feedback 
on what they expected a CEO should do rather than what was necessarily happening 
in practice. This is a key variation in the findings between the two companies and 
further reinforces the industry variation as well as an organisational context found 
between FinanceCo and EnergyCo in their approach to safety leadership.  
    A further finding from Study 2 relates to the role of the Chairman in leading 
the organisation with respect to safety. The current research confirmed existing 
corporate governance literature on the role of the Chairman (Bainbridge, 2002; 
Levrau & Van Den Berghe, 2013; Tricker, 2012). Interviews with participants from 
both FinanceCo and EnergyCo did not define safety leadership as a role for the 
Chairman outside of the boardroom. The leadership of the Chairman was confined to 
the boardroom rather than necessarily being visible to employees and other 
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stakeholders.  Interestingly, many Chairmen did see safety as an area for mention in 
their letters to shareholders with references to safety in annual report Chairmen’s 
letters increasing since 2001 as found in Study 1. The current research study has 
therefore identified a difference between the safety leadership expectations and 
behaviours of the CEO and Chairman. The results of interviews held with FinanceCo 
and EnergyCo confirmed that the safety leadership expectations of a Chairman are 
contained within the boardroom, while the safety leadership responsibilities of the 
CEO extended beyond the internal organisation to all stakeholders.  
6.4.3 Decision-making 
The interviews conducted during Study 2 provided insight as to the role of the 
board in safety with respect to the criterion of decision-making. A key finding from 
the interviews in FinanceCo and EnergyCo was the expectation that the board as a 
whole would demonstrate safety leadership but that it be confined to the boardroom 
through demonstrating safety leadership to the senior executives of the organisation. 
The attention placed on safety by the board had a relationship with the level of 
attention safety received from the CEO and senior executives of the company. In this 
way, the research confirmed the principle of the focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997). 
This principle considers that “what decision-makers do depends on what issues and 
answers they focus their attention on” (Ocasio, 1997, p.188). The principle of focus 
of attention suggests that given decision makers are limited to what they can attend 
to in any particular situation, they are therefore selective as to what issues they focus 
their attention upon at any one time (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947).   
This research has confirmed that when boards, as decision makers, focus on 
safety as an organisational issue, the company is more likely to see that issue 
attended to by senior executives. This was clearly demonstrated in the case studies of 
FinanceCo and EnergyCo and the findings from research question 2 where the level 
of focus on safety (both internally and externally) was in sharp contrast between the 
two organisations. In EnergyCo, where the board placed considerable focus in their 
meetings and discussions with senior executives on safety, workplace safety received 
a correspondingly high level of attention in daily operations led by senior executives. 
In contrast, in FinanceCo where the level of focus on safety by the board was much 
lower, a vastly reduced level of focus on workplace safety within daily operations 
resulted. 
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Study 2 also extended existing corporate governance theory in respect of the 
role of boards in safety. Hopkins (1995) used the example of Shell as an organisation 
whose board spent one third of their meeting devoted to safety and this was provided 
as evidence to explain the superior safety performance of the organisation. What has 
not been previously addressed in the literature is how the board may spend the time 
allocated to safety in a meaningful and effective way. Interviewees of FinanceCo 
focused on the board role as being one of setting the tone, enquiring and questioning, 
ensuring compliance, establishing reporting and setting the culture and safety vision 
of the organisation. By way of contrast, those interviewed in EnergyCo, where the 
importance of personal safety is a basic assumption of the organisation and a strong 
safety culture exists, had a different view of the board’s role. Unlike the visible 
safety leadership role required of the CEO and senior executive team, the safety 
leadership role of the board was seen as necessary inside the boardroom. Board 
members in EnergyCo were expected to demonstrate a sincere, personal commitment 
to safety. Senior executives expected boards to drive a safety culture – inside the 
boardroom – to influence the behaviour and attention of these senior leaders within 
the business. This research demonstrates that companies with a strong commitment 
to safety by the CEO and senior executives, high levels of disclosure with respect to 
safety-related activities and a resulting strong safety culture, expect a much higher 
level of active safety leadership by their boards within the boardroom than those 
organisations where safety is not given as high a priority.  
The Study 2 findings provided an opportunity to consider the 
conceptualisations of the board role proposed by Nicholson and Newton (2010). 
During interviews, evidence of the four concepts of the role of the board – board 
control, board service, board strategy and access to resources – were identified. 
With respect to board control, both FinanceCo and EnergyCo interviewees 
highlighted the role of the board in safety by monitoring senior executives and 
establishing reporting and setting boundaries (Keasey & Wright, 1993). The second 
conceptualisation suggested by Nicholson and Newton (2010), board service, was 
also evident during interviews with the background experience of board members 
being seen as particularly relevant in both FinanceCo and EnergyCo in assisting to 
raise the level of focus and attention on safety. These board members were also seen 
as being able to assist senior executives to analyse strategic alternatives (Forbes & 
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Milliken, 1999) when managing safety. The third conceptualisation, board strategy, 
encompassed the role expressed by interviewees with respect to establishing the 
vision for safety in the organisation (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2001). In addition, 
safety strategies had been developed in FinanceCo and EnergyCo, which identified 
responsibilities for the board in safety and required board endorsement. The final 
conceptualisation of the board role proposed by Nicholson and Newton (2010), 
access to resources, refers to using board members to assist in controlling the 
operating environment of the organisation or to assisting in securing critical 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  This conceptualisation was reflected in the 
views of senior leaders when discussing the need by the board to allocate appropriate 
funding and people in order to meet the safety vision of the organisation. 
6.4.4 Transparency 
The Study 2 findings related to the criterion of transparency reinforced those 
from Study 1, where tangible data such as safety statistics, as well as the link 
between remuneration and safety, received a high level of focus. Despite the 
different levels of statistical safety reporting being undertaken between FinanceCo 
and EnergyCo, both organisations revealed similar challenges with collecting 
meaningful data. This confirmed the concerns in practice of the inadequacy of 
current processes for measuring and reporting safety performance (Safe Work 
Australia, 2013). The level of discussion within boardrooms in terms of analysing 
safety data being presented was not consistent between FinanceCo and EnergyCo. 
Whether there was sufficient depth and analysis of safety data appeared to depend on 
the quality of the information gathered, the regularity with which it was presented, 
the knowledge and experience of safety amongst board members and the existence of 
an organisational culture that focused attention on safety. In FinanceCo, the 
collection of safety statistical data was relatively new and there was still work to be 
completed in determining the data that would provide the board and senior 
executives with the most meaningful understanding of safety performance in the 
organisation. In EnergyCo, the collection of safety statistical data was more mature 
and had evolved from lag indicators to a range of additional lead indicators. In recent 
times, board members had been appointed with strong industry knowledge of safety, 
which ensured safety discussions with senior executives inside the boardroom were 
sufficiently insightful to contribute to meaningful change. These findings supported 
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the view of the importance that background experiences of board members played in 
focusing attention on specific issues and the extent to which that focus could then 
move beyond a general discussion to an in-depth analysis of the safety issues at hand. 
The second key finding relating to the transparency criterion in Study 2 was 
the extent to which structured remuneration systems that are in place to reward 
safety, influence levels of attention on safety. In FinanceCo, safety was not an area 
rewarded under current remuneration arrangements. This appears to have a direct 
relationship with the level of focus on safety generally by senior executives. By 
contrast, in EnergyCo where the level of focus on safety by senior executives is very 
high, safety outcomes are a key performance indicator and directly impacts 
remuneration of senior executives.  
Relevance of agency and stewardship theory 
During the literature review, the theories of agency theory and stewardship 
theory were introduced to explain the role of board members and senior executives in 
the governance of an organisation. Agency theorists suggest that senior executives 
are “opportunistic agents” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) motivated by extrinsic rewards. In 
such cases, a board of directors is necessary to curtail such opportunism (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). By contrast, stewardship theorists argue that intrinsic motivation 
will drive behaviour (Donaldson, 1990) including the need for senior executives to 
be recognised for achievement, successful performance and respect (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). According to stewardship theory, in an environment such as this, the 
board empowers senior executives rather than seeking to control them (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). 
During interviews conducted with CS1 and CS2 in Study 2, two very different 
approaches to safety leadership and safety governance were observed. In CS1, the 
role of the board could be considered to have reflected agency theory. That is, 
participants viewed the board as setting the tone of the organisation, establishing 
reporting mechanisms, and questioning and monitoring senior executives. In this 
way, the board had adopted a strong oversight role with respect to the senior 
executives of the organisation in their leadership and governance of safety. There 
was not the same level of expectation by senior executives that board members show 
leadership in relation to safety but rather the board was expected to monitor and 
govern, as well as hold the senior executives to account. Individuals interviewed in 
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CS1 did not, on the whole, express strong level of personal commitments to safety 
and participant responses generally focused on ensuring compliance with safety 
legislation. 
The individual and personal commitments to the safety of employees expressed 
by CS2 participants would suggest that stewardship theory was evident. Stewardship 
theory recognises that there are a range of motives for the behaviour of senior 
executives that extend beyond financial reward. These include the need for 
achievement and recognition, the satisfaction of successful performance, respect for 
authority, and work ethic (Argyris, 1964; Herzberg, 1966; McClelland, 1961). The 
findings from Study 2 confirm the work of Kouzes and Posner (1993) where senior 
executives are expected to be committed to the welfare, growth and wholeness of 
stakeholders. It is likely in this context that the desire of senior executives to ensure 
that no one is injured at work would be a considerable motivation. Throughout the 
interviews with CS2 participants the goal within the organisation to ensure no harm 
to people was described as a fundamental, core value of the business. While there 
was acknowledgment of the extrinsic reasons for keeping people safe, such as loss of 
social licence leading to reduced financial success, it was apparent that intrinsic 
reasons dominated CS2 interview participant’s responses to questions regarding the 
importance of safety in the organisation. These intrinsic reasons included social 
acceptance within the organisation given the view that senior executives would be 
considered “cultural misfits” (CS2002) if they did not share the same passion for 
safety. This research study has therefore confirmed that both agency and stewardship 
theory are relevant when considering the issue of workplace safety. While it is 
beyond the scope of this study to consider which theory may be more applicable in 
different circumstances facing an organisation, or the extent to which both theories 
may effectively work together in addressing organisational safety issues, it is 
certainly an area that warrants further research in the future. 
6.4.5 Summary 
Research question 3 explored the extent to which the four criteria of safety 
leadership were evident in the views of board members and senior executives. The 
findings from research question 3 addressed a gap in the literature in applying safety 
leadership to a group of senior leaders who are frequently ignored. The findings have 
contributed to existing research by demonstrating the applicability of safety 
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leadership to this group thereby extending the existing application of SSTL (Barling 
et al., 2002). The criterion of vision, personal commitment and decision-making were 
all evident in the views of those interviewed in Study 2. An additional criterion of 
transparency, which was identified after a systematic review of alternative models of 
safety leadership, was also evident in the views of board members and senior 
executives.   
The findings from research question 3 has also shown that while concepts such 
as leadership and culture are not routinely disclosed in annual reports, they remain 
important determinants of the safety culture of an organisation and are evident in the 
views of board members and senior executives. A distinction has been identified in 
the current research between the safety leadership roles of the CEO and Chairman 
and while both have been found to be important, they each have very different 
expectations and areas for focus.  This research study has identified that in those 
organisations where a strong safety culture exists, the safety leadership expectations 
of the board is much higher. The relevance of both agency and stewardship theory to 
the area of safety leadership and safety governance has been confirmed with 
elements of agency theory evident in the responses of those interviewed from 
FinanceCo compared with elements of stewardship theory evident in the responses 
from EnergyCo participants.  
In addition to the theoretical contributions outlined in the findings from the two 
research questions, this research study has made a number of practical contributions 
to industry, which will now be discussed. 
6.5 CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE 
This study has made a number of contributions to practice, including defining 
safety governance and establishing a safety governance framework for boards. These 
contributions have emerged directly from Study 2 of this research, which allowed for 
a deep exploration of two different organisational approaches to safety leadership. It 
is expected that the findings from this research study will offer a fresh approach 
when assessing the role that boards play in workplace safety, beyond compliance 
with relevant legislation. The outcomes of the current research study, and the 
practical contributions that were identified from Study 2, will assist boards by 
providing a safety governance framework, based on empirical research, from which 
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boards can benchmark their existing procedures. In addition, findings from this 
research will also provide compilers of annual reports (and the boards who authorise 
their publication) with suggestions on what areas of safety-related activities might be 
disclosed in order to provide assistance to stakeholders in assessing the company’s 
approach to safety.   
As outlined in Chapter 2, the concept of safety governance was defined as: 
Safety governance is the relationship between board members and senior 
executives in the safety leadership of an organisation and provides the 
structure through which the vision and commitment to safety is set, the 
means of attaining safety objectives are agreed; the framework for 
monitoring performance is established; and compliance with legislation is 
ensured. 
Safety governance may be reflected in the charters and policies, 
communication channels, and reporting and measurement tools established by board 
members and senior executives to maintain attention and oversight on workplace 
safety performance beyond simply compliance with relevant legislation.  This 
research study has contributed to practice through the development of a safety 
governance framework for use within an organisation. In recognition of the 
continuing importance of maintaining a safe workplace, there is a need to ensure that 
organisations develop policies and practices, particularly at a board level, that 
continuously promote a proactive safety culture.  It is acknowledged that 
interventions and research aimed at improving safety leadership represent a 
fundamental shift in the approach to workplace safety in organisations (Mullen & 
Kelloway, 2009). That is particularly so in the case of the board’s leadership role in 
safety, which has not previously been considered in academic research yet remains a 
key area of focus for regulatory control. Practically, the findings also provide 
guidance to potential investors of large listed companies in terms of what to look for 
when assessing the approach taken to safety within an organisation. Currently the 
primary focus is on lag safety indicators and the outcomes of the current study 
enhance that practice by looking at a much broader range of factors. 
To ensure that company boards have adequately considered the content of a 
safety governance framework, the following recommendations have been identified 
for consideration by boards from the case study organisations in Study 2. These 
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recommendations will ultimately be contingent on the particular context of the 
organisation including considerations such as the nature of the business, physical 
conditions of the working environment, inherent risks in the work being undertaken 
and size of the business. These recommendations have been aligned with each of the 
four safety leadership criteria and are set out in Table 43. Table 43 also indicates 
whether each of these practical contributions were evident within FinanceCo and 
EnergyCo. These safety governance responsibilities focus on the role of the board 
and could be utilised in conjunction with other safety management systems and 
policies to assist in the safe management of daily operations. Table	  43	  -­‐	  Safety	  governance	  framework	  
 Study 2 
FinanceCo EnergyCo 
Vision 
1. Include a commitment to workplace safety within the board’s 
charter of responsibilities setting the tone from the top that 
safety is a critical issue for the board’s attention. 
No Yes 
2. Ensure the company has a safety vision that is communicated 
regularly and widely to all employees, contractors and 
visitors.  
No Yes 
3. Ensure the safety vision for the company aligns with and 
supports existing company values. No Yes 
4. Establish ‘non-negotiable’ safety rules across the company 
and ensure these are widely communicated and understood.  No Yes 
5. Ensure the board and senior executive team accepts, 
promotes and communicates the concept of ‘safe production’ 
across the company.  
No Yes 
6. Ensure all decisions from the board and senior executive 
team support the message of ‘safe production’ rather than 
creating conflicting objectives for employees in needing to 
meet production targets at the expense of safe decisions.   
No Yes 
Personal commitment 
7. Ensure the CEO primarily, and the Chairman where 
appropriate, regularly reinforces to employees the company 
safety vision. 
No Yes 
8. Demonstrate safety leadership when on site visits through 
authentic engagement with employees on safety issues. No Yes 
9. Ensure that all board members are aware of safety rules as 
they apply to them when visiting the office or on site.  Yes Yes 
10. As a board, acknowledge and accept the role of the board in 
safety and support the CEO and senior executive team in 
their safety leadership of the company. 
No Yes 
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 Study 2 
FinanceCo EnergyCo 
Decision-making 
11. Establish a board sub-committee focused on safety matters 
particularly in companies with large, diverse operations. 
While safety is the responsibility of all board members, a 
sub-committee enables safety issues to be discussed at 
greater length. Ensure the sub-committee has an effective 
charter in place clearly setting out safety responsibilities. 
Yes Yes 
12. Ensure regular, robust and meaningful safety reporting of 
company safety performance is provided to the board 
monthly (or at least, quarterly). 
Yes Yes 
13. Develop a schedule of regular site visits, safety observations 
and safety training for board members to raise awareness of 
issues of risk within the business.  
No Yes 
14. Develop a safety policy endorsed by the board for 
application across the company. Yes Yes 
15. Provide detailed safety-related activity disclosures within 
annual reports and CSR reports.  No Yes 
16. Consider the safety implications of all board decisions 
particularly when considering commencing new projects, 
purchasing assets or bidding for new work. 
No Yes 
17. Assess the commitment of the CEO and senior executive 
team towards safety leadership in the company and provide 
guidance and mentoring where necessary. 
Yes Yes 
18. Encourage senior executives to think strategically about 
safety and not just as a source of statistical analysis. No Yes 
19. Undertake regular safety culture or safety climate surveys 
and have those results provided to the board. No Yes 
20. Ensure senior executives lead and participate in employee 
safety committees. Consider implementing a cascading 
safety committee structure. 
No Yes 
21. Ensure all directors clearly understand their due diligence 
obligations under the relevant safety legislation. Provide an 
induction for all new directors as appropriate as well as 
regular updates to the full board on any relevant changes to 
safety legislation or regulations.  
Yes Yes 
22. Ensure the senior executive responsible for safety has 
adequate exposure to the board and is asked to report on 
safety matters directly to the board or relevant sub-
committee. 
No Yes 
23. Include safety leadership as an item for discussion in any 
evaluation of board performance. No Yes 
24. Ensure the board is regularly briefed on the key safety risks 
(including both personal and process based safety risks) 
within the company. 
Yes Yes 
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 Study 2 
FinanceCo EnergyCo 
Transparency 
25. Introduce safety outcomes as a key performance indicator for 
all senior executives.  No Yes 
26. Include team safety performance within the performance 
management system for the CEO and senior executives. 
Ensure this cascades throughout the company. 
No Yes 
27. Provide meaningful safety performance data to shareholders, 
analysts and institutional investors to assist them to 
understand safety achievements within the company beyond 
statistics.  
No Yes 
28. Ensure a range of lead and lag indicators are captured for all 
employees (including contractors) with a focus on severity of 
injury as well as a focus on both personal and process safety. 
No Yes 
29. Ensure the board is apprised of critical safety incidents 
immediately with full details of investigation findings, as 
they become known.  
Yes Yes 
30. Develop open communication with other companies to 
ensure best practice in safety. Adopt a view that there are ‘no 
secrets in safety’ so that the interests of ensuring employees 
remain safe is paramount and any concerns of competitor 
advantage secondary. 
No Yes 
 
This research has made a contribution to corporate governance practice through 
the development of a safety governance framework based on empirical research. This 
framework provides boards with practical recommendations for ensuring the four 
safety leadership criteria are reflected in the governance practices of boards. Doing 
so will help to develop robust and meaningful measures against which boards may be 
able to assess their performance. This knowledge is a valuable contribution to 
practice as board members seek to ensure the companies they govern have high 
levels of safety.  
6.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Invariably when conducting any research study, a number of limitations will be 
encountered. The following section acknowledges five limitations specific to this 
research study.  First, it is expected that internal safety documents and public 
documents could both co-exist independently without causing outcomes relating to 
safety leadership. Both sets of documents have been produced for different reasons. 
Public documents are produced for external stakeholders including shareholders, 
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employees and government. Internal documents have been produced for internal use 
only and are generally designed to ensure that policies and procedures are clearly 
understood for employees. Therefore, whether a company makes reference to safety 
in their annual report or whether they have an internal safety policy may not be 
directly related to whether safety leadership criteria within an organisation. This 
claim has not been made and research question 2 has been addressed with this 
limitation in mind to ensure that observations understand the extent to which the 
public ‘face’ of safety for an organisation reflects that of an internal one. 
Second, safety is very organisation specific. That is, whether safety is 
considered an important issue at a point in time to one particular organisation may 
depend on factors such as a history of safety incidents which may have occurred or 
the role of government in legislating on safety matters for a particular industry.  
Study 1 conducted research over a ten-year period during which time organisation 
specific, or industry specific, influences on safety may have occurred. For example, 
in some organisations where workplace fatalities occurred in a reporting year, it may 
have influenced public disclosures in subsequent years. These additional influencing 
factors were not considered in Study 1 and public disclosures were analysed in 
isolation from any contributory influences. In order to try and overcome this 
limitation, Study 2 sought to ‘go behind the numbers’ to understand more directly the 
influence that such contextual effects may have had on safety leadership within the 
organisation. 
Third, a limitation of Study 2 is the lack of generalizability (Yin, 2009) of the 
findings to industry sectors beyond financial services and energy. Given the 
relevance of organisational culture and individual company contexts to the focus on 
safety, this research study may even be limited in its generalizability to other 
organisations within the same sector. This is particularly the case given case studies 
are only generalizable to theoretical propositions and not entire populations (Yin, 
2009).  
Fourth, a further limitation is the lack of triangulation using independent 
measures of safety performance with the findings of Study 1. Safety reporting is not 
standardised between companies, industry sectors or countries and therefore the use 
of such measures was not possible. For example, different measures are used with 
variation occurring between companies as to whether or not contractors are included 
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in statistical reporting. Within the large Australian companies on which this research 
is focused, it is also apparent that due to the voluntary nature of safety reporting not 
all companies report on safety (Prior, 2009; 2010). Because of the inconsistent nature 
of safety reporting a limitation of this study has been the inability to compare the 
findings of Study 1 with any independent measure of the safety performance of the 
sample. 
Fifth, safety leadership behaviours are very personal to individual leaders. That 
is, some leaders appear to demonstrate a strong passion and enthusiasm for safety 
whereas others may have a different focus. In adopting a longitudinal approach to 
Study 1, the relationship between public disclosures over a ten-year period has not 
been correlated with any changes in senior leaders of each of the sample companies. 
Similar to the previous limitation, Study 2 was an element in the research design to 
attempt to overcome this limitation by understanding at a point in time the influence 
the safety leadership behaviours of senior leaders may have on the organisation. 
6.7 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research study has raised the opportunity for a number of new avenues of 
research. First, while the current focus has been on ASX200 companies, additional 
research could be undertaken with smaller, unlisted organisations. Smaller 
companies may not have the same level of resources and funding available to 
dedicate to internal safety management and therefore the safety leadership activities 
and attitudes of board members and senior executives in such environments could 
warrant further exploration. Second, this research project has focused on Australian 
companies only. Future research may consider a comparison between the safety 
leadership of board members and senior executives in Australia as compared with 
other countries.  
Third, the category of reputation was the lowest of all categories to be 
disclosed in Study 1 with only 5% of companies making such a disclosure by 2011. 
The reason reputation was included as a category is that from a strategic perspective, 
safety is seen by some organisations as a determinant of firm status - specifically 
corporate image and identity (Smallman & John, 2001). While only being disclosed 
in relatively small numbers, the trend since 2001 shows that disclosures are 
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increasing and this may be an area for future study to understand whether corporate 
reputation does drive senior executive attention on workplace safety.  
Fourth, the findings from this research also suggest that safety leadership will 
be applicable to senior leaders who work both inside and outside the organisation, for 
example, between members of a board who are essentially part-time, non-executives 
and senior executives who work inside the business every day. This finding may 
warrant further research to understand the relative importance of different criteria of 
safety leadership to board members and senior executives. 
Fifth, given the increase in remuneration category disclosures from 7% of 
companies in 2001 to 53% of companies in 2011, this research has extended 
knowledge of the extent of companies that include safety performance within their 
remuneration arrangements for CEOs and senior executives. Given the focus on the 
role of senior executives and the board in the aftermath of major safety accidents, 
and the relevance of agency and stewardship theory, the impact of linking safety 
outcomes with remuneration may be an area for future research.  
6.8 CONCLUSION 
This research study has sought to examine the role of board members and 
senior executives, previously described as a “neglected species” (Flin & Yule, 2004; 
p. ii48), with respect to safety leadership and safety governance. Chapter 1 
introduced the intersection of three fields of research to be considered by this 
research study including leadership theory, corporate governance and workplace 
safety.  Chapter 2 conducted a review of the literature in each of these three fields 
and found a number of gaps warranting attention. These included expanding theory 
through the development of four defined criteria of safety leadership – vision, 
personal commitment, decision-making and transparency – and applying these 
criteria to senior leaders. A further gap was identified during the application of 
agency and stewardship theory in helping to explain a board’s approach to workplace 
safety in the review of corporate governance literature.  In addition, little research 
was identified in terms of public disclosures of safety-related activities and how such 
disclosures may reflect a company’s internal focus on safety. Finally, a review of the 
evolution of safety management and the focus by industry on the role of senior 
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leaders in terms of safety highlighted a gap in research literature with respect to 
safety governance. 
Chapter 3 outlined the qualitative research design used in this research. Two 
distinct studies were undertaken which together provided analysis of safety 
leadership and safety governance. Study 1 involved a documentary analysis of 
annual reports and CSR reports of 76 companies. Study 2 involved case studies with 
two companies from the Study 1 sample. Qualitative research was used throughout 
the research to examine companies and individuals in their natural world. Detailed 
results from Study 1 were presented in Chapter 4 followed by results from Study 2 
presented in Chapter 5. All findings were then summarised and discussed in Chapter 
6. 
The final chapter of this research study discussed a number of findings in 
addressing the three research questions. Research question 1 demonstrated that the 
four identified safety leadership criteria could be applied to written communications 
in the form of annual reports and CSR reports. Safety leadership was also extended 
in addressing research question 1 through identifying transparency as a fourth 
criterion of safety leadership. Research question 1 also identified that material 
disclosed in annual reports tended to reflect tangible, structural information such as 
statistics, documents and systems, rather than more intangible issues such as 
leadership and culture, and this was further confirmed in interviews conducted in 
Study 2.  
Research question 2 explored the extent to which there is a high degree of 
congruency between the level of focus safety receives within an organisation and the 
resulting public disclosures made about safety activities.  FinanceCo had a low focus 
on safety internally and had a low level of public disclosures of safety-related 
activities. Similarly, EnergyCo had a high level of focus on safety internally and a 
correspondingly high level of public disclosures of safety-related activities. The 
results were considered in light of the theory of organisational attention (Simon, 
1947) and the attentional perspective of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). The findings from 
research question 2 also provided further evidence to suggest that there is an 
evolution of maturity for organisations with respect to workplace safety (Smallman 
& John, 2001).  
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Research question 3 provided further contributions to safety leadership by 
understanding the extent to which the four safety leadership criteria were evident in 
the views of board members and senior executives. Safety leadership as defined in 
this research in the context of workplace safety was found to be applicable to senior 
leaders, offering a valuable extension to existing theory. The conceptualisations of 
the board role proposed by Nicholson and Newton (2010) were confirmed in terms of 
their applicability to the issue of workplace safety.  
It is anticipated that practical contributions that may result from this research 
study include providing industry with a definition of safety governance and a 
framework for safety governance for use by boards. This practical contribution is 
expected to assist boards in understanding the role they play, beyond compliance 
with relevant legislation, to the safety outcomes of the organisations they govern.  
In conclusion the work undertaken through this research project has provided a 
much deeper analysis and understanding of the role of boards and senior executives 
in safety leadership. Workplace safety continues to be a challenge in modern 
organisations, despite the significant engineering and technological advances of the 
past century. While lives continue to be lost at work, senior leaders will attempt to 
consider ways to reduce the level of harm on employees and this research has 
attempted to assist in this regard. Knowledge of the importance of safety leadership 
at all levels of an organisation can assist senior leaders with understanding the role 
that their attention on the issue can play as well as the impact that their own personal 
commitment to safety may have on others. In addition, safety leadership has been 
shown to be equally applicable to words and actions hopefully providing 
opportunities for senior leaders to enhance their approaches to improve safety 
performance.  
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 	  
Introductory question 
Can you please tell me about your role and responsibilities and how long you have been 
involved with the organisation?  
Substantive questions 
1 What is your impression of how safety of employees is treated within the 
organisation? 
2 How involved do you think the board is around safety? 
3 Do you think the board has any role in what you see as the culture of the organisation? 
Thinking specifically about safety, do you think the board has a role in influencing 
safety culture? 
4 How do you think the board responds to safety issues within the business? 
5 Do you think the organisation has a clear vision in regards to safety? 
6 Have you seen leaders within the organisation demonstrate a personal commitment to 
safety? 
7 From your perspective, how do you think the board is kept informed about safety 
issues in order to assist with their decision-making? 
8 How transparent do you think the senior leaders of this organisation are around safety 
issues? 
9 Overall, how do you think the board can influence safety outcomes of an organisation? 
10 In terms of your annual reports, what drives your decision-making process on what to 
disclose, or not disclose, in relation to safety? 
11 Do you see a role for safety performance being linked to remuneration for senior 
executives? 
12 Do you think your shareholders, or other stakeholders, are interested in the safety of 
employees? 
 
